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Page 1 of 10 
Seco ial District Court- Nez Perce User: DEANNA 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0002219 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, etal. 
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, City Of Lewiston, Lowell J Cutshaw 
Date Code User Judge 
10/22/2009 NCOC KATHY New Case Filed-Other Claims Carl B. Kerrick 
ATTR KATHY Plaintiff: Block, John Attorney Retained Ronald J Carl B. Kerrick 
Landeck 
KATHY Filing: A -All initial civil case filings of any type not Carl B. Kerrick 
listed in categories B-H, or the other A listings 
below Paid by: Landeck, Ronald J (attorney for 
Block, John) Receipt number: 0344213 Dated: 
10/22/2009 Amount: $88.00 (Check) For: Block, 
John (plaintiff) 
COMP KATHY Complaint Filed Carl B. Kerrick 
FSUM KATHY Summons Filed/Jack Streibick Carl B. Kerrick 
FSUM KATHY Summons Filed/City of Lewiston Carl B. Kerrick 
FSUM KATHY Summons Filed/Lowell J Cutshaw Carl B. Kerrick 
11/10/2009 KATHY Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Carl B. Kerrick 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Clements et al Receipt number: 0345107 Dated: 
11/10/2009 Amount: $18.00 (Check) 
12/7/2009 JENNY Filing: 11 - Initial Appearance by persons other Carl B. Kerrick 
than the plaintiff or petitioner Paid by: Cantril! 
Skinner Sullivan & King Receipt number: 
0346525 Dated: 12/8/2009 Amount: $58.00 
(Check) For: Streibick, Jack Joseph (defendant) 
NOAP JENNY Notice Of Appearance Carl B. Kerrick 
ATTR JENNY Defendant: Streibick, Jack Joseph Attorney Carl B. Kerrick 
Retained Clinton 0. Casey 
12/10/2009 NTSV JENNY Notice Of Service - plf Carl B. Kerrick 
MSOS JENNY Motion For Service Outside The State Carl B. Kerrick 
osos JENNY Order For Service Outside The State Carl B. Kerrick 
FSUM JENNY Out-of-State Summons Filed Carl B. Kerrick 
12/11/2009 ACSV JENNY Acceptance Of Service/Jack Streibick Carl B. Kerrick 
12/16/2009 AFSV JENNY Affidavit Of Service - City of Lewiston served Carl B. Kerrick 
12/9/09 
12/30/2009 PRSV JENNY Proof Of Service of Process Carl B. Kerrick 
NOAP JENNY Notice Of Appearance Carl B. Kerrick 
ATTR JENNY Defendant: City Of Lewiston Attorney Retained Carl B. Kerrick 
Don L Roberts 
ATTR JENNY Defendant: Cutshaw, Lowell J Attorney Retained Carl B. Kerrick 
Don L Roberts 
1/19/2010 NOTC JENNY Notice of Association of Counsel Carl B. Kerrick 
1/22/2010 ANSW JENNY Answer (Streibick) Carl B. Kerrick 
2/3/2010 ANSW JENNY Answer and Demand for Jury Trial (Julian) Carl B. Kerrick 
~~STER e.JINN't:TIONS Notice Of Service - def Carl B. Kerrick 
2/11/2010 NTSV JENNY Notice Of Service - def Carl B. Kerrick 
Date: 3/27/2012 ial District Court~ Nez Perce Cou User: DEANNA 
Time: 01:26 PM ROA Report 
Page 2 of 10 Case: CV-2009-0002219 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, etal. 
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, City Of Lewiston, Lowell J Cutshaw 
Date Code User Judge 
4/30/2010 NTSV JENNY Notice Of Service - plf Carl B. Kerrick 
5/13/2010 NTSV JENNY Notice Of Service - def Carl B. Kerrick 
5/24/2010 MTSJ JENNY Motion for Summary Judgment Carl B. Kerrick 
MEMO JENNY Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Carl B. Kerrick 
Judgment 
MISC JENNY Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Carl B. Kerrick 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD JENNY Affidavit of Stephen Adams in Support of Motion Carl B. Kerrick 
for Summary Judgment 
NTHR JENNY Notice Of Telephonic Hearing Carl B. Kerrick 
HRSC JENNY Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Motion Hearing Carl B. Kerrick 
07/27/2010 10:00 AM) 
6/3/2010 NTSV JENNY Notice Of Service - def Carl B. Kerrick 
6/21/2010 NTSV JENNY Notice Of Service - plf Carl B. Kerrick 
NTSV JENNY Notice Of Service - plf Carl B. Kerrick 
MISC JENNY Subpoena Duces Tecum (Custodian of Records Carl B. Kerrick 
of USKH Inc.) 
AFSV JENNY Affidavit Of Service Carl B. Kerrick 
MISC JENNY Subpoena Duces Tecum (Custodian of Records Carl B. Kerrick 
of Allwest Testing & Engineering) 
AFSV JENNY Affidavit Of Service Carl B. Kerrick 
MISC JENNY Subpoena Duces Tecum (Custodian of Records Carl B. Kerrick 
of Strata Engineering) 
AFSV JENNY Affidavit Of Service Carl B. Kerrick 
MISC JENNY Subpoena Duces Tecum (Custodian of Records Carl B. Kerrick 
of Keltic Engineering, Inc.) 
AFSV JENNY Affidavit Of Service Carl B. Kerrick 
6/23/2010 AFFD JENNY Supplemental Affidavit of Stephen Adams in Carl B. Kerrick 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
AFFD JENNY Affidavit of Travis Wambeke Carl B. Kerrick 
7/13/2010 MEMO JENNY Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Carl B. Kerrick 
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment 
AFFD JENNY Affidavit of John Block Carl B. Kerrick 
AFFD JENNY Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl Carl B. Kerrick 
7/16/2010 MISC JENNY Reply in Support of Motion for Summary Carl B. Kerrick 
Judgment 
REGISTER OF ACTIONS 
Date: 3/27/2012 
Time: 01:26 PM 
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Seco udicial District Court- Nez Perce Cou 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0002219 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, etal. 
User: DEANNA 
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, City Of Lewiston, Lowell J Cutshaw 
Date Code User Judge 
7/27/2010 MINE JENNY Minute Entry Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing type: Motion for Summary Judgment 
Hearing date: 7/27/2010 
Time: 10:06 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: JENNY 
Tape Number: CTRM#1 
*RON LANDECK FOR BLOCK 
*CLINTON CASEY FOR STREIBICK 
*STEPHEN ADAMS FOR CITY OF LEWISTON & 
CUTSHAW 
ADVS JENNY Hearing result for Telephonic Motion Hearing held Carl B. Kerrick 
on 07/27/2010 10:00 AM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement Motion for Summary Judgment 
DCHH JENNY District Court Hearing Held Carl B. Kerrick 
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
9/14/2010 DEOP JENNY Memorandum Opinion and Order on Motion for Carl B. Kerrick 
Summary Judgment 
9/17/2010 NDEP JENNY Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum of John Block Carl B. Kerrick 
9/23/2010 NTSV JENNY Notice Of Service - plf Carl B. Kerrick 
9/28/2010 NTSV JENNY Notice Of Service - plf Carl B. Kerrick 
10/21/2010 NTSV JENNY Notice Of Service - def Carl B. Kerrick 
11/1/2010 ROTS JENNY Request For Trial Setting - plf Carl B. Kerrick 
11/3/2010 RRTS JENNY Response To Request For Trial Setting - def Carl B. Kerrick 
11/8/2010 NDEP JENNY Notice Of Continued Deposition Duces Tecum of Carl B. Kerrick 
John Block 
RRTS JENNY Defendant Streibick's Response To Plaintiff's Carl B. Kerrick 
Request For Trial Setting 
11/10/2010 NTSV JENNY Notice Of Service - plf Carl B. Kerrick 
11/23/2010 OPSC JENNY Order For Telephonic Scheduling Conference Carl B. Kerrick 
HRSC JENNY Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Scheduling Carl B. Kerrick 
Conference 12/07/2010 10:45 AM) 
12/7/2010 HRHD JENNY Hearing result for Telephonic Scheduling Carl B. Kerrick 
Conference held on 12/07/2010 10:45 AM: 
Hearing Held 
OSTP JENNY Order Setting Trial & Pre-trial Conference Carl B. Kerrick 
HRSC JENNY Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference Carl B. Kerrick 
09/16/2011 01:30PM) 
HRSC JENNY Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 09/26/2011 09:00 Carl B. Kerrick 
AM) 
12/29/2010 NTSV JENNY Notice Of Service - plf Carl B. Kerrick 
2/4/2011 ~f@JSTER ~i4f:TIONS Notice Of Service - def Carl B. Kerrick 
Date: 3/27/2012 
Time: 01:26PM 
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Seco udicial District Court- Nez Perce Cou 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2009-0002219 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, etal. 
User: DEANNA 
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, City Of Lewiston, Lowell J Cutshaw 
Date Code User Judge 
2/24/2011 NDEP JENNY Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum Carl B. Kerrick 
-Travis Wambeke 
NDEP JENNY Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum- Scott Carl B. Kerrick 
Neumann 
3/4/2011 MISC JENNY Plaintiffs Expert Witness Disclosures Carl B. Kerrick 
3/9/2011 NTSV JENNY Notice Of Service - plf Carl B. Kerrick 
3/10/2011 NDEP JENNY Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Carl B. Kerrick 
Tecum - Scott Neumann 
NDEP JENNY Amended Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Carl B. Kerrick 
Tecum -Travis Wambeke 
3/14/2011 NDEP JENNY Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum- Carl B. Kerrick 
Warren Watts 
NDEP JENNY Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum- Carl B. Kerrick 
Gary Stone 
NDEP JENNY Notice Of Continued Deposition Duces Tecum of Carl B. Kerrick 
John Block 
NDEP JENNY Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum- John Carl B. Kerrick 
Swift 
NDEP JENNY Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum- Eric Carl B. Kerrick 
Hasenoehrl 
4/4/2011 RTSV JENNY Return Of Service- subpoena duces tecum Carl B. Kerrick 
served 3/30/11 
4/18/2011 NTSV JENNY Notice Of Service - def Carl B. Kerrick 
4/21/2011 NDEP JENNY Notice Of Taking Deposition Duces Tecum- Carl B. Kerrick 
Terry Rudd 
NDEP JENNY Notice Of Continued Deposition Duces Tecum of Carl B. Kerrick 
John Block 
NDEP JENNY Notice Of Continued Deposition Duces Tecum Carl B. Kerrick 
Eric Hasenoehrl 
STIP JENNY Stipulation to Extend Defendants' Discosure of Carl B. Kerrick 
Expert Witnesses 
4/25/2011 ORDR JENNY Order Extending Defendants' Disclosure of Expert Carl B. Kerrick 
Witnesses 
5/11/2011 NTSV JENNY Notice Of Service - def Carl B. Kerrick 
5/16/2011 NDEP JENNY Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum- Terry Rudd Carl B. Kerrick 
5/19/2011 STIP JENNY Stipulation for Extension of Time for Defendants Carl B. Kerrick 
to Disclose Their Damage Expert Reports 
ORDR JENNY Order Extending Defendants' Disclosure of Carl B. Kerrick 
Damage Expert Reports 
6/3/2011 DCWT JENNY Defendant City of Lewiston and Lowell Cutshaw's Carl B. Kerrick 
Expert Witness Disclosure 
6/7/2011 NTSV JENNY Notice Of Service - def Carl B. Kerrick 
~ISTER ~~'CTIONS Defendant Streibick's Liability Expert Witness Carl B. Kerrick 
Disclosure 
Date: 3/27/2012 
Time: 01:26 PM 
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Seco udicial District Court - Nez Perce Cou 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0002219 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, etal. 
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, City Of Lewiston, Lowell J Cutshaw 
Date Code User 
6/10/2011 MTSJ JENNY Motion for Summary Judgment 
MEMO JENNY Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
AFSP JENNY Affidavit of Daniel J. Skinner In Support of 
Summary Judgment 
NTHR JENNY Notice Of Hearing 
HRSC JENNY Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary 
Judgment 07/26/2011 09:00AM) 
AFFD JENNY Affidavit of David Vanderostyne in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
6/21/2011 NTSV JENNY Notice Of Service- plf 
NTSV JENNY Notice Of Service - def 
6/27/2011 DCWT JENNY Supplemental Expert Witness Disclosure 
DCWT JENNY Defendant Streibick's Damage Expert Witness 
Disclosure 
6/28/2011 MTSJ JENNY Motion for Summary Judgment 
MEMO JENNY Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
MISC JENNY Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD JENNY Supplemental Affidavit of Stephen Adams in 
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
NTHR JENNY Notice Of Hearing 
HRSC JENNY Hearing Scheduled (Motion for Summary 
Judgment 07/26/2011 09:00AM) Def City of 
Lewiston and Cutshaw 
MEMO JENNY Supplemental Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
User: DEANNA 
Judge 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
AFFD JENNY Second Affidavit of Daniel J. Skinner in Support of Carl B. Kerrick 
Summary Judgment 
AFFD JENNY Affidavit of Brad Dodge Carl B. Kerrick 
AFFD JENNY Affidavit of Ken Morrison Carl B. Kerrick 
6/29/2011 AFFD JENNY Affidavit of Kari Ravencroft in Support of Carl B. Kerrick 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment 
7/1/2011 MISC JENNY Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application or, Alternatively, Carl B. Kerrick 
Motion to Continue Hearing on Defendants' 
Pending Motions for Summary Judgment and 
Brief 
AFFD JENNY Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck in Support of Carl B. Kerrick 
Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application or, Alternatively, 
Motion to Continue Hearing on Defendants' 
Pending Motions for Summary Judgment 
~STER efff'JJ\ICTIONS Plaintiffs Ex Parte Application or, Alternatively, Carl B. Kerrick 
Motion to Shorten Time for Hearing 
Date: 3/27/2012 
Time: 01:26PM 
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Seco icial District Court - Nez Perce Cou User: DEANNA 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0002219 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, etal. 
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, City Of Lewiston, Lowell J Cutshaw 
Date Code User Judge 
7/1/2011 NTHR JENNY Notice Of Hearing on Plaintiffs Motion to Shorten Carl B. Kerrick 
Time for Hearing and Plaintiffs Motion to 
Continue Hearing 
HRSC JENNY Hearing Scheduled (Hearing on Motions Carl B. Kerrick 
07/05/2011 10:00 AM) 
7/5/2011 MINE JENNY Minute Entry Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing type: Mtn to Continue Hearing 
Hearing date: 7/5/2011 
Time: 10:05 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: JENNY 
Tape Number: CTRM #1 
RON LANDECK FOR PLAINTIFF 
DAN SKINNER FOR STREIBICK 
STEPHEN ADAMS FOR CITY OF 
LEW/CUTSHAW 
ORDR TERESA Order to Continue Hearing on Defendants' Carl B. Kerrick 
Pending Motions for Summary Judgment 
CONT TERESA Continued (Motion for Summary Judgment Carl B. Kerrick 
08/09/2011 10:30 AM) Streibick 
CONT TERESA Continued (Motion for Summary Judgment Carl B. Kerrick 
08/09/2011 10:30 AM) Def City of Lewiston and 
Cutshaw 
GRNT JENNY Hearing result for Hearing on Motions scheduled Carl B. Kerrick 
on 07/05/2011 10:00 AM: Motion Granted 
DCHH JENNY District Court Hearing Held Carl B. Kerrick 
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
7/7/2011 JENNY Miscellaneous Payment: For Making Copy Of Any Carl B. Kerrick 
File Or Record By The Clerk, Per Page Paid by: 
Clements Brown & McNichols Receipt number: 
0011851 Dated: 7/7/2011 Amount: $7.00 
(Check) 
7/26/2011 NTSV JENNY Notice Of Service - def Carl B. Kerrick 
MEMO JENNY Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to Carl B. Kerrick 
Defendant City's Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
AFFD JENNY Second Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck in Support Carl B. Kerrick 
of Plaintiffs Objections to Defendant City's Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
AFFD JENNY Second Affidavit of John Block Carl B. Kerrick 
AFFD JENNY Second Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl Carl B. Kerrick 
AFFD JENNY Affidavit of John R. ("Hank") Swift Carl B. Kerrick 
7/29/2011 NOTC JENNY Notice of Vacating Defendant Streibick's Motion Carl B. Kerrick 
REGISTER OF ACTIONS for Summary Judgment Hearing Only 
Date: 3/27/2012 
Time: 01:26 PM 
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udicial District Court - Nez Perce Cou 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2009-0002219 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, etal. 
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, City Of Lewiston, Lowell J Cutshaw 
Date Code User 
7/29/2011 HRVC JENNY Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment 
scheduled on 08/09/2011 10:30 AM: Hearing 
Vacated Streibick 
8/1/2011 MOTN JENNY Motion to Strike Expert Testimony and/or Vacate 
Trial 
MOTN JENNY Motion to Shorten Time 
AFFD JENNY Affidavit of Stephen Adams in Support of Motion 
to Strike and/or Vacate and Motion to Shorten 
Time 
NTHR JENNY Notice Of Hearing 
HRSC JENNY Hearing Scheduled (Hearing on Motions 
08/09/2011 10:30 AM) Motion to Strike and/or 
Vacate Trial 
MOTN JENNY Motion to Strike Portions of Second Affidavit of 
John Block, Second Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl, 
Affidavit of John R. "Hank" Swift, and Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant City's 
Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
AFFD JENNY Affidavit of Stephen Adams in Support of Motion 
to Strike 
MOTN JENNY Motion to Shorten Time 
NTHR JENNY Notice Of Hearing 
HRSC JENNY Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 08/09/2011 10:30 
AM) Motion to Strike 
8/3/2011 MISC JENNY Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
8/5/2011 STIP JENNY Stipulation for Dismissal with Prejudice of 
Defendant Jack J. Streibick, a Single man and as 
Personal Representative of the Estate of Maureen 
F. Streibick 
8/8/2011 NTSV JENNY Notice Of Service 
User: DEANNA 
Judge 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
ORDR JENNY Order of Dismissal of Defendant Jack J. Streibick, Carl B. Kerrick 
A Single Man and As Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick 
CD IS JENNY Civil Disposition entered for: Streibick, Jack Carl B. Kerrick 
Joseph, Defendant; Block, John, Plaintiff. Filing 
date: 8/8/2011 
MISC JENNY Plaintiffs Response to City's Motion to Strike Carl B. Kerrick 
Expert Testimony and/or Vacate Trial and To 
City's Motion to Strike portions of Affidavits and 
Plaintiffs Memorandum 
AFFD JENNY Third Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck in Support of Carl B. Kerrick 
Response to City's Motion to Strike Expert 
Testimony and/or Vacate Trial and To City's 
Motion to Strike Portions of Affidavits 
ElE(llffiTER GHNN~TIONS Plaintiffs First Supplemental Expert Witness Carl B. Kerrick 
Disclosure 
Date: 3/27/2012 
Time: 01 :26 PM 
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ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0002219 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, etal. 
User: DEANNA 











































Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on 
08/09/2011 10:30 AM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement Motion to Strike 
Judge 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing result for Hearing on Motions scheduled Carl B. Kerrick 
on 08/09/201110:30 AM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement Motion to Strike and/or Vacate Trial 
Hearing result for Motion for Summary Judgment Carl B. Kerrick 
scheduled on 08/09/2011 10:30 AM: Case 
Taken Under Advisement Def City of Lewiston 
and Cutshaw 
District Court Hearing Held Carl B. Kerrick 
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Carl B. Kerrick 
09/26/2011 09:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled Carl B. Kerrick 
on 09/16/2011 01:30PM: Hearing Vacated 
Amended Order Setting Trial & Pre-trial 
Conference 
Hearing Scheduled (Pretrial Conference 
01/27/2012 10:00 AM) 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing Scheduled (Jury Trial 02/06/2012 09:00 Carl B. Kerrick 
AM) 
Minute Entry Carl B. Kerrick 
Hearing type: Mtn for Summary Judgment!Mtn to 
Strike 
Hearing date: 8/9/2011 
Time: 11:04 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: JENNY 
Tape Number: CTRM #1 
RON LANDECK FOR PLAINTIFF 
BRIAN JULIAN FOR DEF CITY OF LEW & 
STREIBICK 
Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum (John "Hank" Carl B. Kerrick 
Swift) 
Notice of Citation of Additional Authority Carl B. Kerrick 
Stipulation to Extend Defendants' Expert Witness Carl B. Kerrick 
Disclosures 
Order Extending Defendants' Expert Witness 
Disclosures 
Amended Notice Of Deposition Duces Tecum 
(John " Hank" Swift) 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
DEOP JENNY Memorandum Opinion and Order on Second 
Motion for Summary Judgment 
REGISTER OF ACTIONS 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Date: 3/27/2012 
Time: 01:26PM 
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Seco icial District Court - Nez Perce Cou User: DEANNA 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2009-0002219 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, etal. 
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, City Of Lewiston, Lowell J Cutshaw 
Date Code User Judge 
10/14/2011 MISC JENNY **The Defendant City of Lewiston and Lowell J. Carl B. Kerrick 
Cutshaw's Second Motion for Summary 
Judgment is hereby GRANTED.** 
HRVC JENNY Hearing result for Pretrial Conference scheduled Carl B. Kerrick 
on 01/27/2012 10:00 AM: Hearing Vacated 
HRVC JENNY Hearing result for Jury Trial scheduled on Carl B. Kerrick 
02/06/2012 09:00AM: Hearing Vacated 
CD IS JENNY Civil Disposition entered for: City Of Lewiston, Carl B. Kerrick 
Defendant; Cutshaw, Lowell J, Defendant; Block, 
John, Plaintiff. Filing date: 10/14/2011 
STAT JENNY Case Status Changed: Closed Carl B. Kerrick 
10/28/2011 MOTN JENNY Motion for Reconsideration of Memorandum Carl B. Kerrick 
Opinion and Order on Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
MEMO JENNY Memorandum in Support of Motion for Carl B. Kerrick 
Reconsideration of Memorndum Opinion and 
Order on Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
AFSP JENNY Fourth Affidavit of Ronald J. Landeck in Support Carl B. Kerrick 
of Plaintiffs Motion to Reconsider Memorandum 
Opinion and Order on Second Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
MEMC JENNY Defendant's Memorandum Of Costs - fax filed Carl B. Kerrick 
AFSP JENNY Affidavit Of Stephen Adams In Support of Carl B. Kerrick 
Defendants' Memorandum of Costs - fax filed 
10/31/2011 MEMC JENNY Defendant's Memorandum Of Costs -original Carl B. Kerrick 
AFSP JENNY Affidavit Of Stephen Adams In Support of Carl B. Kerrick 
Defendants' Memorandum of Costs - original 
11/1/2011 MEMO JENNY Amended Memorandum in Support of Motion for Carl B. Kerrick 
Reconsideration of Memorandum Opinion and 
Order on Second Motion for Summary Judgment 
11/4/2011 NTHR JENNY Notice Of Hearing Carl B. Kerrick 
HRSC JENNY Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 11/29/2011 09:00 Carl B. Kerrick 
AM) Motion for Reconsideration 
STAT JENNY Case Status Changed: Closed pending clerk Carl B. Kerrick 
action 
11/10/2011 MISC JENNY Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants' Memorandum Carl B. Kerrick 
of Costs and Plaintiffs Motion to Disallow 
11/14/2011 NTHR JENNY Notice Of Telephonic Hearing Carl B. Kerrick 
HRSC JENNY Hearing Scheduled (Hearing 11/29/2011 10:00 Carl B. Kerrick 
AM) Motion for Costs 
11/18/2011 MISC JENNY Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration Carl B. Kerrick 
MISC JENNY Reply in Support of Defendants' Memorandum of Carl B. Kerrick 
Costs 
11/25/2011 It~ffiSTER ()}N~CTIONS Reply Brief in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Carl B. Kerrick Reconsideration 
Date: 3/27/2012 
Time: 01 :26 PM 
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icial District Court - Nez Perce Cou 
ROAReport 
Case: CV-2009-0002219 Current Judge: Carl B. Kerrick 
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, etal. 
John Gustav Block vs. Jack Joseph Streibick, City Of Lewiston, Lowell J Cutshaw 
Date Code User 
11/29/2011 ADVS JENNY Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on 
11/29/2011 09:00AM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement Motion for Costs 
ADVS JENNY Hearing result for Hearing scheduled on 
11/29/2011 09:00AM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement Motion for Reconsideration 
DCHH JENNY District Court Hearing Held 
Court Reporter: Nancy Towler 
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing 
estimated: less than 100 pages 
MINE JENNY Minute Entry 
Hearing type: Mtn for Reconsideration/Mtn for 
Costs 
Hearing date: 11/29/2011 
Time: 9:51 am 
Courtroom: 
Court reporter: Nancy Towler 
Minutes Clerk: JENNY 
Tape Number: CTRM #1 
RON LANDECK FOR PLAINTIFF 
STEPHEN ADAMS FOR DEFENDANT 
1/4/2012 DEOP JENNY Memorandum Opinion and Order on Plaintiffs 
Motion for Reconsideration and Defendants' 
Memorandum of Costs 
CD IS JENNY Civil Disposition entered for: City Of Lewiston, 
Defendant; Cutshaw, Lowell J, Defendant; Block, 
John Gustav, Plaintiff. Filing date: 1/4/2012 
2/1/2012 JDMT JENNY Judgment 
STAT JENNY Case Status Changed: Closed 
2/9/2012 APSC DEANNA Appealed To The Supreme Court 
NTAP DEANNA Notice Of Appeal 
User: DEANNA 
Judge 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
Carl B. Kerrick 
DEANNA Filing: L4 - Appeal, Civil appeal or cross-appeal to Carl B. Kerrick 
Supreme Court Paid by: Landeck, Ronald J 
(attorney for Block, John Gustav) Receipt 
number: 0002126 Dated: 2/9/2012 Amount: 
$101.00 (Check) For: Block, John Gustav 
(plaintiff) 
BNDC DEANNA Bond Posted- Cash (Receipt 2127 Dated Carl B. Kerrick 
2/9/2012 for 290.00) 
BONG DEANNA Condition of Bond Estimate Reporters Transcript Carl B. Kerrick 
BNDC DEANNA Bond Posted - Cash (Receipt 2128 Dated Carl B. Kerrick 
2/9/2012 for 1 00.00) 
BONG DEANNA Condition of Bond Estimate Clerk's Record Carl B. Kerrick 
2/27/2012 SCRT DEANNA Supreme Court Receipt- Clerk's Record and Carl B. Kerrick 
Reporter's Transcript must be filed at the SC by 
April 25, 2012 
3/13/2012 ~STER f))(fAAfJ.AIONS Supreme Court Receipt- Clerk's Certificate filed Carl B. Kerrick 
at the SC 
RONALD J. LANDECK 
JSB No. 3001 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
693 Styner Avenue 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
FILED 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 









JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK ) 
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of the ) 
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased, ) 
CITY OF LEWISTON, a municipal corporation ) 
of the State of Idaho, and its employee, LOWELL ) 
J. CUTSHAW, CityofLewiston Engineer, and ) 







Fee Categories (I)(A) $88.00 
Plaintiff John G. Block, for causes of action against Defendants, complains and alleges as 
follows: 
I. PARTIES 
1. Plaintiff John G. Block ("Block" or "Plaintiff') is a single man. 
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2. Defendant Jack J. Streibick ("Streibick"), upon information and belief, is a single 
man. 
3. Defendant Jack J. Streibick, upon information and belief, is or was the personal 
representative ("Personal Representative") of the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased (the 
"Maureen Streibick Estate"). 
4. Defendant City of Lewiston ("City of Lewiston") is a municipal corporation of the 
State ofldaho. 
5. Defendant Lowell J. Cutshaw ("Cutshaw") was an employee of the City of 
Lewiston and its City Engineer. 
6. DOES I - 20 are unknown employees, agents, or servants of City of Lewiston 
("Others"). 
II. JURISDICTION AND VENUE 
7. This action asserts claims in tort and contract based upon conduct and occurrences 
in Nez Perce County, Idaho and affecting real property located in Nez Perce County, Idaho. All 
claims in this action are within the personal jurisdiction and subject matter jurisdiction of this 
Court. 
8. The amount in controversy in this Complaint exceeds the jurisdiction ofthe 
Magistrate Division. 
9. None of the Defendants are entitled to immunity under Idaho law in regard to 
Plaintiff's causes of action set forth in this Complaint. 
10. Any notice required by law prior to commencement of this action has been given by 
Plaintiff. 
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III. GENERAL STATEMENT OF FACTS 
11. On or about August 10, 2005, Block, as "Buyer," entered into a Real Estate 
Purchase And Sale Agreement ("Purchase Agreement") with Streibick and the Maureen 
Streibick Estate, represented by the Personal Representative, as "Seller," to purchase Lots 1, 2, 3 
and 4, Amended Administrative Plat of Sunset Palisades No. 8 to the City of Lewiston, 
according to the recorded plat thereof, records of Nez Perce County, Idaho (individually "Lot 1," 
"Lot 2," "Lot 3" and "Lot 4," respectively, and collectively the "Property"). On or about 
December 2, 2005, Streibick and the Maureen Streibick Estate, represented by the Personal 
Representative, conveyed the Property to Block by Warranty Deed recorded in the records of 
Nez Perce County, Idaho (the "Streibick Deed"). On information and belief, at all times 
relevant, Streibick and his wife, Maureen F. Streibick, (i) owned the Property until Maureen F. 
Streibick's death whereupon the Estate of Maureen Streibick succeeded to Maureen F. 
Streibick's interests therein until the Property was sold to Block and (ii) had developed the 
Property by constructing the required infrastructure and platting the Property. 
12. At all times relevant, Streibick was a real estate developer engaging, in part, in the 
platting and development of subdivisions and the sale of residential lots to building contractors 
for construction of residential dwellings. 
13. Prior to Block's purchase of the Property on December 2, 2005, Block had 
purchased other residential building lots from Streibick located in Lewiston, Idaho, that had been 
platted and developed by Streibick and upon which Block had thereafter constructed residences. 
14. On or about early 2006, Block made application to the City of Lewiston to 
resubdivide Lot 4 into three lots and such resubdivision application was reviewed and approved 
by Cutshaw and/or Others and by the City of Lewiston as Lot 1, Lot 2 and Lot 3, Administrative 
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Plat of Canyon Greens, City of Lewiston, a resubdivision of Lot 4 of Amended Administrative 
Plat of Sunset Palisades No. 8, and such lots are commonly known and addressed, respectively, 
as 155 Marine View Drive, Lewiston, Idaho ("155"), 159 Marine View Drive, Lewiston, Idaho 
("159") and 153 Marine View Drive, Lewiston, Idaho ("153") ("collectively "Canyon Greens"). 
15. In 2006, Block made application to the City of Lewiston to resubdivide Lot 1, Lot 2 
and Lot 3 of Amended Administrative Plat of Sunset Palisades No. 8 into eight lots, and such 
resubdivision application was reviewed and approved by Cutshaw and/or Others and by the City 
of Lewiston as Lots 1 through 8 of Canyon Greens No. 2 to the City of Lewiston, a resubdivision 
of Lots 1, 2 and 3 of Amended Administrative Plat of Sunset Palisades No.8 (collectively 
"Canyon Greens No. 2"). 
16. On or about May 15, 2006, Block made application to the City ofLewiston and 
building permits were approved and issued by the City of Lewiston and/or Others to construct 
residences on 153 and 155. On or about August 22, 2006, Block made application to the City of 
Lewiston and a building permit was approved and issued by the City of Lewiston and/or Others 
to construct a residence on 159. The City of Lewiston and/or Others approved Block's request to 
construct, pursuant to plans prepared by Block's engineer, retaining walls within the area of 153, 
155 and 159 and issued building permits for and inspected and approved such construction. 
Block thereafter constructed single-family residences on 153, 155 and 159. City of Lewiston 
and/or Others issued certificates of occupancy for the residences constructed by Block on 153, 
159 and 155 on May 30, 2007, May 30, 2007 and June 12, 2008, respectively. Block then put 
the residences he constructed on 153, 159 and 155 on the market for sale. On or about April30, 
2007, Block sold and conveyed 159 to a purchaser. 
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17. Between January, 2006 and June, 2009, Block made application to the City of 
Lewiston and was issued building permits by the City of Lewiston and/or Others to construct 
residences on Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 of Canyon Greens No.2. Block has constructed 
residences on Lots 2, 4, 5 and 7 of Canyon Greens No. 2. Block is in the process of constructing 
residences on Lots 1, 3 and 6 of Canyon Greens No. 2. Block sold Lot 8 of Canyon Greens No. 
2 to a purchaser as vacant land. Block sold Lots 4 and 7 of Canyon Greens No. 2 to purchasers 
with residences constructed by Block. Block continues to own Lots 1, 2, 3, 5 and 6 of Canyon 
Greens No. 2. 
18. All residential construction by Block on 153, 155, 159 and Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 
has been done in accordance with all laws, statutes, ordinances, regulations and codes required 
by the City of Lewiston, Others and any other governmental agency having jurisdiction thereof, 
including, but not limited to, all required soil compaction testing. 
19. On or about October 23,2007, a realtor showing 153 to a prospective purchaser 
observed settling in the northwest comer of 153 and the realtor informed Block. On or about 
early November, 2007, the owner of 159 told Block that there was a crack in the basement floor 
of 159. On or about early November, 2007, Block observed settling under an exterior door of 
155. On November 13, 2007, Block consulted with professional engineers Keltic Engineering, 
Inc. and Strata Inc. Based upon professional advice from those engineers that 153, 155 and 159 
were experiencing settlement problems, Block entered into a contract on December 14, 2007 
with a contractor, Montana Helical Inc., to resolve the settlement problems by making structural 
adjustments to the structures on 153, 155 and 159 in areas where settlement had occurred by 
constructing a series ofhelical piers, and those structural adjustments were made in December, 
2007. 
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20. On or about December 14, 2007, to appease the owner's dissatisfaction with the 
condition of 159 and to be able to resolve the settlement problems to 159, Block reacquired 159 
from the owner. During the spring of 2008, Block made non-structural repairs and 
improvements to 153, 155 and 159 that were related to the settlement problems and the 
subsequent helical pier construction activity. 
21. Block rented 155 to a tenant on June 1, 2008. Block rented 153 to a tenant in July, 
2008. Block rented 159 to a tenant on December 1, 2008. 
22. In February, 2009, the tenant in 159 called Block, who was in California, and stated 
that they noticed settlement in the foundation of 159. Several weeks after that, the tenant in 153 
called Block, who was still in California, and stated that there was settlement in the driveway and 
basement area of 153. Block returned to Idaho in March, 2009, inspected 153, 155 and 159, 
observed settlement to the structures on 153, 155 and 159 and observed cracks in the surface of 
the ground within the area of 153, 155 and 159. On or about May 11, 2009, a natural gas leak 
occurred at 153. On May 12, 2009, the City of Lewiston and/or Others inspected 153, 155 and 
159 and posted notice that the residential structures on 153 and 159 were unsafe to occupy. The 
tenants of 153 and 159 vacated the premises that same day. The City of Lewiston and/or Others 
required Block to submit an abatement plan to address the unsafe conditions, and Block 
immediately prepared and submitted an abatement plan for review and approval by the City of 
Lewiston. That plan, as approved by the City of Lewiston and/or Others, required the demolition 
of 153 and 159 and structural repairs to 155. In accordance with the approved plan, Block 
demolished and removed the structures on 153 in June, 2009 and removed the main floor, 
remodeled the garage on site, although the City of Lewiston and/or Others have denied Block's 
request to provide electrical service to said garage and have determined the garage violates the 
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City of Lewiston's zoning ordinance as there is no longer a residential structure on this lot, and 
demolished and removed the remaining structures on 159 in August, 2009. Block has made 
improvements required by the City of Lewiston and/or Others to allow 155 to be occupied. 
23. In late May, 2009, Sandra E. Lee, a reporter for the Lewiston Tribune sent Block a 
copy of a May 20, 1999 Lewiston Tribune article that reported that earth movement had occurred 
in 1999 in the area of Marine View Drive in the vicinity of 153, 155 and 159. Block reviewed 
City of Lewiston records and other information he obtained regarding the development history of 
the Property and determined that (i) the City of Lewiston had issued two (2) separate permits to 
Streibick allowing Streibick in 1993, to place and grade fill in the area of 153, 155 and 159 and 
requiring Streibick to make and file daily compaction reports in regard to such fill activity, 
however, Block could not locate any such compaction reports in the City of Lewiston's records; 
(ii) in 1994, the City of Lewiston and/or Others required Streibick to obtain approval for a storm 
water drainage and detention plan for the development of the Palisades #4 subdivision, a storm 
water drainage and detention plan was submitted to the City of Lewiston by Streibick's engineers 
in October, 1994, and no detention pond was constructed as required by such plan in the 
development of the Palisades #4 subdivision; (iii) in 1999 Streibick and the City of Lewiston, 
Cutshaw and Others knew that substantial earth movement occurred within the area of 153, 155 
and 159 and the City of Lewiston memorialized this occurrence in the City of Lewiston's records 
related to Palisades #4 subdivision; (iv) upon information and belief, Streibick, between the earth 
movement in 1999 and Block's initial inspection ofthe Property in 2005, placed and graded fill 
within the area of 153, 155 and 159 that intentionally covered up any evidence of such earth 
movement; (v) upon information and belief, neither the City of Lewiston, nor Cutshaw nor 
Others required Streibick to conduct any soil stability testing or evaluation prior to Streibick's 
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filling and grading activities within the area of 153, 155 and 159 to address the earth movement 
that the City of Lewiston knew had occurred in the vicinity of 153, 155 and 159, and/or imposed 
any condition(s) of approval on any and all subdivision plats submitted by Streibick for approval 
to the City of Lewiston that related in any way to the development in the area now known as 153, 
155 and 159 including, but not limited to, the Palisades No.4 and Palisades No.8 subdivisions, 
and (vi) in 2005, the City of Lewiston and/or Others required construction of a storm water 
detention facility in the area now described as 153 as a condition of Streibick' s resubdivision of 
Block 3 of Palisades No. 4 subdivision in a newly created Sunset Palisades No. 8 subdivision; 
however, the City of Lewiston and/or Others, at Streibick's request, approved the relocation of 
that proposed detention facility from the location within the area of 153 originally shown in such 
1994 detention plan to another location within the area of 153, and Streibick constructed that 
detention facility in 2005 on that new location prior to Block's purchase ofthe Property. 
24. Neither the City of Lewiston, nor Cutshaw nor Others required Streibick at the 
time(s) he sought approvals for the Plats related to Palisades No.4 and Palisades No. 8 that the 
earth movement with 153, 155 and 159 needed to be eliminated or properly abated nor did they 
require Streibick to complete the required storm water improvements in 1994 for the Palisades 
No. 4 subdivisions. 
25. Neither the City of Lewiston nor Cutshaw nor Others advised or warned Block at 
the time(s) he sought approval for the plats of Canyon Greens and Canyon Greens No.2 and/or 
at the time of Block's application for building permits for 153, 155 and/or 159 and/or for Lots 1, 
2, 4, 5, 6 and/or 7 of Canyon Greens No.2 of the earth movement within 153, 155 and/or 159 of 
which the City of Lewiston had actual knowledge since on or about April, 1999. The City of 
Lewiston and Others did not, as a condition of such subdivision approval(s) and/or permitting, 
COMPLAINT -- 8 
require Block (i) to undertake any soil stability testing or evaluation to determine the cause or 
extent of such earth movement, other than standard soil compaction testing which Block did as 
required, to determine whether the land in the area of 153, 155 and 159 was stable enough for 
residential construction or (ii) to undertake any reasonable measures prior to constructing 
residences on 153, 155 and 159 to eliminate or properly abate such earth movement known to the 
City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others. 
26. On information and belief, approval by the City of Lewiston and/or Others of 
Streibick's construction of a detention pond in 2005 within 153 near an area where the City of 
Lewiston had knowledge of earth movement contributed to the settling and earth movement that 
occurred within 153, 155 and 159 from 2007 through 2009 as set forth above. 
27. The fair market value of all lots and/or improvements thereon owned by Block 
within the Property have been substantially diminished and/or rendered valueless as a proximate 
result of the acts and conduct of Defendants as set forth above. Block's reputation as a 
contractor and Block's ability to conduct business in the manner in which he had previously 
conducted business, including, but not limited to, his ability to procure credit, his ability to 
complete ongoing construction projects and the availability of working capital to undertake 
additional projects, his capital reserves having been exhausted on costs associated with 
abatement of the settlement and earth movement discussed above, have been substantially and 
adversely affected as a direct and proximate result of the acts and conduct of Defendants. Block 
has made reasonable efforts to mitigate his damages and losses in connection with his interests in 
this matter. 
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II. CAUSES OF ACTION 
COUNT ONE- MISREPRESENTATION 
28. Plaintiff restates and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 27 of the Complaint as if set 
forth fully herein. 
29. In connection with the transaction involving the Purchase Agreement and Streibick 
Deed (the "Transaction"), Streibick did not disclose to Block any information concerning the 
earth movement that had occurred within the area of 153, 155 and 159 in 1999, did not disclose 
to Block that Streibick had filled and graded within the area of 153, 155 and 159 between April, 
1999 and December2, 2005, and intentionally concealed all evidence of such earth movement 
and did not disclose to Block that Streibick had not taken any measures to eliminate and/or 
properly abate such earth movement and that there was a substantial risk and/or probability that 
additional earth movement would likely occur within the area of 153, 155 and 159 (collectively 
"the Defective Condition"). 
30. At all times relevant, Streibick knew of the Defective Condition and the Defective 
Condition was unknown to Block. 
31. The Defective Condition was not discoverable upon reasonable inspection by Block 
prior to July, 2009. 
32. Streibick had superior knowledge regarding the Defective Condition and Block was 
ignorant of the facts regarding the Defective Condition. Streibick dealt from a condition of 
superior knowledge in connection with the Transaction and knew that Block did not know of the 
Defective Condition. Streibick knew that Block was being misled by believing that the Property 
was suitable for residential construction. 
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33. A confidential relationship existed between Streibick and Block in regard to the 
Transaction. 
34. Streibick knew that his failure to disclose the Defective Condition might justifiably 
induce Block to purchase the Property. 
35. Streibick was under a duty to Block to exercise reasonable care to disclose the 
Defective Condition to Block. 
36. Streibick's nondisclosure of the Defective Condition constituted a material 
misrepresentation of the condition ofthe Property. 
37. Streibick intended that Block rely on the nondisclosure of the Defective Condition 
and purchase the Property in the Transaction. 
38. Block was entitled to rely upon Streibick's nondisclosure ofthe Defective 
Condition, and Block relied thereupon to Block's consequent and proximate injury and damage. 
39. Streibick's material misrepresentation and nondisclosure of the Defective Condition 
as set forth above was made and/or done in Streibick's individual capacity and in Streibick's 
fiduciary capacity as Personal Representative. 
40. Streibick is personally liable to Block in his individual capacity and in Streibick's 
fiduciary capacity as Personal Representative of the Maureen Streibick Estate for such material 
misrepresentation and nondisclosure as set forth above. 
41. Maureen Streibick Estate is liable to Block for the Personal Representative's 
material misrepresentation and nondisclosure as set forth above. 
COUNT TWO- BREACH OF AFFIRMATIVE DUTY OF DISCLOSURE 
42. Plaintiff restates and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 41 of the Complaint as if set 
forth fully herein. 
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43. Streibick, Personal Representative and Maureen Streibick Estate had an affirmative 
duty to disclose to Block that the Property was not suitable for residential construction and failed 
to do so. 
COUNT THREE- BREACH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY 
44. Plaintiff restates and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 43 of the Complaint as if set 
forth fully herein. 
45. Streibick, Personal Representative and Maureen Streibick Estate had a duty to 
Block to exercise reasonable care to ensure that the Property was suitable for residential 
construction and failed to do so. 
46. Streibick, Personal Representative and Maureen Streibick Estate impliedly 
warranted and represented to Block in the Transaction that the Property was suitable for 
residential construction and breached that warranty and representation. 
47. Streibick, Personal Representative and Maureen Streibick Estate impliedly 
warranted to Block in the Transaction that the Property had been developed in a good and 
workmanlike manner and breached that warranty. 
48. Streibick, Personal Representative and Maureen Streibick Estate impliedly 
warranted to Block in the Transaction that the Property would, upon proper residential 
construction, be suitable for habitation and breached that warranty. 
COUNT FOUR- BREACH OF COVENANT OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING 
49. Plaintiff restates and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 48 of the Complaint as if set 
forth fully herein. 
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50. Streibick, Personal Representative and Maureen Streibick Estate impliedly 
covenanted to Block in the Transaction to act in good faith and deal fairly and breached that 
covenant by nullifying any benefit to Block from the Transaction. 
COUNT FIVE- NEGLIGENCE/STREIBICK 
51. Plaintiff restates and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 50 of the Complaint as if set 
forth fully herein. 
52. Streibick's work in (i) placing fill and grading within the area of 153, 155 and 159 
between 1999 and the sale of the Property to Block and (ii) the construction of the detention 
pond and related improvements within the area of 153 as set forth above were not performed in a 
workmanlike manner. 
53. Streibick had a duty to place and grade such fill and to construct such detention 
pond and related improvements in a workmanlike manner, to use ordinary care not to injure 
others, to avoid injury to others by any agency set in operation by him and to do his work to 
avoid any such injury, and Streibick breached this duty. 
COUNT SIX- NEGLIGENCE/CITY OF LEWISTON, CUTSHAW AND OTHERS 
54. Plaintiff restates and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 53 ofthe Complaint as if set 
forth fully herein. 
55. The City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others had a duty to act with reasonable care 
under the circumstances and without negligence. The City of Lewiston, Cutshaw, the City 
Engineer(s) and Others, acting within the course of their employment or duties, breached that 
duty of care by (i) failing to notify and/or warn Block at the time he sought building permits for 
153, 155 and 159 and Lots 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 ofCanyon Greens No.2 of earth movement that 
the City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and Others knew had occurred in 1999 within the area of 153, 
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155 and 159 and that such earth movement had neither been eliminated nor properly abated in 
any manner, (ii) failing to take any action to prevent, restrict or regulate development within the 
area of 153, 155 and 159 until such earth movement had been eliminated or properly abated, (iii) 
failing to require that such earth movement in the area of 153, 155 and 159 be eliminated or 
properly abated by Streibick and/or Others prior to Block's purchase of the Property, (iv) failing 
to prevent Streibick from developing and selling 153, 155 and 159 to Block without notice 
and/or warning to Block that such earth movement had occurred in 1999 or without having 
eliminated or properly abated such earth movement, (v) failing to require Streibick to complete 
the required storm water improvements in 1994 for Palisades No. 4 subdivision and approving 
and allowing Streibick' s construction of a storm water detention pond within the area of 153 
where the City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others knew earth movement had occurred in 1999, 
thereby contributing to the instability of the soil in that area, (vi) approving the plats of Canyon 
Greens and Canyon Greens No.2 without notifying and/or warning Block that earth movement 
had occurred on 153, 155 and 159 in 1999 and had not been eliminated or properly abated; (vii) 
failing to require an approved design or plan incorporating engineering standards applicable to 
the grading, filling, compacting of soil, detaining of storm water and constructing of residences 
on the Property and failing to approve such a design or plan and/or to require compliance with 
such design or plan prior to any such improvements being allowed by the City of Lewiston, 
Cutshaw and/or Others and/or undertaken to eliminate or properly abate such earth movement 
within the area of 153, 155 and 159; (viii) failing to act with ordinary care to protect against the 
likely risks, danger and adverse consequences from such earth movement the City of Lewiston, 
Cutshaw and/or Others knew had occurred in the area of 153, 155 and 159 in 1999; (ix) failing to 
require and/or compel Streibick to eliminate or properly abate the dangerous condition caused by 
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and/or existing as a result of such earth movement in the area of 153, 155 and 159; (x) failing to 
supervise Streibick's development activities within the area of 153, 155 and 159 between 1999 
and 2006 thereby allowing concealment of such earth movement and the creation of a dangerous 
condition and risk of harm; and (xi) failing to inspect and/or make an inadequate inspection of 
Streibick's development activities within the area of 153, 155 and 159 between 1999 and 2006 
thereby allowing concealment of such earth movement and the creation of a dangerous condition 
and risk of harm. 
COUNT SIX- GROSS NEGLIGENCE 
56. Plaintiff restates and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 55 of the Complaint as if set 
forth fully herein. 
57. The City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others, while acting within the course and 
scope of their employment, did or failed to do those acts set forth above in this Complaint which 
acts a reasonable person in a similar situation would, with a minimum of contemplation, be 
inescapably drawn to recognize a duty to do or not do and that failing that duty showed 
deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences to Block. The City of Lewiston, Cutshaw 
and/or Others intentionally and knowingly did or failed to do those acts set forth in this 
Complaint above creating an unreasonable risk of harm to Block and persons occupying the 
Property and involving a high degree of probability that such harm would result. In so doing or 
failing to do those acts set forth above, the City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others, acting 
within the course and scope of their employment, acted with gross negligence or recklessly, 
willfully or wantonly. 
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III. DAMAGES 
58. Plaintiff restates and incorporates paragraphs 1 through 57 of the Complaint as if set 
forth fully herein. 
59. As a direct and proximate result ofthe acts and conduct ofStreibick, Personal 
Representative and Maureen Streibick Estate, Block has suffered property damages, actual 
damages, consequential damages, economic losses, loss of reputation and devaluation ofthe 
Property and Streibick, Personal Representative and Maureen Streibick Estate are liable to Block 
for all such damages and/or losses. The exact nature, extent and amount of such damages will be 
proven at trial. 
60. As a direct and proximate result of such negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or 
omissions and the gross negligence and/or reckless, willful and wanton conduct of the City of 
Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others as set forth above in this Complaint, Block has suffered 
property damages, actual damages, consequential damages, economic losses, loss of reputation 
and devaluation of the Property and the City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others are liable to 
Block for all such damages and/or losses. The exact nature, extent and amount of such damages 
will be proven at trial. 
IV. ATTORNEYFEES 
As to All Claims 
61. In order to recover damages referred to above, Block was required to retain the 
services of Ronald J. Landeck, P.C. to represent him in this action. Defendants should be 
ordered to pay to Block an amount as and for reasonable attorney fees as the Court deems just 
and for costs incurred pursuant to Idaho law, including, but not limited to, Idaho Code sections 
12-120 and 12-121. 
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RIGHT TO AMEND 
62. Block reserves the right to amend this Complaint as this matter proceeds. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for relief against Defendants, as follows: 
a. For judgment for misrepresentation, breach of affirmative duty of disclosure, 
breach of implied warranty, breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing, 
negligence and gross negligence, as more particularly set forth in Counts One 
through Six of the Complaint, including allowable damages in amounts to be 
proven at trial; 
b. For statutory prejudgment interest; 
c. For an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs necessarily incurred in this 
action; 
d. For such other and further relief as the Court deems reasonable and just. 
Dated this 22nd day of October, 2009. 
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RONALD J. LANDECK, P .C. 
By:_(~~~:2__~::_L__::_fu..4:~··ltut,__=-=--:.:=====::--~ 
Ronal J. Landeck 
Atto eys for Plaintiff John G. Block 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Latah ) 
John G. Block, being first duly sworn on oath, deposes and says that he is Plaintiff in the 
above-entitled action, that he has read the foregoing Complaint and that he believes the facts 
stated to be true to the best of his knowledge. 
Jo 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 22nd day of October, 2009. 
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; '~: (/Ytn: c &/ (l/11:;) 
NOTARY PUBLIC for the State ofldaho 
My commission expires: g -1 7 -;;; D/5 
I 
906 
Clinton 0. Casey, ISB #4333 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING~L~p:~:~;-~~. 0: ~·~~;cllilf 1!1/1 1 ... ~ 
~4~n~:~s'9ane rtflifi~"'' 1 ,,_,_ 
Bo1se, Idaho 83 701 ~ .. ~ : 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant, Jack J. Streibick, 
individually and as personal representative of 
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick 
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Case No. CV09 02219 
ANSWER 
COMES NOW, the above-entitled Defendeant Jack J. Streibick a single man and Jack 
Streibick, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick by and through his 
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attorneys of record, Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King, LLP, and answers Plaintiffs' Complaint as 
follows: 
FIRST DEFENSE 




Defendant denies each and every allegation of the Complaint not herein expressly and 
specifically admitted. 
II. 
Defendant admits the allegations contained in paragraphs 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6. 
III. 
Answers to paragraphs 7 and 8, the Defendant Streibick admits that the jurisdiction and 
venue appear to be proper. All remaining allegations contained therein are denied. 
IV. 
To the extent the allegations contained in paragraphs 9 and 10 are directed at this 
answering Defendant, the allegations contained therein are denied. 
v. 
In answer to paragraph 11, this Defendant admits that a real estate purchase and sale 
agreement containing the date August 10, 2005, or at least a portion thereofwas signed by John 
Block as buyer and Jack Streibick as seller. Defendant also admits that he has a copy of a 
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warranty deed dated December 2, 2005, purporting to convey the property to Block but 
Defendant's copy is unsigned. In addition, Defendant admits that he owned the property set forth 
in said paragraph 11 at the date listed on the purchase and sale agreement and the unsigend 
warranty deed. The remaining allegations contained in paragraph 11 are denied. 
VI. 
In answer to paragraph 12, the Defendant admits that at various times the Defendant did 
own real estate some of which he developed. The remaining allegations contained therein are 
denied. 
VII. 
In answer to paragraph 13, the Defendant agrees that prior to December 2, 2005, he sold 
undeveloped real estate lots located in Lewiston, Idaho to the Plaintiff upon which the Plaintiff 
thereafter constructed residences. The remaining allegations contained in paragraph 13 are 
denied. 
VIII. 
In answer to paragraph 14, this Defendant is without sufficient information or knowledge 
to either admit or deny the allegations contained in paragraph 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 
23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 and therefore Defendant denies the same. 
IX. 
In answer to paragraph 28, the Defendant incorporates herein by reference the answers to 
the allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 27 above as if set forth in their entirety herein. 
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X. 
The Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 
36, 37, 38, 39, 40 and 41. 
XI. 
In answer to paragraph 42, this Defendant incorporates by reference herein the answers to 
paragraphs 1 through 41 above as if set forth in their entirety herein. 
XII. 
The Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 43. 
XIII. 
In answer to paragraph 44, this Defendant incorporates herein answers to the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 43 above as if set forth in their entirety herein. 
XIV. 
Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 45, 46, 4 7 and 48. 
XV. 
In answer to paragraph 49, the Defendant incorporates herein answers to the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 48 above as if set forth in their entirety herein. 
XVI. 
Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraph 50. 
XVII. 
In answer to paragraph 51, This Defendant incorporates herein answers to the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 50 above as if set forth in their entirety herein. 
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XVIII. 
Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 52 and 53. 
XIX. 
Count Six of Plaintiffs Complaint set forth in paragraphs 54 and 55 of Plaintiff's 
Complaint does not allege a cause of action against this Defendant and therefore no response is 
necessary. 
XX. 
Count Six of Plaintiffs Complaint set forth at paragraphs 56 and 57 does not raise 
allegations against this Defendant and therefore no answer is required. 
XXI. 
In answer to paragraph 58, this Defendant incorporates herein answers to the allegations 
contained in paragraphs 1 through 57 above as if set forth in their entirety herein. 
XXII. 
Defendant denies the allegations contained in paragraphs 59, 60, 61, and 62 of Plaintiffs 
Complaint. 
AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE 
1. The negligence of Plaintiff Block in not conducting his own geotechnical studies 
and/or due diligence prior to purchase of the property and/or prior to construction of homes on 
the property exceeded the negligence of this Defendant, if any. 
2. The Plaintiff's claims are barred by the doctrine of unclean hands. 
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Case No. CV09-02219 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
INTRODUCTION 
John G. Block, doing business as The Block Group ("Block") presented a Notice of 
Claim for Damages to the City of Lewiston, a municipal corporation ofthe State ofidaho ("City 
of Lewiston") and Lowell J. Cutshaw ("Cutshaw") in his capacity as City of Lewiston Engineer 
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on August 26, 2009 to recover money damages under the Idaho Tort Claims Act ("ITCA"). On 
October 22, 2009 Block filed a Complaint against Defendants, Jack J. Streibick, City of 
Lewiston, and Cutshaw. Defendants City of Lewiston and Cutshaw were served with the 
Complaint and Summons on December 9 and December 18,2010, respectively. Defendant City 
of Lewiston has moved for Summary Judgment on the grounds that Block failed to timely file a 
Notice of Tort Claim and that Block is barred from pursuing damages against the City of 
Lewiston and Cutshaw. Block opposes this motion as there are either genuine issues of material 
fact that preclude summary judgment or the material facts conclusively establish that the Notice 
of Tort Claim was timely filed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In December 2005, Block purchased property located in Lewiston, Idaho from Defendant 
Jack Streibick and the Estate of Maureen Streibick that was, in part, pursuant to Block's 
application, approved by the City of Lewiston, for resubdivision into three (3) residential lots 
that are commonly known as 153 Marine View Drive ("153"), 155 Marine View Drive ("155"), 
and 159 Marine View Drive ("159") (collectively the "Canyon Greens" subdivision). In May 
2006, Block received building permits from the City of Lewiston to construct homes on 153, 155 
and 159. Block assumed that all grading and fill on the Canyon Greens property had been done 
and placed correctly under permit from the City of Lewiston and under its supervision and 
inspection. Block constructed a home on each lot and the City of Lewiston conducted 
inspections, found those homes to be constructed in accordance with applicable building codes 
and standards and issued certificates of occupancy for the homes. Complaint, pp. 3-4, Affidavit 
of John Block ("Block Aff."), p. 2. 
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On or about October 23, 2007, while showing 153 to a prospective purchaser, a realtor 
observed settling on the northwest corner of 153 and then informed Block of what she had 
observed. In November 2007, the owner of 159 reported settlement ofthe basement floor to 
Block. Also in November 2007, Block observed settling under an exterior door of 155. Block 
Aff., p. 2. On or about mid-November, 2007, Block consulted with Keltic Engineering regarding 
possible solutions to the settlement that was observed on the three properties. Eric Hasenoehrl, of 
Keltic Engineering, then contacted Strata, Inc., a geotechnical engineering firm, to assist on this 
project. Affidavit ofEric Hasenoehrl ("Hasenoehrl Aff."), p. 2; Block Aff., p. 2. Mr. Block and 
Andrew Abrams, a Strata representative, met on site on December 6, 2007 to observe the 
conditions of distress to the homes. Mr. Abrams stated that without detailed subsurface 
knowledge and engineering evaluation, he could not provide an engineering opinion of the 
causes of the "observed settlement." Mr. Block, desiring an immediate repair of these homes, 
asked for options and Mr. Abrams stated that a deep foundation system such as helical piers was 
an alternative. Block Aff., pp. 3-4; Hasenoehrl Aff., p. 3. Block then consulted with Keltic 
Engineering and decided to utilize the helical piers system because it had been recommended by 
Mr. Abrams to remedy foundation settlement. On December 14, 2007, Block, with Keltic's 
assistance, entered into a contract with Montana Helical, Inc. to install the helical piers system on 
and underneath the properties. The piers were installed in December 2007, and the installation 
was overseen by representatives of Keltic and Strata. Block also hired Keltic to monitor the 
structural stability of the residences by surveying prior to installation of the helical piers and 
surveying at least monthly after installation of the helical piers through December 2008. Based 
upon this constant monitoring over this one-year period, Block and Keltic believed that the 
installation of the piers had remedied the localized settling that had been observed on the 
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properties. Block, confident that the helical piers had remedied the settling, undertook needed 
repairs to 153, 155 and 159 during Spring 2008. No further problems were observed or reported 
until February 2009. Hasenoehrl Aff. pp. 3-4; Block Aff., p. 3. 
In February 2009, the tenant of 159 called Block, who was out-of-state, and stated that 
they had noticed settlement in the foundation of 159. Several weeks after that, the tenant in 153 
called Block, who was still out-of-state, and stated that there was settlement in the driveway and 
basement of 153. Block returned to Idaho in March 2009 and promptly inspected 153, 155 and 
159 and observed settlement ofthe structures on 153, 155 and 159 and cracks in the ground 
surface of all three properties. On or about May 11, 2009, a natural gas leak occurred at 153. On 
May 12, 2009, the City of Lewiston inspected 153, 155 and 159 and posted notice that the 
residential structures on 153 and 159 were unsafe to occupy. The tenants vacated the premises 
that same day. The City of Lewiston required Block to submit an abatement plan which, as 
approved by the City of Lewiston, required the demolition of 153 and 159 and structural repairs 
to 155. Block demolished and removed the structures on 153 in June 2009 and the structures on 
159 in August 2009. Block made improvements required by the City of Lewiston to allow 155 to 
be occupied. Block Aff., pp. 3-4 
In late May 2009, Sandra E. Lee, a reporter for the Lewiston Tribune sent Block a copy 
of a May 20, 1999 Lewiston Tribune article that reported slope movement had occurred in 1999 
in the area ofMarine View Drive in the vicinity of 153, 155 and 159. Block Aff., p.4. In late 
May, 2009, Block started researching City of Lewiston records regarding the development 
history of the Property and found that the City had issued two separate permits to Streibick in 
1993 that allowed Streibick to place and grade fill in the area of 153, 155 and 159. On June 5, 
2009, Block then discovered from the City's records that the City of Lewiston knew in 1999 that 
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substantial slope movement occurred within the area of 153, 155 and 159 and that the City of 
Lewiston memorialized this occurrence in the City of Lewiston's records related to the Palisades 
#4 subdivision and pledged to deal with the problem before development of that area. Id. 
Although, Keltic and Hasenoehrl had provided substantial engineering services related to 
153, 155 and 159, the City of Lewiston had not made them aware of the 1999 landslide in the 
area of 153, 155 and 159. It was not until Block shared the documents and photograph from 
Lewiston's records and the 1999 Tribune article from Ms. Lee that Hasenoehrl realized the 
settlement conditions that he had observed in late 2007 were more likely caused by slope 
movement than settlement as he had previously believed. Hasenoehrl Aff. pp. 4-5. Hasenoehrl 
surveyed the fault line of the 2009 slope movement, compared that line with the fault line shown 
in the 1999 photograph and concluded that the lines are almost identical. Id. at p. 5. Hasenoehrl 
believes that Block acted reasonably in deciding to utilize helical piers to stabilize the settlement 
conditions that were observed by him, Hasenoehrl and Abrams in December 2007 and to monitor 
that situation. Hasenoehrl opines that it would not be reasonable to conclude that Block or 
Hasenoehrl should have known or should have attempted to discover, prior to May 2009, that the 
observed settlement in 2007 was slope movement and not settlement. Id. 
Block presented and filed his Notice of Claim for Damages with the City of Lewiston, 
including Cutshaw in his capacity as City of Lewiston Engineer, to recover money damages 
under the Idaho Tort Claims Act ("ITCA") on August 26, 2009. Exhibit B to Affidavit of 
Stephen Adams dated May 21,2010. On October 22, 2009 Block filed a Complaint against 
Defendants, Jack J. Streibick, City of Lewiston, and Cutshaw. Block made no attempt to effect 
service of process of the Complaint and Summons in this case on any defendant until 90 days 
had elapsed from the date of filing of Block's Notice of Claim For Damages with the City of 
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Lewiston. The Complaint and Summons were served on Defendant City of Lewiston December 
9, 2009, and on Defendant Cutshaw on December 18, 2009. Block Aff. pp. 4-5. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In assessing the City's motion for summary judgment, all disputed facts are to be 
liberally construed in favor of the nonmoving party. Mallory v. Montpelier, 126 Idaho 446, 447, 
885 P2d 1162, 1163 (Ct. App. 1994). The burden of proving the absence of a material fact rests 
at all times upon the moving party. McCoy v. Lyons, 120 Idaho 765, 769, 820 P.2d 360, 364 
(1991). This burden is onerous because even circumstantial evidence can create a genuine issue 
of material fact. Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P2d 1238 (1986). The court must draw all 
reasonable inferences in favor of Mr. Block. Id. The court must look to the "totality of the 
motions, affidavits, depositions, pleadings, and attached exhibits," not merely to portions of the 
record in isolation." Id. at 469, 716 P2d at 1241. All doubts are to be resolved against the moving 
party. !d. In order to survive a motion for summary judgment the plaintiff need not prove that an 
issue will be decided in its favor at trial; rather, it must simply show that there is a triable issue. 
G & M Farms v. Funk Irrigation Co., 119 Idaho 514, 524, 808 P2d 851, 861 (1991). The motion 
must be denied if the evidence is such that conflicting inferences can be drawn and if reasonable 
people might reach different conclusions. Id. at 518, 808 P2d at 855. 
LEGAL ARGUMENT 
John Block timely filed a Notice ofTort Claim. 
In late October 2007, Block was notified about settling to the foundation of 153 and the 
following month to settlement in the basement floor of 159 and to an exterior door of 155. Block 
then sought engineering advice and undertook reasonable repair ofthe damage to the homes that 
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was caused by what appeared to him, to his geotechnical engineer, Andrew Abrams of Strata, 
Inc., and to his civil engineer, Eric Hasenoehrl of Keltic Engineering, to be normal settling. 
Block monitored the helical pier system repair for one year, and no further settling was observed. 
However, in February 2009, until Block, who was not in Idaho, learned of additional settling to 
159 and several weeks later, to 153. Block returned to Idaho in March, 2009 and observed 
settlement of the structures on 153, 155 and 159. Structural conditions worsened later that 
Spring, and, after rupture of a natural gas line in May 2009, the City posted 153 and 159 as 
unsafe to occupy. 
On or about May 27, 2009, Block first learned from Sandra E. Lee, a reporter for the 
Lewiston Tribune, that a landslide had occurred in 1999 in the area of Marine View Drive where 
he had constructed the residences on 153, 155 and 159. Ms. Lee had written a report published in 
the Lewiston Tribune on May 20, 1999, stating that slope movement had been observed in the 
area of Marine View Drive, that officials of the City of Lewiston had been provided aerial 
photographs ofthat movement and that the City of Lewiston Engineer, at that time, Tim Richard, 
had stated that the City will document the slope movement information and, if plans for that 
property are submitted, will deal with it at that time. On June 5, 2009, Block reviewed the City's 
subdivision records and located a photograph taken in March, 1999 showing a landslide within 
the area of 153, 155 and 159. At this point, Block first realized that the damages to structures on 
153, 155 and 159 were most likely not the result of foundation settlement, rather, that they 
resulted from a landslide in the exact area in which there had been a previous landslide of which 
the City had actual knowledge that had been documented in its records. 
The Idaho Tort Claim Act § 6-906 states that all claims against a political subdivision 
arising under the provisions ofthis act and all claims against an employee of a political 
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subdivision for any act or omission of the employee within the course or scope ofhis 
employment shall be presented to and filed with the clerk or secretary of the political subdivision 
within one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have 
been discovered, whichever is later. (emphasis added). 
The question of when the claimant reasonably should have discovered the governmental 
entity's role is a question of material fact, which if genuinely disputed, is inappropriate for 
determination on a motion for summary judgment. Trosper v. Raymond, 99 Idaho 54, 577 P2d 33 
(1978). In Trosper, the critical date was not and is not the date of injury but the date of 
reasonable discovery of the claim. The court explained that "determining when the county's 
interest in the gravel pond reasonably should have been discovered is a question of material fact 
which, by its very nature, is inappropriate for determination on a motion for summary 
judgment." Compare Full Circle, Inc. v. Schelling, 108 Idaho 634, 701 P2d 254 (Ct. App. 1985) 
(question of reasonable diligence to discover fraud under applicable statute of limitation is a 
question of fact for the jury). 
In Carman v. Carman, 114 Idaho 551, 758 P2d 710 (Ct. App. 1988), the plaintiff neither 
know nor had sufficient facts to cause her to properly inquire further that a county employee was 
involved in her injury. There were facts in existence at the time ofthe injury that plaintiff did not 
know, and could not have been reasonably expected to discover until a later time when some 
knowledge beyond her initial reach, was imparted to her. 
In Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 716 P2d 1238 (1986), the court explained that 
Plaintiffs had no reason to know of and possessed no knowledge that would cause them to 
investigate into the district's hiring of an offending teacher. It was only after preparation of a 
presentence investigation of the teacher in a criminal action did the parents learn of potential 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-- 8 
liability of the school district. Thus, the statute was properly tolled until the parents received 
information that led them to inquire further into the school's knowledge. The court stated that 
"obviously, a claim is not necessarily discovered the instant the injury or damages occur." Id. at 
474, 716 P2d at 1246. The, then, 120-day limit only began to run after the claimant became fully 
apprised of not only the injury or damages but also of the governmental entity's role. Id. 
Likewise, here, normal or localized settlement that occurs commonly on construction and 
building projects is not typically an occurrence that would involve the City government. The 
City's knowledge ofthe substantially more severe slope movement was not discovered by Block 
until he became aware in May 2009 that slope movement had occurred in 1999 and that the City 
knew that slope movement had occurred. Block knew nothing of the role of the City until a 
point well within the 180-day period preceding filing of his Tort Claim Notice. Surely, the City 
does not suggest that normal or localized settlement on a construction site raises a presumption 
that the City had prior knowledge or was somehow involved. 
Conversely, in Mallory v. Montpelier, 126 Idaho 446, 885 P2d 1162 (Ct. App. 1994), the 
court, in focusing on the interpretation of the language "the claim ... reasonably should have 
been discovered" stated that "knowledge of facts which would put a reasonably prudent person 
on inquiry" triggers the running of the time limitation. Id. at 448, 885 P2d at 1164. The court 
concluded that the undisputed facts of the case were that the possible cause of Mallory's injury 
during the softball game was revealed by a cursory inspection of the field and the city's 
ownership was determined with minimal effort. Id. at 449, 885 P2d at 1165. There being no 
questions regarding a latent injury and no other hidden facts, Mallory was held to have been put 
on inquiry notice of the city's role in her injury when sustained. Id. These circumstances are 
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dissimilar to the facts of this case where Block had no notice of the extent ofthe foundation 
problem much less any idea as to the City's knowledge ofthe 1999 landslide. 
The situation in this case is analogous to that in Leaf v. City of San Mateo, 104 Cal App 
3d 398 (Ct. App. 1st Dist. 1980). In Leaf, plaintiffs appealed from a summary judgment entered 
against them. Id. at 402. In January 1972, the Leafs, purchased a parcel of real property that 
included a duplex in the City of San Mateo. Id. at 403. Final completion and acceptance of the 
subdivision to which it was a part of was believed to have occurred in 1965. Id. In June 1972, the 
Leafs discovered that the floors were unlevel and the exterior of the building was cracking. I d. 
After consulting two different engineering firms, in August 1972, and July, 1973, the Leafs were 
told that the structural problems were caused by differential settlement and subsidence due to 
movement of the fill on the lot caused by water absorption. !d. The recommendation was for the 
Leafs to install a drainage system and that the structure be repaired. Id. In August 1976, the Leafs 
began construction of the recommended drainage system. During construction, the Leafs 
discovered that the City's storm and sanitary sewer trenches on and near the Leaf's property had 
not been compacted and were funneling water onto the Leaf's property. Id. at 403-04. The Leafs 
filed a claim against the City on November 5, 1976 and civil action on January 28, 1977. Id. at 
404. 
The court explained that the question of when the Leaf's cause of action accrued was a 
mixed question oflaw and fact. Id. at 406. The City argued that the cause of action accrued when 
the Leafs became aware of the damage to their property, i.e., when they noticed the unlevel 
floors and cracks in the building exterior. Id. at 406. The Leafs argued that the "rule of 
discovery" would start the statute running only when they were aware ofthe damage but also 
became aware ofits negligent cause, i.e., at the time of the cave-in. Id. The court noted that the 
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discovery rule operates to protect the plaintiff who is "blamelessly ignorant" of his cause of 
action. !d. at 408. Thus, the court stated "we do not think that plaintiffs' cause of action in this 
case should accrue from the occurrence of the last essential fact, nor from discovery of the 
damage to their property, as defendant contends, but rather from the point in time when plaintiffs 
became aware of defendant's negligence as a cause, or could have become so aware through the 
exercise of reasonable diligence. Id. (emphasis added). 
In determining whether the Leafs exercised reasonable diligence in discovering the 
negligent cause of their injuries, the court explained that there was no reason to start the statute 
of limitations running when plaintiffs, at the outset, made reasonable, but unsuccessful efforts to 
identify the negligent cause of damage. The plaintiffs consulted with professional engineers as to 
the source oftheir injury and were entitled to rely upon that advice. !d. "It would be contrary to 
public policy to require that plaintiffs file a lawsuit against City of San Mateo at a time when the 
evidence available to them failed to indicate a cause of action against this defendant." !d. at 408-
09. (emphasis added). Further, whether plaintiffs in fact exercised reasonable diligence in 
discovering the negligence of the City was a question of fact. !d. at 409. 
Here, Block, was "blamelessly ignorant" ofthe facts upon when his claim against the 
City of Lewiston is based until May 28, 2009. As in Leaf, it would be contrary to public policy, 
under these circumstances to require that Block file a notice of claim and subsequent lawsuit 
against the City of Lewiston at a time, that is, in 2007 or 2008, when the evidence available to 
him failed to indicate a cause of action against this defendant. This public policy is not only 
recognized in California, but was also recognized in Idaho by the dissent in Mitchell v. Bingham 
Memorial Hospital, 130 Idaho 420, 426, 942 P2d 544, 550 (1997) ("Accusing an institution of 
misdeeds without an adequate basis is not something people of honor do."). 
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Further, whether Block exercised reasonable diligence in discovering the negligence of 
the City is a question of fact as it was in Leaf.Jd. at 409. In November, 2007, when he observed 
settlement in the homes on 153, 155 and 159, Block consulted with two engineering 
professionals, Mr. Abrams of Strata and Mr. Hasenoehrl ofKeltic. Mr. Abrams indicated some 
potential causes ofthe observed settlement and recommended a system to remedy the settlement 
by installation of a deep foundation system utilizing helical piers, which system Block 
subsequently implemented. Block's efforts were reasonable. Block was entitled to reasonably 
rely on Mr. Abrams' recommendation and Mr. Hasenoehrl's consultation to address the observed 
settlement. In addition, the helical piers installation was monitored by Keltic from installation in 
December, 2007 through December, 2008, without sign of settlement or slope movement, which 
supports the conclusion that it was not reasonable to believe that a claim against the City had 
arisen in late 2007. Mr. Hasenoehrl has opined that it would not be reasonable, under the 
circumstances, to expect that he or Block should have known that slope movement had occurred 
in 2007 or should have attempted to eliminate slope movement as a cause of the settlement they 
had observed in late 2007. 
Block had knowledge that fill had been placed on these properties, which is not an 
uncommon building practice in the City of Lewiston. The foundations for these properties also 
met all compaction test standards for construction ofthese three residences. The AllWest 
disclaimer is not notice that the properties were subject to past slope movement or landslide 
activity, rather, its disclaimer merely states that AllWest did not test compaction of all fill on 
these properties. Further, it has been recognized by courts that having knowledge that a house is 
located on fill is not the same as having knowledge of preexisting slides and springs on such 
property. Barnhouse v. City of Pinole, 133 Cal App 3d 171, 178 (1982). "The repair of a 
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preexisting slide, which may reoccur, is a complicated structural job, whereas the typical fill is 
merely a beautification measure. Id. at 189. Having notice that a home was on a filled lot was not 
notice of other independent soil conditions, i.e., preexisting seeps, springs and slides. !d. at 190. 
At the very least, whether Block's knowledge of fill on these properties translates to knowledge 
the earth movement that has caused these substantial damages is a question of material fact. 
Relationship with the Federal Tort Claims Act 
"The Idaho legislature largely modeled the ITCA on the FTCA." Doe, 110 Idaho at 473, 
716 P2d at 1245, FN 2. Thus, there is a presumption that when the legislature adopts the statute 
of another jurisdiction, it also adopts the prior construction of that statute by courts of the other 
jurisdiction. Id. The following FTCA case provides some guidance as to when a plaintiff has 
knowledge that is required to set the statute of limitations running. 
When there are two causes of an injury, and only one is the government, the knowledge 
that is required to set the statute oflimitations running for a claim under Federal Tort Claims Act 
(FTCA) is knowledge ofthe government cause, not just ofthe other cause; thus, the limitations 
period begins to run either when the government cause is known, or when a reasonably diligent 
person in the tort claimant's position reacting to any suspicious circumstances of which he might 
have been aware would have discovered the government cause-whichever comes first. Garza v. 
US. Bureau of Prisons, 284 F.3d 930 (8th Cir. 2002). As applied to this case, Block's discovery 
of extensive earth movement, as contrasted to normal settlement, most certainly did not occur 
prior to December, 2007, and most assuredly occurred in May, 2009, was not of itself notice or 
knowledge ofhis claim against the City. That knowledge or the reasonable discovery of that 
knowledge did not occur and was not reasonably discoverable until at least late May, 2009, when 
Block learned that the 1999 landslide had been investigated and reported on by a Lewiston 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION TO 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT-- 13 
Tribune reporter and that her reporting included interviews with City officials. Even if Block had 
known of the landslide in December, 2007, which he did not, such knowledge would not have 
precluded him from rightfully filing a notice of claim against the City on August 26, 2009, as he 
did. The limitation period against the City of Lewiston did not begin to run until Block had 
knowledge of or reasonably should have discovered the City's negligence in failing to either 
abate the dangerous condition, prevent development until abatement had been completed or 
inform Block about the 1999 landslide before he developed the properties. That discovery as has 
been demonstrated, did not occur until Block read the Lewiston Tribune article in late May, 2009 
and located the City's record of the 1999landslide in the City's files on June 5, 2009. 
Block's complaint should not be dismissed on the grounds it was filed prematurely. 
The City's Motion For Summary Judgment has been made on the singular ground that 
Plaintiff failed to timely file a Notice of Tort Claim. Motion For Summary Judgment, p. 2. 
Despite not having pled that the Complaint should be dismissed on other grounds, the City has 
included argument in its Memorandum that the Complaint should be dismissed because the 
Complaint was filed prior to the expiration of a 90 day period following Block's filing Notice of 
his tort claims against the City. City has not cited any authority for its argument other than 
referencing I.C. § 6-910. City's argument on this point should not be considered by the Court as 
it has not been properly pled and is not relevant to the only grounds stated in the City's Motion 
For Summary Judgment, however, if considered, the argument should be denied for the reasons 
set forth below. 
Idaho Code § 6-908 states that "no claim or action shall be allowed against a 
governmental entity or its employee unless the claim has been presented and filed within the 
time limits prescribed by this act." Emphasis added. Pursuant to § 6-909, the governmental entity 
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within ninety (90) days after the filing of the claim shall act thereon and notify the claimant in 
writing of its approval or denial. A claim shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end of the 
ninety (90) day period the governmental entity has failed to approve or deny the claim. Under 
LC. § 6-910, ifthe claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district court against 
the governmental entity or its employee in those circumstances where an action is permitted by 
this act. 
In this case, Block presented and filed his Notice of Tort Claim on August 26, 2009. 
Thereafter, Block filed his Complaint on October 22, 2009; however, the Defendant City of 
Lewiston was not served with a Summons and Complaint until December 2, 1009, more than 90 
days after the Notice was filed and presented to the City and also after the claim had been 
deemed denied because ofthe City's failure to approve or deny the claim during the ninety (90) 
day period. 
Courts adhere to the universal rule of statutory construction that a statute must be 
construed in light of its intent and purpose. Jorstad v. Lewiston, 93 Idaho 122, 125, 456 P2d 766, 
769 (1969). "The object of the statute must be kept in mind, and it should not be given a 
construction which will defeat the ends of justice." !d. at 126, 456 P2d at 770. In Cobbley v. 
Challis, 138 Idaho 154, 59 P3d 959 (2002), the court noted the purpose of LC. § 6-906 which is 
to (1) provide an opportunity for resolution of the claim and save the expense oflitigation, (2) 
allow the governmental entity to fully investigate the claim to determine its liability, if any, (3) 
allow the governmental entity to prepare its defenses. !d. at 157, 59 P3d at 962. A liberal 
approach is taken in interpreting the notice requirement of the ITCA. Doe, 110 Idaho at 474, 716 
P2d at 1246. 
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Thus, although Block's complaint was filed prior to the passing of 90 days, it was not 
served upon the City until90 days had passed, therefore none of the purposes ofi.C. § 6-906 
were diminished. The City had sufficient time to resolve the claim, investigate the claim and 
prepare its defenses as the time for responding to the complaint would not begin to run until 
service was made. 
Moreover, Idaho Code § 6-910, by its express terms, neither prohibits the filing of suit 
within 90 days of filing a tort claim notice nor bars the bringing of suit under ITCA for filing a 
"premature" complaint. In Farnworth v. Femling, 125 Idaho 283,869 P2d 1378 (1994), 
Farnworth, on February 21, 1989, filed a notice of claim with Blaine County and on March 7, 
1989, Farnworth sued Femling and the county seeking damages for wrongful termination under 
42 USC § 1983 and requesting an allowance to amend the complaint to add additional actions 
and tort claims as may be necessary upon denial of the tort claim. !d. at 284-85, 869 P2d at 13 79-
80. After Femling and the county moved for summary judgment, Farnworth, on May 21, 1990, 
filed an amended complaint and added a claim against the county for the tort of wrongful 
discharge, among others. !d. The trial court concluded that Farnworth's ITCA claim was barred 
because the amended complaint related back to the date of the original complaint, therefore 
violating I.C § 6-910. !d. The Idaho Supreme Court disagreed and reasoned that the bar to 
bringing suit under ITCA is effective "when the notice of claim is not filed with the 
governmental entity within the time permitted by ITCA." !d. at 288, 869, P.2d at 1383. The 
Farnworth Court determined that the case before it, just as the case before this Court, presented a 
"different question" and concluded there was no legal basis for the trial court to dismiss 
Farnworth's ITCA claim on the ground it was filed prematurely. !d. 
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Section 6-910 does not provide express authority for an action to be disallowed or 
dismissed due to a premature filing nor does the actual language of Section 6-910 prohibit the 
filing of a complaint prior to 90 days after the filing of a tort claim notice. In this case, although 
the Complaint was filed within 90 days of filing the Notice, no defendant was served until the 
claim was deemed denied. Thus, applying the express language of Section 6-910, Block did not 
"institute an action in the district court against the governmental entity or its employee" because 
the City and Mr. Cutshaw were not served with summons and complaint until the 90 days had 
passed. There is no legal authority under Idaho law that supports disallowance or dismissal of 
Block's claim against the City for premature filing of a complaint. Moreover, the City has not 
been prejudiced in any manner as a result of the filing and service as it occurred. 
CONCLUSION 
This Court should deny the City's Motion for Summary Judgment and enter judgment 
that Block's Notice of Tort Claim was timely filed. 
DATED this 13th day of July, 2010 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
By:', '!u_(tbt..tit.t/~---~ 
Ro ld J. Landeck 
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JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK ) 
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of the ) 
Estate ofMaureen F. Streibick, deceased, ) 
CITY OF LEWISTON, a municipal corporation ) 
of the State ofldaho, and its employee, LOWELL) 
J. CUTSHAW, CityofLewiston Engineer, and ) 




STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Latah ) 
John Block, upon oath, deposes and says: 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BLOCK-- 1 
Case No. CV09-02219 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BLOCK 
1. I am over eighteen (18) years of age and make this affidavit upon my personal 
knowledge. 
2. I am a Plaintiff in the within action and am competent to testify to the matters stated 
herein. 
3. In December 2005, I purchased Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4 of Amended Administrative Plat 
of Sunset Palisades No. 8 from Defendants Streibick and submitted to Defendant, City of 
Lewiston (sometimes "City") an application to resubdivide Lot 4 into 3 lots. In early 2006, City 
and Defendant Lowell Cutshaw, City Engineer ("Cutshaw"), approved my application for 
resubdivision resulting in the establishment of the lots commonly known and addressed as 153 
Marine View Drive ("153"), 155 Marine View Drive ("155") and 159 Marine View Drive 
(" 159") (collectively "Canyon Greens"). I applied for and the City of Lewiston granted building 
permits to construct homes on 153, 155 and 159. Assuming that these lots had been properly 
graded and filled under permit from the City and supervision and inspection by the City, I 
constructed a home on each lot, and the City of Lewiston conducted inspections, found those 
homes to be constructed in accordance with applicable building codes and standards and issued 
certificates of occupancy for those homes. 
4. On or about October 23, 2007, while showing 153 to a prospective purchaser, a 
realtor observed settling on the northwest comer of 153 and then informed me of what she had 
observed. In November 2007, the owner of 159 reported settlement of the basement floor to me. 
Also in November 2007, I observed settling under an exterior door of 155. 
5. On or about mid-November, 2007, I consulted with Keltic Engineering regarding 
possible solutions to the conditions that were observed on the three properties. Eric Hasenoehrl, 
of Keltic Engineering, met me on the site and then contacted Strata, Inc., a geotechnical 
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engineering firm, to assist on this project. Andrew Abrams, a Strata representative, and I met on 
site on December 6, 2007 to observe the conditions of distress to the homes. Mr. Abrams stated 
that without detailed subsurface knowledge and engineering evaluation, he could not provide an 
engineering opinion of the causes of the observed settlement, and he further discussed the scope, 
cost and duration of such an evaluation. Desiring an immediate repair of these homes, I asked 
for other options, and Mr. Abrams stated that a deep foundation system such as helical piers was 
an alternative, but, without a detailed evaluation, such an installation may or may not remedy the 
causes of distress. 
6. I then spoke with Eric Hasenoehrl of Keltic Engineering who then spoke with Mr. 
Abrams about the helical pier system. Because helical piers had been recommended by Mr. 
Abrams to remedy foundation settlement and because settlement is what we all had observed, I 
decided to utilize the helical piers system. On December 14, 2007, with Keltic's assistance, I 
entered into a contract with Montana Helical, Inc. to install the helical piers system on and 
underneath the properties. The piers were installed in December 2007 with Keltic and Strata 
representatives present to monitor the installation. 
7. I hired Keltic to monitor the structural stability of the residences by surveying the 
properties prior to installation of the helical piers and surveying at least monthly after installation 
of the helical piers through December 2008. Based upon this constant monitoring over this one-
year period, and based upon consultation with Eric Hasenoehrl, I believed that the installation of 
the piers had remedied the localized settling. Confident that the helical piers had remedied the 
settling, I undertook the needed repairs to 153, 155 and 159 during Spring 2008. No further 
problems were observed or reported until February 2009. 
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8. In February 2009, the tenant of 159 called me, while I was out-of-state, and stated 
that they had noticed settlement in the foundation of 159. Several weeks after that, the tenant in 
153 called me, while I was still out-of-state, and stated that there was settlement in the driveway 
and basement of 153. I returned to Idaho in March 2009 and promptly inspected 153, 155 and 
159 and observed settlement ofthe structures on 153, 155 and 159 and cracks in the ground 
surface of all three properties. On or about May 11, 2009, a natural gas leak occurred at 153. 
9. On May 12, 2009, the City of Lewiston inspected 153, 155 and 159 and posted 
notice that the residential structures on 153 and 159 were unsafe to occupy. The tenants vacated 
the premises that same day. The City of Lewiston required me to submit an abatement plan to 
address the unsafe conditions and I immediately prepared and submitted an abatement plan for 
review and approval by the City of Lewiston. That plan, as approved by the City of Lewiston 
and/or others required the demolition of 153 and 159 and structural repairs to 155. I demolished 
and removed the structures on 153 in June 2009 and the structures on 159 in August 2009. I 
made improvements required by the City of Lewiston to allow 15 5 to be occupied. 
10. In late May 2009, Sandra E. Lee, a reporter for the Lewiston Tribune sent me a copy 
of a May 20, 1999 Lewiston Tribune article that reported that earth movement had occurred in 
1999 in the area of Marine View Drive in the vicinity of 153, 155 and 159, a true and correct 
copy of which is attached hereto and labeled 0140 Block. 
11. In late May, 2009, I started researching City of Lewiston records regarding the 
development history of the Property and found in those records documents establishing that the 
City had issued two separate permits to Streibick allowing Streibick in 1993 to place and grade 
fill in the area of 153, 155 and 159, true and correct copies of which are attached hereto and 
labeled 0108 and 0109 Block. On June 5, 2009, I then discovered documents and a photograph in 
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the City's records establishing that in 1999 the City of Lewiston knew that substantial earth 
movement had occurred within the area of 153, 155 and 159 which the City of Lewiston had 
memorialized this occurrence in the City of Lewiston's records related to the Palisades #4 
subdivision, true and correct copies of which are attached hereto and labeled 0134-0137 Block. 
12. I presented and filed my Notice of Claim for Damages with the City ofLewiston, 
including Cutshaw in his capacity as City of Lewiston Engineer, to recover money damages 
under the Idaho Tort Claims Act ("ITCA") on August 26,2009. On October 22,2009 I filed a 
Complaint against Defendants, Jack J. Streibick, City of Lewiston, and Cutshaw. I made no 
attempt to effect service of process of the Complaint and Summons in this case on the City or 
Cutshaw so as to not initiate the action as to them until 90 days had elapsed from the date of 
filing of my Notice of Claim For Damages with the City of Lewiston. Accordingly, the 
Complaint and Summons were served on Defendant City of Lewiston December 9, 2009, and on 
Defendant Cutshaw on December 18,2009, well beyond the 90 days from the filing of my 
Notice of Claim For Damages. 
The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
Dated this 13th day of July, 2010. 
John 
SUBSCR1BED AND SWORN TO before me this __ day ofJuly, 2010. 
I r·-- ~~ (~\ 
Cl/lJ_l[fJ)JlL h . --~ 
I / ' 
NOTARY PUBLIC foc4e State of Idaho 
My commission expires:f2JZ2/2DI4 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of July, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of this 
document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below: 
CLINTON 0. CASEY 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLN AN & KING LLP 
1423 TYRELL LANE 
P.O. BOX359 
BOISE, ID 83701 
BRIAN K. JULIAN 
STEPHEN L. ADAMS 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. MOORE PLAZA 
250 SOUTH FIFTH STREET, SUITE 700 
POST OFFICE BOX 7426 
BOISE, IDAHO 83707-7426 
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"John G Block" <linnelson@clearwire.net> 
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Cracks that are the telltale marks of moving earth line the sides of the gully below the 11th hole at the 
Lewiston Golf and Country Club. 
It's tough to stop geology; Hillside near Lewiston•s Marine View Drive is slowly, but surely, slipping 
away 
Byline: Sandra Lee 
The earth is slipping on a hillside north of Marine View Drive, a few lmndred feet from some of 
Lewiston•s most expensive homes. 
It probably will stop before it tlm:atens any homes in the area, Moscow geotechnical engineer Terry R. 
Howard said. But something needs to be done about the water that is poudng into the hillside, he said, 
and the cracks created by the slips should be closed up. 
The movement is below and to the west of a bridge that connects the 11th fairway at the Lewiston Golf 
and Country Club. 
South ofthere, above Atlas Sand and Rock, a chunk of earth above a settling pond has broken loose. 
Both are south of the Snake River Avenue slide that has threatened the Lewiston Elks Temple and 
hampered traffic through the area since May 4, 1998. 
They were discovered while reviewing aerial photographs taken ofthe area this spring, Howard said. 
Copies of the photographs were provided to both city of Lewiston and Nez Perce County officials, but 
neither poses an immediate threat to any dwelling, business or road. 
Eventually it will stabilize itselfthrough a proc.ess in which the toe washes out, earth slips down, and 
the process repeats itself over and over, retired Lewiston Public Works Administrator BudJ1:.Y~ne 
said of the slump below the golf course":""''EVeiffii'afly it will be stable. How far back it will go, I don't 
know." 
He won't live long enough to see it stabilize, Van Stone said. !!Jt's a Jong-tenn situation ... 
The second site above the settling pond will do the same thing until it forms a gully up the hillside 
unless it's stopped by placing rock to stop the erosion, he said. 
Not all of the movement closest to Marine View Drive appears to be new this year, Van Stone and 
Howard said. 
~ed ~1e street_}vas built. Howard said. ,"That subdivistm~Jandslid~~~ 
Lewiston•s policy 1s to retain water on-site, and it tells the deveToper to do thai, he said. 
The goal of retention is to hold the water until it evaporates or it soaks into the ground. If the ground 
becomes saturated, it causes a landslide. 
The city also uses dry wells, which are just catch basins that let water seep into the ground, he said. 
One is at tl1e lower end of Marine View Drive. 
As the dirt slides down the south face of the gully nearest Marine View Drive, it forces the stream of 
''later to the other side, where it's now eating into that slope. It will become steeper until it fails, too, 
6/1/2009 
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HEATING, VENTILATING OR AIR CONDITIONING. Units 
Septic System Permit 
Number 
Manufactured Home 
H.U.D. LD. No. 
THIS PERMIT BECOMES NULL AND VOID IF WORK OR CONSTRUCTION 
AUTHORIZED IS NOT COMMENCED WITHIN 180 DAYS, OR IF CONSTRUC· 
TION OR WORK IS SUSPENDED OR ABANDONED FOR A PERIOD OF 180 
DAYS AT ANY TIME AFTER WORK IS COMMENCED. 
I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT J HAVE READ AND EXAMINED THIS APPLICATION AND KNOW THE SAME TO 
BE TRUE AND CORRECT. ALL PROVISIONS OF LAWS AND ORDINANCES GOVERNING THIS TYPE OF 
WORK Will BE COMPLIED WITK WHET~.HER SPECIFIED HEREIN OR NOT. THE .ANTING OF A PERMIT 
DOES NOT PRESUME TO GIVE AUTHORITY TO VIOLATE OR CANCEl PROVISIONS OF ANY 
OTHER STATE OR LOCAL LAW REGULATING CONSTRUCTION THE PERFORMANCE OF 
CONSTRUCTION, 
~~NTRA~R/_~RIZEDAG:/NT. 
/--.><:::L'~:.:JP.o ~ ' df_;_ ~-
-- -'L . / ft5WNQl (IF oWi;t;lj'li'uJLDERl -
WHEN PROPERLY VALIDATED IN THIS SPACE 
THIS IS YOUR PERMIT 
(DATE) 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BLOCK 
CITY TREASURER 
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APPROVED FOR ISSUAN.CE 
By: 
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AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BLOCK 
City of Lewiston 
MEMORANDUM 
Date: April 9, 1999 
To: File- Sunset Palisades #4 
From: Tim Richard, City Engineer 
Subject: Slope Movement 
Attached is a photograph provided by Ten-y Howard, P.E. of Strata showing slope 
movement in Sunset Palisades #4 subdivision. This photo was received ii·om Terry 
Howard on 3/26/99. The area is located at the nmih end of Marine View Drive. It is on a 
side slope to the east-west running drainage draw located just north of this subdivision. 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BLOCK 
0135 l f ( 
BLOCK 
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AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BLOCK 
II :A 
(._ fY OF LEWISTON 
TRANSMITTAL DOCUMENT 
----------------------------------------------------------~ 
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Gentlemen: 
!'be following items are: 0 ltequested 
~closed 0 Sent aeparately da ______________ _ 
(:]Report (:]specification [:]coat Estimate 
(:JT81t lteault r:J Prints [:]Test Sample 
Ro. of Description Copies 
I f}bTO$ oF <::.LO!''J£ ~70 t/P.iJ11zUY1" 
r:J Shop Drawings 
Oother 
!'bese data are subnitted: OAt your request 
0 For your approval 
D !'or your review 
r:J For your action 
D Por your files 
~lor your information 




AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN BLOCK 
Sincerely, 
./___, ·. !} I -1 __ A. /1-l- ;cu. ·v.'tt C'-"'{ 
CITY 01' L!WISTOH 




~: _________________________ _ 
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BLOCK 
RONALD J. LANDECK 
ISB No. 3001 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
693 Styner A venue 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
(208) 883-1505 
FAX (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 









JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK ) 
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of the ) 
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased, ) 
CITY OF LEWISTON, a municipal corporation ) 
of the State ofldaho, and its employee, LOWELL) 
J. CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, and ) 
DOES1-20 ) , ) 
Defendants. ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) ss. 
County of Nez Perce ) 
Eric Hasenoehrl, upon oath, deposes and says: 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC HASENOEHRL -- 1 
Case No. CV09-02219 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC 
HASENOEHRL 
1. I am over eighteen (18) years of age and make this affidavit upon my personal 
knowledge. 
2. I am a licensed civil engineer in the State of Idaho. I am qualified to render the 
testimony and opinions expressed in this affidavit. 
3. I am employed by Keltic Engineering, Inc., an Idaho professional services 
corporation ("Keltic"), as a civil engineer and am a principal of that business and its President. 
4. Keltic provided engineering services to John Block beginning in mid-November, 
2007 in regard to the condition ofhomes constructed by Mr. Block in a subdivision known as 
Canyon Greens, and, specifically on Lot 1, Lot 2 and Lot 3, Administrative Plat of Canyon 
Greens, City of Lewiston, a resubdivision of Lot 4 of Amended Sunset Palisades No.8. Such 
lots are commonly known and addressed as 153 Marine View Drive (" 153 "), 155 Marine View 
Drive ("155") and 159 Marine View Drive ("159") (collectively "Canyon Greens"). 
5. Keltic had been previously engaged by the prior owners of Canyon Greens, the 
Streibicks, to prepare of the Administrative Plat of Sunset Palisades No. 8 and the Administrative 
Plat of Amended Sunset Palisades No. 8, which platting was completed and accepted by the City 
of Lewiston and recorded in November, 2005, shortly before Mr. Block purchased the Canyon 
Greens property. 
6. John Block then retained Keltic in December 2005 to provide engineering services in 
regard to his application for Canyon Greens, which resubdivided Lot 4 of Amended Sunset 
Palisades No.8 and, Keltic provided those services for Mr. Block by preparing the 
Administrative Plat for Canyon Greens which was accepted by the City of Lewiston and 
recorded on February 15, 2006. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC HASENOEHRL -- 2 
7. As a result of providing the foregoing engineering services, I have had substantial on-
site experience as well as in-depth interaction with the City of Lewiston, its engineers and other 
staff personnel in matters related to the platting and development of the real property that 
eventually became 153, 155 and 159. 
8. During the course of construction of the homes on 153, 155 and 159 in 2006, Keltic, 
on Mr. Block's behalf, engaged AllW est Testing & Engineering to test compaction of finished 
grade for the footings on those lots. As Mr. Block's engineer representative, I received and 
reviewed testing reports from AllWest, copies of which are attached hereto as Exhibit A. The 
reports established that all foundation locations were compacted in accordance with applicable 
building standards prior to construction on those lots. AllWest's compaction testing reports on 
153, 155 and 159 also disclosed that fill had been placed in the area of the testing, that AllWest 
did not test all areas of the lots and that AllW est would assume no responsibility for areas not 
tested. AllWest's statements to that effect are a standard engineering disclaimer, emphasizing 
that AllWest's duties did not extend beyond compaction testing of footings. Further, it is 
important to understand that the placement of fill on a building lot is common practice in the 
City of Lewiston and that the placement of fill is subject to permitting and review by the City for 
compliance with code requirements. Placement of fill on a building lot, of itself, provides no 
evidence or indication of slope movement or the probability of slope movement. 
9. In mid-November, Mr. Block requested that I view the condition of the homes on 
153, 155 and 159, which I did. I observed settlement in certain areas ofthe foundations. Mr. 
Block asked me what he should do. I suggested that we contact a geotechnical engineering firm, 
and I recommended Strata, Inc. ("Strata") to Mr. Block. He agreed and I then contacted Strata to 
discuss the matter with a Strata representative and arranged for a Strata representative to meet 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC HASENOEHRL -- 3 
Mr. Block at the site in early December 2007. After meeting with Mr. Abrams, Mr. Block 
consulted with me about his meeting with Mr. Abrams. I received a copy of Mr. Abrams' report 
ofthis meeting, (a copy of which is attached and labeled SE 2) and noted Mr. Abrams' reference 
in that report to "the observed settlement." I followed up by speaking several times to Mr. 
Abrams about the helical piers system which Mr. Abrams had recommended as an option to 
address foundation settlement. I shared this information with Mr. Block, and Mr. Block decided 
to pursue the installation ofhelical piers to remedy the settlement that was observed. 
10. I contacted Montana Helical Piers, Inc. on Mr. Block's behalf and monitored 
Montana Helical's December 2007 installation ofthe helical piers system on 153, 155 and 159. 
11. Prior to the helical piers being installed, Keltic established a methodology for 
monitoring movement ofthe structures on 153, 155 and 159 and began by performing an initial 
survey on December 5, 2007. Thereafter, Keltic performed an approximately, monthly survey 
that recorded the movements of all 3 structures at 32 different locations through December 15, 
2008. A portion of that survey data is attached to this affidavit as Exhibit B. Based upon that 
one-year survey data, I concluded that the helical piers had performed their intended function of 
stabilizing the structures on 15 3, 15 5 and 15 9. 
12. Throughout the course of my dealings and interactions with the City of Lewiston, 
neither I nor anyone at Keltic was ever made aware by the City that slope movement had 
previously occurred in the area of 153, 155 and 159, nor, during the substantial time I spent on 
the site in 2005, did I observe any evidence of slope movement in the area of 153, 155 and 159. 
It was not until John Block met with me in June 2009 and showed me a copy of documents and a 
photograph he told me he had obtained from the City of Lewiston's records and of a 1999 
Lewiston Tribune article that he had received from Sandra Lee (copies of which are attached 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC HASENOEHRL -- 4 
hereto and labeled Block 0135, 0136, 0137, 0138, 0140 and 0141) did I realize that slope 
movement had previously occurred in the area of 153, 155 and 159 and that the City of Lewiston 
had been made aware of that slope movement in 1999 and maintained that information in its 
records. 
13. What I observed in June, 2009 from the 1999 photograph that Mr. Block located in 
the City's records was slope movement, more commonly known as a landslide, in the area of 
153, 155 and 159 where Mr. Block had constructed 3 homes. Upon viewing the photograph, I 
realized for the first time that the settlement conditions that we had observed to those homes on 
153, 155 and 159 in November and December 2007 were more likely than not caused by slope 
movement or, in other words, by a landslide and not by foundation settlement as I had reasonably 
believed to that point. Mr. Block then asked me to survey the fault line of the 2009 slope 
movement, and I did so as set forth on the attached document labeled Block 0261. Comparing 
that 2009 survey line of the slope movement with the 1999 photograph from the City of 
Lewiston's records, I concluded that the fault line of the 2009 slope movement that is, the line 
from which the slope broke away and moved, is almost identical to the fault line ofthe 1999 
slope movement. 
14. The distressed condition ofthe structures on 153, 155 and 159 that I observed in 
November and December 2007 did not cause me, as a licensed professional engineer, to 
recommend that Mr. Block conduct an evaluation to determine whether or not the slope was 
unstable and/or whether the foundation settlement conditions we observed were other than 
normal settlement. There was no overt evidence of slope movement in December 2007. Mr. 
Block, with the information available to him, acted reasonably in deciding to utilize the helical 
pier system to stabilize the settlement conditions that were observed in December 2007 by 
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Block, Abrams and me and to properly, effectively monitor that situation. In my opinion, it 
would not be reasonable to conclude that Mr. Block or I should have known or should have 
attempted to discover, prior to May, 2009, that the settlement observed in 2007 was slope 
movement and not settlement. 
15. The above statements are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief. 
Dated this 13th day of July, 2010. 
Eric Hasenoehrl 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this __ day ofJuly, 2010. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 13th day of July, 2010, I caused a true and correct copy of this 
document to be served on the following individual in the manner indicated below: 
CLINTON 0. CASEY 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP 
1423 TYRELL LANE 
P.O. BOX 359 
BOISE, ID 83701 
BRIAN K. JULIAN 
STEPHEN L. ADAMS 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. MOORE PLAZA 
250 SOUTH FIFTH STREET, SUITE 700 
POST OFFICE BOX 7426 
BOISE, IDAHO 83707-7426 
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[ X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Email 
[X] FAX (208) 345-7212 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[X] U.S. Mail 
[ ] Email 
[X] FAX (208) 344-5510 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
~ Nci. 
ALL WEST Testing & Engineering 
DAILY PROJECT FIELD REPORT 
Project: Canyon Green Phase 1 Project: 306-014 
Project Address: Lewiston, ID Weather: Clear 
Permit# Date: 5/4/2006 
Type of Testing/Inspection: Compaction 
Deficiencies Noted: No Yes X If yes, explain below 
Reported To: Jon Block/ Eric H. of Owner/ Keltic Engineering 
Narrative: 
Arrived on site to test compaction of finish grade for footings on lots 153, 155, and 159. Lot 153 
had a large amount of oversized material that could not be tested with a moisture density gauge. 
one location was tested which indicated compaction of 86% (104.5pcf@ 10.3% moisture). Finish 
grade appeared scarified and uncompacted. Lot 159 was not tested due to scarification and no 
compactive efforts. We were able to push by hand the testing probe to a depth of 12". Lot 155 
appears to be a native cut and a 6' fill on NE section. Material is too rocky to test with a moisture 
density gauge, however, three tests were taken in testable material that indicated compaction of 
:84% to 96%. We recommend that material be scarified 12", moisture added and recompacted 
with suitable equipment. Owner has agreed and further testing will be needed. Lot 153, 155, and 
159 have had fill placed at earlier times. ALL WEST has no responsibility or liability for these 
areas. ALL WEST test results are only indicated to there exact locations and elevations. 
Representative: , T. Nielson #21279 Received By: 
Codes I 
Project Times ~ Equipment Begin End Hours 
Compaction 3:30 4:30 1 1/2 X Nuke 
8:00 9:00 1 1/2 Coring Machine 
Other 
3600 E Main, Suite B • Lewiston, 10 83501 • (208) 743-5710 • Fax (208) 743-8270 
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ALLWEST Testing & Engineering 
FIELD DENSITY TEST REPORT for SOILS 
Job# 
Canyon Green Phase 1 306-018 
Weather: Test Method:AASHTO T -130 Gauge: 
5/4/2006 Clear 
Technician: T. Nielson 
Lewisotn, ID 
M.S.: 
14079, Troxler 3440 
Contractor: Keltic Engineering D.S.: 









1 Native Silty Sand 12.6 121.7 Modified 
Test Elevation Proctor Probe % Dry % Required 
Location Number Depth Moisture Density Compaction Compaction 
finish 
Lot 153/ N side of buildingFooting grade 1 12" 10.3 104.5 86% 95 
Lot 159 Loose Material 
finish 
Lot 155/ N corner of house grade 1 12" 10.4 116.9 96% 95 
finish 
Lot 155/ S corner- N side of Garaqe grade 1 12" 10.0 112.5 93% 95 
finish 
Lot 155/ NW corner of house front ent. grade 1 12" 10.2 102.5 84% 95 
2 of 7 
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AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC HASENOEHRL 
No. 
ALLWEST Testing & Engineering 
DAILY PROJECT FIELD REPORT 
Project: Canyon Green Phase 1 Project: 306-014 
Project Address: Lewiston, ID Weather: Partly Cloudy 
Permit# Date: 5/26/2006 
Type of Testing/Inspection: Compaction 
Deficiencies Noted: No Yes X If yes, explain below 
Reported To: Jon Block of Owner 
Narrative: 
On site to retest footing areas that were tested on 5/4/06. 
Contractor has used a sheeps foot trench roller to compact material, with locations and 
testing results as follows on page 2. It appears that lots 153 and 159 have had fill placed 
throughout location. ALL WEST has no responsibility and accepts no liability for these areas. 
ALL WEST's test results are only indicative to their exact locations and elevations. 
Representative: T. Nielson #21279 Received By: John Block 
Codes I Project Times I Miles I Equipment Begin End Hours 
Compaction 10:30 12:30 2 X Nuke 
Coring Machine 
Other 
3600 E Main, Suite B • Lewiston, 10 83501 • (208) 734-5710 • Fax (208) 743-8270 
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ALL WEST Testing & Engineering 
FIELD DENSITY TEST REPORT for SOILS 
Canyon Green Phase 1 jJob# 306-018 
Weather: Test Method: compaction Gauge: 
5/26/2006 Partly Cloudy 
Technician: T. Nielson 
Lewisotn, ID 
M.S.: 
14079, Troxler 3440 
616 
Contractor: John block D.S.: 
2516 














Native Silty Sand 12.6 121.7 Modified 
Test Elevation Proctor Probe % Dry % Required 
Location Number Depth Moisture Density Compaction Compaction 
Lot 153 
SW corner of S footing FG 1 12" 12.3 117.9 97 95 
E footing, middle of footing FG 1 TO ROCKY TO TEST 
N trench footing, middle of footing FG 1 TO ROCKY TO TEST 
W footing, middle of footing FG 1 TO ROCKY TO TEST 
Lot159 
N trench, middle of footing FG 1 12" 15.4 118.2 97 95 
E footing of SE corner FG 1 12" 18.7 111.5 92 95 
S footing SW corner FG 1 12" 15.3 112.9 93 95 
W footing, middle of footing FG 1 TO ROCKY TO TEST 
4 of 7 
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ALL WEST Testing & Engineering 
DAILY PROJECT FIELD REPORT 
Project: Canyon Green Phase 1 Project: 306-014 
Project Address: Lewiston, ID Weather: Clear 
Permit# Date: 6/2/2006 
Type of Testing/Inspection: Retest for Compaction 
Deficiencies Noted: No Yes X If yes, explain below 
Reported To: Jon Block of Owner 
Narrative: 
On site to retest area offooting in lot 159. We retested area where compaction had failed due to 
high moisture in soil. The retest location appears to have lost moisture with compaction 
ranging between 95-97%, with test results and location as followed on second sheet. 
We also tested frost footing located on lot 153. Sub base was to rocky to test. Contractor has 
proof rolled material to set large cobble and has placed 8"-12" of 5/8" minus base agg. In 
locations with shots being taken on all levels of frost footing. 
It appears fill has been placed throughout lots 153 and 159. A sample was pulled to verify a 
proctor checkpoint. ALL WEST has no responsibility and accepts no liabilities for these areas. 
ALL WEST test results are only indicative to their exact locations and test elevations. 
Representative: T. Nielson #21279 Received By: John Block 
Codes 
Project Times I Miles I Equipment Begin End Hours 
Compaction 8:00 9:00 1 1/2 X Nuke 
Coring Machine 
Other 
3600 E Main, Suite B • Lewiston, 10 83501 • (208) 734-5710 • Fax (208) 743-8270 
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EXHIBIT A 
AL._ ST Testing & Engineering 
FIELD DENSITY TEST REPORT for SOILS 
Project: 
Canyon Green Phase 1 'Job# 306-014 
Date: Weather: Test Method:AASHTO T-130 Gauge: 
6/2/2006 Clear 14079, Troxler 3440 
Location: Technician: T. Nielson M.S.: 
Lewisotn, ID 2567 
Contractor: John Block D.S.: 
625 
Proctor Number Soil Description Optimum Maximum Density Standard!Modified 
Moisture 
1 Native Silty Sand 12.6 121.7 Modified 
2 Atlas 5/8" minus base agg. 8.4 137.5 Modified 
Test Test Elevation 
Proctor Probe % Dry % Required 
Nurnber Location Number Depth Moisture Density Compaction Compaction 
Retest Location of lot 159 
Retest from 5/26/06 #6 E footing of SE 
1 corner FG 1 12" 8.6 118.2 97% 
Previous Test #6 from 5/26/06 18.7 111.5 92% 
Retest from 5126106 #7 S footing, SW 
2 corner FG 1 12" 7.7 116.8 96% 
Previous Test #7 from 5/26/06 15.3 112.9 93% 
3 NW corner of frost footing FG 1 12" 10.2 115.6 95% 
Lot 153: 8"-12" Base agg. 
4 NE upper section of frost footing FG 2 6" 3.7 134.8 98% 
5 N lower section of frost footing FG 2 8" 3.8 135.3 98% 
NW corner of upper section of frost 
6 footing FG 2 8" 4.2 133.8 97% 
6 of 7 
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Materials Testing • Geotechnical Engineering 
June 1, 2006 
To: John Block 
Re: Density testing per lots 153, 155, and 159 for canyon Green, Phase 1 Subdivision 
Dear Mr. Block, 
ALL WEST was contracted by Keltic Engineering to do density testing on footing sub-
grade for lots 153, 155, and 159 for Canyon Green Phase 1 Subdivision, located in 
Lewiston, Idaho. It appears that footings will be sitting on fill material that was not tested 
for compaction by ALL WEST at time of placement. 
Compaction testing performed by ALL WEST for footings are indicated to there exact 
locations and elevations. ALL WEST assumes no liability of performance for existing fill. 
The owner has acknowledged acceptance of all liability and long term performance of fill 
placed for lots mentioned above. 
Respectfully Submitted, 
Chris Beck 
Area Manager Principal Engineer 
CC: Eric Hasenhorl 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERlC HASENOEHRL 
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Miles From To Hours 
MPJ Project Engineer Site VisiUProject Coordination 2.5 
EQUIPMENT Nuke: Mobile Lab: Torque Wrench: RebarLoc 
Per Diem: Lodging: Cylinders: 
EXPENSES 
Other (describe): Weather: 
Approved Plans on S1te: Yes No Date: Archttect: ------Type ofTesUinSRc:..: _________________________________ _ 
Deficiencies: 
Action(s} Taken: 
Results Reported to: 
Narrative: 
John Block of 
of 
I arrived at the project site as requested by Mr. John Block to observe the condition of distress to homes which he has developed 
along Marine View Drive in Lewiston, Idaho. The addresses of the homes were 153, 155 and 159 Marine View Drive. At the time I 
arrived on site J met Mr. Block who showed me around the property and pointed out signs of distress to .the homes. Each of the homes 
as well as site retaining walls constructed by Mr. Block exhibit visible cracking and signs of deformation and misalignment. Cracking 
and misalignment was observed in the stem walls for the footings as well as slabs on grade for driveways and a pool patio. Mr. Block 
indicated that the observed distress appeared to coincide with the timing of an extreme irrigation event which caused water to pond in 
the yards which comprised backfill for the site retaining walls. 
During our discussions Mr. Block indicated the site had been filled by a previous property owner and he was unaware of any 
compaction testing or condition of fill placed prior to his ownership. Mr. Block inquired my opinion of potential solutions for the distress 
and settlement issues observed. I indicated to Mr. Block that without detailed subsurface knowledge and engineering evaluation of 
current site conditions I could not provide an engineering opinion of the causes of the observed settlement. However, I indicated that 
some potential causes of the observed stress may include but are not limited to settlement offill placed for site grading or slope 
instability of the development as a whole or in localized areas of the development. At that time I outlined verbally to Mr. Block a 
conceptual geotechnical engineering scope of service which may help evaluate site conditions and potential causes of distress. This 
scope outlined to him included subsurface exploration and sampling through soil borings extending to native soil below previously 
placed fill. Also, a detailed site survey of existing surface conditions and historical information regarding previous grading at the site 
would be required to make any detailed evaluation of potential slope stability problems at the site. I indicated to John that I could not 
provide a detailed fee estimate of such a geotechnical scope at this time however the scope may be on the order of $25,000 depending 
on the final scope authorized. I also indicated to John that this detailed exploration and evaluation may take 6 to a weeks to 
accomplish. John indicated he did not Wish to proceed with such a detailed evaluation at this time. He then asked for other options or 
alternatives. I indicated to John that another alternative may be to simply install a deep foundation system such as helical piers 
beneath the homes experiencing distress. I clarified With John that without a detailed engineering evaluation of subsurface conditions 
and factors influencing the observed distress such installation would be at his own risk with respect to the depth of piers installed and 
whether or not they would actually remedy the causes of distress. I indicated to John that piers may help to remedy potential 
embankment settlement beneath the homes by bypassing structural loads through the fill into native soil below however, helicaf piers 
will not provide significant lateral restraint for stabilization for slope movement. John then indicated he would discuss the project with 
his structural engineer, Keltic Engineering and decide how to proceed. John indicated he did not desire STRATA to perform any 
additional services or prepare a detailed scope for geotechnical evaluation of the site at this time. 
1. 
2. 
-------------------- Strata Representative: Andrew J. Abrams 
-------------------- Received By: 
Revised 1lf04 
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Total Movements 
Descrip. Pt.# Total Since Jacks Total Since Beginning 
H= .12 NE H= .12 NE 
Wall 1 V= .02 Higher V= 0 
H= .15 NE H= .17 NE 
Wall 2 V= .09 Lower V= .11 Lower 
H= .21 NE H= .23 NE 
Wall 3 V= .19 Lower V= .21 Lower 
H= .21 NE H= .23 NE 
Wall 4 V= .19 Lower V= .23 Lower 
H= .23 NE H= .24 NE 
Wall 5 V= .19 Lower V= .23 Lower 
H= .20 NE H= .24 NE 
Wall 6 V= .19 Lower V= .20 Lower 
H= .19 NE H= .19 NE 
Wall 7 V= .18 Lower V= .20 Lower 
H= .17 NE H= .17 NE 
Wall 8 V= .17 Lower V= .20 Lower 
H=.15NE H= .16 NE 
House (Cor) 9 V= .09 Lower V= .10 Lower 
H=.15 NE H=.19 NE 
House (Cor) 11 V= .15 Lower V= .04 Lower 
H= .17 NE H= .17 NE 
House (Side) 12 V= .09 Lower V= .08 Lower 
H= .17 NE H= .19 NE 
Wall 13 V=.09 Lower V=.10 Lower 
H= .16 NE H= .16 NE 
Wall 14 V= .11 Lower V= .11 Lower 
H= .16 NE H= .18 NE 
Wall 15 V= .12 Lower V= .13 Lower 
H= .18 NE H= .20 NE 
Wall 16 V= .16 Lower V= .19 Lower 
H= .09 NE H= .10 NE 
Wall 17 V= .15 Lower V= .15 Lower 
H=.10NE H= .12 NE 
Wall 18 V= .09 Lower V= .10 Lower 
H= .12 NE H= .12 NE 
Wall 19 V= .12 Lower V= .13 Lower 
House (Side) 20 Lost Lost 
H= .03 NW H= .03 SE 
House (Cor}_ 21 V= .06 Lower V= .10 Higher 
H= .04 NW H= .06 NE 
Wall 22 V= .13 Lower V= .13 Lower 
H= .11 NW H= .11 NW 
Wall 23 V= .15 Lower V= .17 Lower 
H= .16 NW H= .16 NW 
Wall 24 V= .11 Lower V= .14 Lower 
H=.05 NW H= .07 NW 
Wall 25 V= .03 Lower V= .03 Lower 
H=.04 NW H= .05 NW 
House (Side) 26 V= .06 Lower V= .05 Lower 
H= .04 NW H=.01 NW 
House (Cor) 27 V= .10 Lower V= .07 Higher 
H= .02 NW H= 0 
House (Side) 28 V= .02 Higher V= .03 Higher 
Deck 29 Lost Lost 
H=.03 NW H= .03 NW 
House (Cor) 30 V=o V= .01 Lower 
House (Side) 31 Lost Lost 
H= .17 NE H= .18 NE 
Deck Post 32 V= .15 Lower V= .17 Lower 
AFFIDAVIT OF ERIC HASENOEHRL EXHIBIT 
·153 MARINE VIEW DR 
Location of Pnt Pnt # From Beginning to Installation of Jacks 
12/5/07 - 12/19/07 
Wall 1 H- 0.15 SE V- 0.01 -
Wall 2 H= 0.02 SE V= 0.02 -
Wall 3 H= 0.02 SE V= 0.02 -
Wall 4 H= 0.01 SE V= 0.02 -
Wall 5 H= 0.03 NE V= 0.02 -
Wall 6 H= 0.03 NE V= 0.01 -
Wall 7 H= 0.01 SE V= 0.02 -
Wall 8 H= 0.03 SE V= 0.03 -
Wall 9 H= 0.01 NW V= 0.01 -
Wall 11 H= 0.03 SE V= 0.00 
House 12 H= 0.01 sw V= 0.01 + 
Wall 13 H= 0.02 SE V= 0.01 + 
Wall 14 H= 0.02 SE V= 0.01 -
Wall 15 H= 0.02 NE V= 0.01 -
Deck Post 32 H= 0.03 NE V= 0.00 
159 MARINE VIEW DR 
Location of Pnt Pnt # From Beginning to Installation of Jacks 
12/5/07 - 12/19/07 
Wall 16 H- 0.01 SE V= 0.02 -
Wall 17 H= 0.02 NE V= 0.01 -
Wall 18 H= 0.02 NE V= 0.01 -
Wall 19 H= 0.01 sw V= 0.01 -
House 21 H= 0.02 SE V= 0.02 -
Wall 22 H= 0.03 NE V= 0.02 -
Wall 23 H= 0.01 NW V= 0.02 
I 
Wall 24 H= 0.01 NE V= 0.01 -
Wall 25 H= 0.00 V= 0.02 -
House 26 H= 0.01 NW V= 0.01 -
-------
155 MARINE VIEW DR 
Location of Pnt Pnt # From Beginning to Installation of Jacks 
12/5/07- 12/12/07 
House 27 H= 0.01 sw V= 0.01 + 
House 28 H= 0.02 NW V= 0.00 
House 30 H= 0.02 NW V= 0.01 
Total Since Installation of Jacks 
1/14/07 -12/15/08 
1 H= 0.14 NE V- 0.06 
2 H= 0.18 NE V= 0.07 
3 H= 0.21 NE V= 0.20 
4 H= 0.21 NE V= 0.20 
5 H= 0.25 NE V= 0.20 
6 H= 0.19 NE V= 0.21 
7 H= 0.19 NE V= 0.19 
8 H= 0.17 NE V= 0.16 
9 H= 0.17 NE V= 0.08 
11 H= 0.17 NE V= 0.12 
12 H= 0.19 NE V= 0.07 
13 H= 0.17 NE V= 0.06 
14 H= 0.17 NE V= 0.10 
15 H= 0.19 NE V= 0.12 
32 H= 0.17 NE V= 0.15 
Total Since Installation of Jacks 
1/14/07 - 12/15/08 
16 H- 0.18 NE V- 0.17 
17 H= 0.09 NE V= 0.15 
18 H= 0.10 NE V= 0.09 
19 H= 0.12 NE V= 0.12 
21 H= 0.01 NW V= 0.04 
22 H= 0.05 NE V= 0.13 
23 H= 0.12 NW V= 0.16 
24 H= 0.16 NW V= 0.12 
25 H= 0.08 NW V= 0.02 
26 H= 0.03 NE V= 0.07 
Total Since Installation of Jacks 
12/19/07 - 12/15/08 
27 H= 0.02 NW V= 0.11 
28 H= 0.01 NW V= 0.04 
30 H= 0.01 NW V= 0.02 
---
+ 1 H= 
- 2 H= 
- 3 H= 
- 4 H= 
- 5 H= 
- 6 H= 
- 7 H= 
- 8 H= 
- 9 H= 
- 11 H= 
- 12 H= 
- 13 H= 
- 14 H= 
- 15 H= 
- 32 H= 
- 16 H= 
- 17 H= 
- 18 H= 
- 19 H= 
- 21 H= 
- 22 H= 
- 23 H= 
- 24 H= 
- 25 H= 
- 26 H= 
- 27 H= 
+ 28 H= 
~ 30 H= 
Total Since Beginning 
12/5/07-12/15/08 
0.14 NE V= 0.03 
0.19 NE V= 0.09 
0.24 NE V= 0.22 
0.23 NE V= 0.24 
0.26 NE V= 0.23 
0.23 NE V= 0.22 
0.20 NE V= 0.21 
0.17 NE V= 0.20 
0.18 NE V= 0.09 
0.21 NE V= 0.01 
0.19 NE V= 0.06 
0.19 NE V= 0.06 
0.17 NE V= 0.11 
0.20 NE V= 0.14 
0.18 NE v= 0.17 
Total Since Beginning 
12/5/07 - 12/15/08 
0.20 NE V- 0.21 
0.10 NE V= 0.15 
0.12 NE V= 0.09 
0.12 NE V= 0.13 
0.04 SE V= 0.11 
0.06 NE V= 0.14 
0.12 NW V= 0.18 
0.16 NW V= 0.15 
0.10 NW V= 0.03 
0.04 NW V= 0.06 
Total Since Beginning 
12/5/07 -12/15/08 
0.01 sw V= 0.07 
O.D1 SE V= 0.06 
















































JOB 07- D2.27 
SHEET NO. __________ _ OF _________ __ 
KELTIC ENGINEERING, INC. 
CALCULATED BY _________ _ DATE _______ _ 
315 Adams Lane· Lewiston, 10 83501 ·Phone (208) 743-2135 CHECKED BY __________ _ DATE _______ _ 
1621 N. 3rd St., Ste 500 . Coeur d'Alene, 10 83814 • Phone (208) 664-4836 
SCALE ______________________ _ 
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City of Lewiston 
MEMORANDUM 
Date: April 9, 1999 
To: File- Sunset Palisades #4 
From: Tim Richard, City Engineer 
Subject: Slope Movement 
Attached is a photograph provided by Teny Howard, P.E. of Strata showing slope 
movement in Sunset Palisades #4 subdivision. This photo was received from Terry 
Howru·d on 3/26/99. The area is located at the nmth end ofMarine View Drive. It is on a 
side slope to the east-west running drainage draw located just north of this subdivision. 
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Caption: Terry Howard photo 
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Cracks that are the telltale marks of moving earth line the sides of the gully below the 11th hole at the 
Lewiston Golf and Country Club. 
It's tough to stop geology; Hillside near Lewiston's Marine View Drive is slowly, but surely, slipping 
away 
Byline: Sandra Lee 
The earth is slipping on a hillside north of Marine View Drive, a few hundred feet from some of 
Lewiston's most expensive homes. 
It probably will stop before it threatens any homes in the area, Moscow geotechnical engineer Terry R. 
Howard said. But something needs to be done about the water that is pouring into the hillside, he said, 
and the cracks created by the slips should be closed up. 
The movement is below and to the west of a bridge that connects the 11th fahway at the Lewiston Golf 
and Country Club. 
South of there, above Atlas Sand and Rock, a chunk of earth above a settling pond has broken loose. 
Both are south of the Snake River Avenue slide that has threatened the Lewiston Elks Temple and 
hampered traffic through the area since May 4, 1998. 
They were discovered while reviewing aedal photographs taken ofthe area this spring, Howard said. 
Copies of the photographs were provided to both city of Lewiston and Nez Perce County officials, but 
neither poses an immediate threat to any dwelling, business or road. 
Eventually it will stabilize itself through a process in which the toe washes out, earth slips down, and 
the process repeats itself over and over, retired Le':Yl.ston Pq~lic Works Administrator Bud R. Van§~ 
said of the slump below the golf course~'Eventuafly it will be stable. How far back it will go, I don't 
know." 
He won't live long enough to see it stabilize, Van Stone said. "It's a long-te1m situation." 
The second site above the settling pond will do the same thing until it forms a gully up the hillside 
unless it's stopped by placing rock to stop the erosion, he said. 
Not all of the movement closest to Marine View Drive appears to be new this year, Van Stone and 
Howard said. 
}t li~ely has ham)ened since the~ was built,~~· "TI~t subd~~aused tlt~Jf!pdslid~.:: 
Lewiston's policy is to retain water on-site, and it tells the devcloper to do that, he said. 
The goal of retention is to hold the water until it evaporates or it soaks into the ground. If the ground 
becomes saturated, it causes a landslide. 
The city also uses dry wells, which are just catch basins that let water seep into the ground, he said. 
One is at the Io·wer end of Marine View Drive. 
As the dirt slides down the south face of the gully nearest Marine View Drive, it forces the stream of 
water to the other side, where it's now eating into that slope. It will become steeper until it fails, too, 
6/1/2009 
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Howard said. 
"Geology loves to do that kind of stuff." 
It's essentially the same thing that happened behind the Elks, where runoff went into dry wells, soaked 
into the subsurface and eventually caused a problem. 
The present slide isn't the first along Snake River A venue. Old news stories describe slides in the early 
1970s, and there have been several in thls decade. 
One inm1ediately below the Elks and adjacent to the current slide was stopped by installation of a 
cribbing wall. One on the northem edge of the slide was stopped when county crews removed much of 
the earth, installed drainage pipes to carry water to the river instead of into the hillside, and seeded the 
surface. 
"Understand, I'm not laying blame here," Howard said of the city's zero-runofipolicy. nThis is the way 
cities do things. If anyone is to blame it's the founders who didn't set aside money for drainage. If they 
had, those who followed would have continued." 
The city tells the developer to deal with water, and that means retaining it or building a pipe to the 
river, Howard said. A pipe could increase the cost of lots until they're not economically feasible. 
New subdivisions should be dealing with water in a more positive manner, and they need to take 
geology into consideration, he said. 
'That's why we have the Elks (slide)-- geology and urbanization." 
_1ewiston C,hy....fu:i.gin~et Tim Richard ®id no act!2!~yd for at this time to jeal w~t~ 
mov_£~11~;!,1L The~. will document the infonnatio!!, and ~~ tha!J!~ are submitt~:!,~ 
deal with it at tl~ · 
Sandra Lee 
(208)848-2266 




Brian K. Julian, ISB No. 2360 
Stephen L. Adams, ISB No. 7534 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: {208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-551 0 
E-Mail: bjulian@ajhlaw .com 
sadams@ajhlaw .com 
Attorneys for Defendants City of Lewiston and 
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer 
FILED 
16 Pl'l 2 17 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK 
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, 
deceased, CITY OF LEWISTON, a 
municipal corporation of the State of 
Idaho, and its employee LOWELL J. 
CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, 
and DOES 1 - 20, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 09-02219 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 1 
COME NOW, the above-entitled Defendants, City of Lewiston and Lowell J. 
Cutshaw, by and through their attorneys of record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, and 
hereby submit this Reply in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I. 
INTRODUCTION 
On May 24, 2010, Defendants filed with this Court a Motion for Summary 
Judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff failed to comply with the requirements of 
the Idaho Tort Claims Act, /.C. § 6-901, et seq. In response, Plaintiff attempts to 
argue that he was "blamelessly ignorant with regard to knowledge of the cause of 
his damages." Memorandum in Opposition, p. 11. Even if the Court were to adopt 
this term, borrowed from the California courts, Plaintiff cannot show that he is 
"blamelessly ignorant", blissfully unaware, or in any other way, ignorant of 
potential causes of his damages. As discussed below, Plaintiff knew or should have 
known in November 2007 of his claims, and was on notice at that point to begin 
investigating potential causes, including the potential that the cause was slope 
movement. The uncontroverted facts before the Court show that Plaintiff had all 
the information that he needed to timely file a Notice of Tort claim within one 
hundred eighty days from November 2007, but did not due to his own choice not 
to investigate. These issues will be discussed in more detail below. 
II. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
A. BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO INVESTIGATE HIS CLAIMS AND FILE A 
NOTICE OF TORT CLAIM WITHIN ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY DAYS OF 
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NOVEMBER 2007, HIS CLAIMS AGAINST DEFENDANT CITY AND 
CUTSHAW ARE BARRED. 
Plaintiff's essential argument is that he could not have known until May 
2009 that the properties at issue were subject to slope movement, and not 
settlement. See Memorandum in Opposition, p. 5. However, the law clearly states 
Plaintiff must file a tort claim within one hundred eighty days "from the date the 
claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever is later." /.C. § 
6-905. There is no question about when the claim arose: Plaintiff admits that he 
discovered evidence of settlement on the three properties in November 2007. See 
Block Aff., ,4. Plaintiff argues that November 2007 is not the start of the one 
hundred eighty day time period because he did not know of the City's involvement 
at that point, and that the reason for the damage was slope movement. 
Memorandum in Opposition, pp. 5, 8-14. However, this is not the appropriate 
standard for when the tort claim notice begins running. The notice period begins 
running when Plaintiff: 1) incurred some damage, and 2) had some knowledge of 
the City's involvement. Both of these elements were met in October and 
November, 2007. 
In Mitchell v. Bingham Mem. Hosp., 130 Idaho 420 (1997), the Idaho 
Supreme Court laid out the standard for when the one hundred eighty day time 
period runs. In that case, the plaintiff was injured at a county hospital as a result 
of an overdose. Mitchell, 1 30 Idaho at 421 . Plaintiffs were told by the hospital that 
the overdose was the result of a malfunction in the machinery delivering the 
medication. /d. Two months later, Plaintiffs were told that the overdose was a 
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result of nurse error. /d. Plaintiffs then filed their Notice of Tort Claim 
approximately one hundred eighty days after notification of nurse error, past 180 
days after the overdose. /d. at 422. In resolving the dispute over which date was 
the proper date to begin the running of the one hundred eighty days, the Court 
stated: 
This Court has held that "knowledge of facts which would put a 
reasonably prudent person on inquiry is the equivalent to knowledge of 
the wrongful act and will start the running of the [180 days]." The 
Court has further held that the statutory period begins to run from the 
occurrence of the wrongful act even if the full extent of damages is 
not known at that time. In a recent case, the Court of Appeals 
clarified the amount of knowledge required to begin the notice period: 
"The statute does not begin running when a person fully understands 
the mechanism of the injury and the government's role, but rather 
when he or she is aware of such facts that would cause a reasonably 
prudent person to inquire further into the circumstances surrounding 
the incident." The claimant in [that case] had argued that the notice 
period should not start running until she knew the exact cause of her 
injury. The Court of Appeals held that "such an interpretation would 
allow a party to delay completion of an investigation for months or 
even years before submitting a notice under the [ITCA]." 
The Mitchells were aware of the overdose and respiratory arrest on 
the day the overdose occurred. The facts available to the Mitchells 
were sufficient to cause a reasonably prudent person to inquire further 
into the circumstances surrounding the incident. Furthermore, even if 
the cause of the overdose had been due to a malfunctioning infusion 
machine, and although there may be ultimate shared responsibility 
with a manufacturer in such a case, the hospital is entitled to timely 
notice of a potential claim. Thus, we hold that the 180-day period 
began to run on July 20, 1992 [the date of the overdose], even 
though the Mitchells did not know the extent of the injury and Mrs. 
Mitchell's damages or the extent to which the hospital was 
responsible. 
Mitchell, 130 Idaho at 423 - 24 (emphasis added; internal citations omitted). 
Plaintiff cites a number of cases which indicate an exception to this rule, 
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under which the tort claim notice period is tolled until the plaintiff has knowledge 
of a governmental entity's involvement. These cases are inapposite to this 
situation. In Trosper v. Raymond, 99 Idaho 54 (1978), the plaintiff sued related to 
the death of a family member in an excavation pond. /d., at 55. Plaintiff sued the 
property owner, unaware that Canyon County was leasing the property. The 
plaintiff did not learn about Canyon County's involvement until discovery had 
started. /d. Plaintiff could not have known of the lease and the County's 
involvement until they had done discovery, at which point the Notice of Tort Claim 
time limits began running. 
In Carman v. Carman, 114 Idaho 551 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988), the question 
involved disclosure of a magistrate's decision relevant to the case. /d. at pp. 552 -
553. Plaintiff did not learn about the disclosure until she had taken the deposition 
of one of the other defendants. /d. at 553. She then filed a Notice of Tort Claim 
which, the Court determined was timely. As the Idaho Court of Appeals stated, 
the plaintiff did not know, nor did she have sufficient facts to cause 
her to properly inquire further, that a county employee was involved in 
her alleged injury. Once she gained such information, through the 
testimony of her former husband during a bankruptcy proceeding, the 
time limit of I.C. § 6-906 began to run. 
Mallory v. City of Montpelier, 126 Idaho 446, 449 (Idaho Ct. App. 1994). The 
Mallory decision also distinguished Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, (1986), stating 
In Doe v. Durtschi, the plaintiffs, parents of minor children who had 
been molested by a teacher, had no reason to know of and possessed 
no knowledge that would cause them to investigate into the school 
district's hiring of the offending teacher with knowledge of his 
improper proclivities. Only after the preparation of a presentence 
investigation of the teacher in a criminal action did the parents learn of 
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the potential liability of the school district. Thus, the statute was 
properly tolled until the parents received information that led them to 
inquire further into the school district's knowledge. 
Mallory, 126 Idaho at 449. Regarding both of these cases, the Court stated "there 
were facts in existence at the time of the injury that the plaintiffs did not know, 
and could not have been reasonably expected to discover, until a later time when 
some knowledge, beyond their initial reach, was imparted to them." /d. 
The facts from these cases are all distinguishable from the present case. 
Plaintiff knew in November 2007, that the Defendants were involved. In his 
Affidavit, he stated that he assumed that the lots at issue had been "properly 
graded and filled under permit from the City and supervision and inspection by the 
City," at which point he constructed a home on each lot. Block Aff., 13.1 Thus, 
Plaintiff knew about the Defendants' involvement prior to building on the 
properties, and Plaintiff also admits that he obtained permits from the City of 
Lewiston. /d. Therefore, unlike the plaintiffs in Trosper, Carmen and Doe v. 
Durtschi, Plaintiff had full knowledge that the City was involved in some fashion as 
early as 2005. Therefore, he cannot claim that he did not have sufficient 
knowledge to put him on inquiry notice until May 2009. 
Even assuming that the Court agrees with Plaintiff that the Notice of Tort 
Claim did not begin running until Plaintiff had notice of potential slope movement 
Why Mr. Block assumed that the City supervised the grading and filling is beyond defense 
counsel's understanding. There is no responsibility or duty for a city to supervise work done 
under a permit. Regardless, Mr. Block admits that he knew the City was involved, or that 
he assumed it was, in which case, he was on inquiry notice to determine if the City caused 
his damages. 
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as opposed to settlement, Plaintiff still was still put on inquiry notice in December 
2007. Both Plaintiff and his engineer, Eric Hasenoehrl, state that they were 
advised that na deep foundation system such as helical piers" was a sufficient 
method for repairing the structures. Memorandum in Opposition, p. 3; Block Aff. 
11 5 - 6; Hasenoehrl Aff., 1 9. These assumptions were based on statements from 
Andrew Abrams, an engineer at Strata, Inc., who was retained to propose solutions 
to the settlement problems. Hasenoehrl Aff., , 9. It is undisputed that Abrams 
specifically told Plaintiff In December 2007 that one potential reason for the 
problems with the property was slope movement. See Block Aft., , 5. Mr. 
Abrahams' report specifically states: 
During our discussions Mr. Block indicated the site had been filled by a 
previous property owner and he was unaware of any compaction 
testing or condition of fill placed prior to his ownership. Mr. Block 
inquired my opinion of potential solutions for the distress and 
settlement issues observed. I indicated to Mr. Block that without 
detailed subsurface knowledge and engineering evaluation of current 
site conditions I could not provide an engineering opinion of the 
causes of the observed settlement. However, I indicated that some 
potential causes of the observed stress may include but are not limited 
to settlement of fill placed for site grading or slope instability of the 
development as a whole or in localized areas of the development. At 
that time I outlined verbally to Mr. Block a conceptual geotechnical 
engineering scope of service which may help evaluate site conditions 
and potential causes of distress. This scope outlined to him included 
subsurface exploration and sampling through soil boring extending to 
native soil below previously placed fill. Also, a detailed site survey of 
existing surface conditions and historical information regarding 
previous grading at the site would be required to make any detailed 
evaluation of potential slope stability problems at the site. I indicated 
to John that I could not provide a detailed fee estimate of such a 
geotechnical scope at this time however the scope may be on the 
order of $25,000.00 depending on the final scope authorized. I also 
indicated to John that this detailed exploration and evaluation may 
take 6 to 8 weeks to accomplish. John indicated he did not wish to 
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proceed with such a detailed evaluation at this time. He then asked for 
other options or alternatives. I indicated to John that another 
alternative may be to simply install a deep foundation system such as 
helical piers beneath the homes experiencing distress. I clarified with 
John that without a detailed engineering evaluation of subsurface 
conditions and factors influencing the observed distress such 
installation would be at his own risk with respect to the depths of 
piers installed and whether or not they would actually remedy the 
causes of distress. I indicated to John that piers may help to remedy 
potential embankment settlement beneath the homes by bypassing 
structural loads though the fill into native soil below however, helical 
piers will not provide significant lateral restraint for stabilization for 
slope movement. John then indicated he would discuss the project 
with his structural engineer, Keltic Engineering and decide how to 
proceed. John indicated he did not desire STRATA to perform any 
additional services or prepare a detail scope for geotechnical 
evaluation of the site at this time. [sic] 
Hasenoehrl Aff., Ex. SE 2; Supplemental Affidavit of Stephen Adams in Support of 
Motion for Summary Judgment, Exhibit "A" (emphasis added). 2 
Plaintiff attempts to rely on a number of non-Idaho cases to support his 
conclusion that the tort claim notice period did not begin to run until he had full 
knowledge of the City's involvement. First, he relies on Leaf v. City of San Mateo, 
104 Cal. App. 3d 398, 408 (Cal. App. 1st Dist. 1980). The rule laid down in Leaf 
has been rejected by Idaho. See Magnuson Props. P'ship. v. City of Coeur D'Alene, 
138 Idaho 166, 169 (2002) (tort claim notice period begins to run from point at 
which Plaintiff is put on inquiry, not the point at which they discover that the 
defendant was a cause of their injuries). It is not clear that Leaf is good law in 
California, let alone Idaho. See Donabedian v. Manzer, 153 Cal. App. 3d 592 (Cal. 
2 This quote comes from a document submitted by both Plaintiff and Defendants responding 
to Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. Therefore, there is no dispute of material or 
non-material fact regarding the contents of this document or what was recommended to 
Plaintiff in December, 2007, and it is admissible and relevant for consideration by the Court. 
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App. 1st Dist. 1984) (holding that it is questionable whether the "discovery rule" 
applicable in Leaf is the appropriate standard). Further, the discussion in Leaf 
revolves around Cal. Code Civ. Proc. § 337.1 5, a code which is analogous to I. C. § 
5-241, dealing with latent defects in construction. The analysis based on these 
sections does not apply to the running of the tort claim notice period. Plaintiff tries 
to supplement the analysis in Leaf by showing that it comports with the dissent in 
Mitchell v. Bingham Mem. Hosp., supra. However, the logic employed in Justice 
Schroeder's dissent in Mitchell is not the law in Idaho; the majority's opinion is the 
law. The fact that Plaintiff relies on the dissent in Mitchell only shows that 
Plaintiff's argument is not supported by law. 
Plaintiff also relies on Garza v. United States Bureau of Prisons, 284 F.3d 
930, 937 (8th Cir. 2002), apparently because of the discussion in a footnote in 
Doe v. Durtschi, 11 0 Idaho 466, 4 73 ( 1986)3, wherein the similarities between the 
Idaho Tort Claims Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act are outlined. There is no 
need to rely on cases discussing the FTCA under these circumstances, because 
there are numerous Idaho cases which already discuss the issue before the Court. 
As the Supreme Court stated in Doe v. Durtschi, the only reason the Court looked 
to cases discussing the FTCA was because the issue being discussed was a matter 
of first impression, for which there was no relevant legislative history. Durtschi, 
110 Idaho at 472. The issue in this case is not a matter of first impression, and 
therefore there is no reason to look to cases outside of Idaho. 
3 See Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 473 {1986) (fn. 2). 
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Even if the Court were to look at the logic employed in Garza, it would find 
that Garza in fact supports the Defendants' position. In Garza, the plaintiff sued the 
U.S. Bureau of Prisons for the wrongful death of his sister at the hands of an 
escaped convict. Garza, 284 F.3d at 933 - 34. The sister was murdered in 1995, 
and the convict was convicted in March, 1996. /d. Plaintiff filed his administrative 
claim on October 29, 1998, about a month after he found out that the employees 
he alleged were responsible were employees of the Bureau. /d. at 933. The trial 
Court determined that the notice accrual date occurred in February, 1996, based 
on the grounds that plaintiff was on inquiry notice as of that date due to various 
factors. /d. at 933 - 34. The 8th Circuit agreed, holding 
The limitations period begins to run either when the government cause 
is known or when a reasonably diligent person (in the tort claimant's 
position) reacting to any suspicious circumstances of which he might 
have been aware would have discovered the government cause--
whichever comes first. Therefore, when catalytic circumstances 
prescribe, a plaintiff must exercise reasonable diligence in inquiring 
into the injury's cause. Although [a] claim does not accrue when a 
person has a mere hunch, hint, suspicion, or rumor of a claim, ... 
such suspicions do give rise to a duty to inquire into the possible 
existence of a claim in the exercise of due diligence. Also, a plaintiff's 
assertion of when he gained actual knowledge is not determinative if 
he did not act reasonably and, in effect, closed [his] eyes to evident 
and objective facts concerning accrual of [his] right to sue. 
/d. at 934 - 35 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). "Where the 
government or its agents have not misled or deceived a plaintiff, or otherwise 
hidden the legal identity of alleged tortfeasors as federal employees, the cause of 
action still accrues when the existence of an injury and its cause are known." /d. at 
935. The Court also held that a plaintiff need not have conclusively known the 
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details giving rise to the claim to be on inquiry notice. /d. at 936. Specifically, 
regarding the knowledge of the relationship between the halfway house where the 
convict lived prior to escaping and the U.S. Bureau of Prisons, the Court held: 
was sufficient to require inquiry into accountability of the respective 
parties and their employees' status. Moreover, from the time [the 
decedent]'s body was discovered, inquiry was in order into the 
tragically obvious questions of whether she had been notified of [the 
convict]'s escape, whether anyone was responsible to make such 
notification and, if so, whom. 
/d. at 936. 
The same analysis applies in this case. Plaintiff was aware that there had 
been fill on the property, and was acting under the assumption that the City had 
been involved. Block Aff., 1 3. Therefore, when settling was discovered on the 
properties in November, 2007, Plaintiff was on inquiry notice as to whether the 
settlement was due to the fill, or some other reason such as slope movement (for 
which he claims the Defendants are liable). Plaintiff even had the opportunity to do 
such an inquiry, and was told by the geotech engineering firm he hired that the 
problem may be slope instability, see Hasenoerhl Aff., Ex. SE 2, but Plaintiff 
ignored this advice, instead choosing a quick fix. Block Aff., 1 5. Plaintiff was not 
allowed to wait until he knew the full details of the City's involvement before the 
tort claim notice time period began running. Mitchell, 30 Idaho at 423 - 24. The 
fact that Plaintiff knew the City was involved when he accrued damages in October 
or November, 2007, was sufficient to start the tort claim notice period. 
Idaho courts have been clear on this subject. When a Plaintiff does not know 
that there is a connection between a governmental entity and a tortious act, the 
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tort claim notice period does not begin to run until the Plaintiff has knowledge 
indicating a connection. Trosper v. Raymond, 99 Idaho 54, 55 (1978); Carman v. 
Carman, 114 Idaho 551, 553 (Idaho Ct. App. 1988}; Doe v. Durtschi, 11 0 Idaho 
466, 474 (1986). When a Plaintiff knows that there is a connection between a 
governmental entity and a tortious act, however tenuous that knowledge, the 
notice period begins running as of the day damages accrue. See Mitchell., 130 
Idaho at 422 - 23; McQuillen v. Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 722 (1987); Ralphs v. 
Spirit Lake, 98 Idaho 225, 227 (1977); Magnuson Props. P'ship. v. City of Coeur 
D'Alene, 138 Idaho 166, 169 (2002); Mallory v. City of Montpelier, 126 Idaho 
446, 447 - 49 {Idaho Ct. App. 1994). In Mallory, the plaintiff was injured sliding 
into second base at a City softball field on July 26, 1990. /d. at 447. On July 31, 
1990, the plaintiff inspected the baseball field, and discovered that the base was 
bolted down. /d. The plaintiff filed a notice of tort claim on January 24, 1991, 182 
days after the injury, but 177 days after the inspection. /d. Summary judgment was 
granted to the City, and the Court of Appeals upheld the decision, stating: 
Whether the Mallorys' argument is correct depends upon how the 
language "reasonably should have been discovered" is to be 
interpreted. Our Idaho Supreme Court has stated, with regard to I.C. § 
6-906, that, "knowledge of facts which would put a reasonably 
prudent person on inquiry is the equivalent to knowledge of the 
wrongful act and will start the running of the [180]-day period." 
McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 722, 747 P.2d 741, 
744 (1987); Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 711, 717, 535 P.2d 1348, 
1354 (1975}. The district court, in its order granting summary 
judgment to the City, stated: 
At the time of the injury to plaintiff, plaintiffs had sufficient 
knowledge to put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry and 
thus the 1 80 day time requirement began to run on July 26, 
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1990. An investigation into whether or not the base was faulty 
was not necessary to place plaintiffs on inquiry. It appears to 
this court that there is no relationship between the late filing 
and plaintiff's being put on inquiry notice. Plaintiff's notice of 
tort claim was dated January 5, 1991 but not filed with the 
City Clerk until January 24, 1991. Because plaintiffs failed to 
give notice to the City within 180 days from the date the claim 
arose, the complaint must fail. 
We agree with the district court's conclusion. The undisputed facts of 
this case are that Mallory was injured when she slid into second base 
during the game. There is no question regarding a latent injury, the 
extent or existence of which is unknown at the time of the "wrongful 
act." Similarly, no other facts were hidden from Mallory that 
subsequently became known and, therefore, put her on inquiry notice 
of the City's role in her injury. Mallory's argument in this case is, 
essentially, that because she did not know the exact cause of her 
injury (allegedly the bolts) on July 26, her claim was not "discovered" 
until she investigated the bases themselves. This argument misreads 
the language of McQuillen. The statute does not begin running when a 
eerson fully understands the mechanism of the injury and the 
government's role, but rather when he or she is aware of such facts 
that would cause a reasonably prudent person to inquire further into 
the circumstances surrounding the incident. 
The Mallorys' case shows quite clearly the difference between actual 
knowledge and knowledge of facts that would put a reasonably 
prudent person on inquiry notice. Although Mallory did not know of 
the metal bolts, or perhaps even that the City owned the softball field, 
at the time of her injury, the facts she was aware of led her to 
investigate the incident further. Her cursory inspection of the field 
revealed a possible cause of the injury and the City's ownership of the 
field could have been determined with minimal effort. Armed with a 
few simple facts, Mallory acted as a reasonably prudent person might 
when she sought to find out the exact nature of the accident. This is 
sufficient to constitute "inquiry notice." Moreover, Mallory does not 
contend that there subsequently became known to her any facts 
between July 26 and July 31 that led her to inspect the field. Thus, 
knowledge of facts that prompted a further inquiry, where such 
inquiry led to the discovery of facts necessary to formulate a claim 
against a government entity, were sufficient to begin the running of 
I.C. § 6-906 on July 26, even though the actual mechanics of the 
injury were unknown. 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 13 
Further, if accepted, Mallory's argument would render the 180-day 
time limit meaningless. Such interpretation would allow a party to 
delay completion of an investigation for months and even years before 
submitting a notice of claim under the Idaho Tort Claims Act. Such is 
not the purpose or intent of the discovery exception in the Act. 
Mallory, 126 Idaho at 448 - 49 (emphasis added). 
Based on these cases, there is only one issue of material fact. It is not how 
much Plaintiff knew regarding the fill, or the level of the City's involvement 
regarding the prior property owner's actions in placing fill on the properties, or even 
the City's knowledge of previous slope movement in the area. The only material 
fact relevant to this Court's determination of this case is whether Plaintiff knew 
that the City had been involved. 4 As discussed above, this fact is undisputed: 
Plaintiff admits that he knew the City had been involved as early as when he 
started building on the properties. Block Aff., , 3. Thus, because of his knowledge, 
he was on inquiry notice the date damages accrued, i.e., October or November, 
2007. With a minimum of effort, he could have discovered the facts on which he 
now relies to allege that the City is liable. Block Aff., , 11. Plaintiff could have 
spent five minutes on the internet and discovered that the entire area on which he 
was building was an ancient landslide area. 5 Plaintiff, who was previously the 
4 
5 
Plaintiff has submitted the affidavit of his engineer, Eric Hasenoehrl, regarding whether it 
was reasonable for Plaintiff to have discovered prior to May , 2009 that the settlement 
observed was caused by slope movement. Hasenoehrl Aff., ,- 14. However, as the only 
material fact relevant to this argument is whether Plaintiff knew that the City had some 
involvement, and not the cause of the earth movement, Mr. Hasenoehrl's opinion is 
irrelevant and moot. 
See KURT L. OTHBERG, ROY M. BRECKENRIDGE, AND DANIEL W. WEISZ, SURFICIAL GEOLOGICAL MAP 
OF THE LEWISTON ORCHARDS NORTH QUADRANGLE AND PART OF THE CLARKSTON QUADRANGLE, NEZ 
PERCE COUNTY IDAHO, (fdaho Geological Survey) (2003), accessible at 
http://www.idahogeology.org/PDF/Digital Data %28D%29/Digital Web Maps %28DWM% 
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community development director for the City of Lewiston, could have spent five 
minutes analyzing whether the property at issue, which is approximately .5 miles 
south of the Elks Club, and is on the same hillside, was subject to the same 
landslide issues that occurred below the Elks Club in May, 1998. Plaintiff could 
have asked Strata, Inc., to actually determine what was causing the settlement 
issues. Instead, he did none of these things. He went with a quick fix which did not 
work. His choice to proceed with a quick fix instead of investigating the causes of 
the settlement does not stop the notice period from running. 
Based on the uncontroverted material facts in this case, Plaintiff knew the 
City had some involvement in October or November, 2007, and incurred some 
damages as of that date. The latest Plaintiff could have filed his notice of tort claim 
was 180 days after he had notice, or approximately April 21, 2008 for 153 Marine 
View Drive, and May 12, 2008 for 155 and 159 Marine View Drive. 6 He admits he 
did not file a notice of tort claim until August 26, 2009. Block Aff., , 12. 
Therefore, Plaintiff has not filed a timely notice of tort claim, and his claims against 
the City are absolutely barred. McQuillen v. Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 722 (1987). 
Defendants request that Plaintiff's claims against Defendants City and Cutshaw be 
dismissed. 
29/DWM-8-M.pdf, (last checked July 14, 201 0). See also IDAHO GEOLOGICAL SURVEY 
6 
PAMPHLET, LANDSLIDE HAZARDS IN IDAHO (2008), accessible at 
http://www .idahogeology .org/uploads/Hazards/Landslides/landSid bro final. pdf (last 
checked July 14, 2010). 
See Complaint, , 19 (Plaintiff had notice on October 23, 2007, regarding settling at 153, 
and knew by November 13, 2007 of settling at 155 and 159). 
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 15 
B. BECAUSE PLAINTIFF FAILED TO WAIT THE FULL 90 DAYS AFTER 
SUBMITTING A NOTICE OF TORT CLAIM TO FILE A COMPLAINT, HIS 
COMPLAINT SHOULD BE DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE 
Defendants have also moved for summary judgment on the grounds that 
Plaintiff failed to wait until the tort claim was denied before filing the lawsuit. 
Plaintiff argues that Defendants' "Motion for Summary Judgment has been made 
on the singular ground that Plaintiff failed to timely file a Notice of Tort Claim." 
Memorandum in Opposition, p. 14. This argument makes no sense, as Defendants 
fully set forth at least two separate grounds for Summary Judgment in the 
Memorandum in Support. See Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment, pp. 7 - 8. Defendants included this affirmative defense in the Answer. 
See Answer, pp. 4 - 6 {see the seventh, tenth, thirteenth, fifteenth, and sixteenth 
defenses). Therefore, Defendants have adequately set forth this argument as 
grounds for summary judgment. 
As to the substance of this argument, Plaintiff argues that the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act cannot be construed to prevent Plaintiff from filing a Complaint prior to 
the close of the 90-day period required by /.C. § 6-909. However, the plain 
language of /.C. § 6-910 leaves no doubt that the tort claim must be denied before 
an action is instituted. Where a statute is unambiguous, "the clear expressed intent 
of the legislature must be given effect and there is no occasion for construction." 
In re Tax Appeal of Roman Catholic Diocese, 123 Idaho 425, 428 (1993). The 
ITCA states 
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If the claim is denied, a claimant may institute an action in the district 
court against the governmental entity or its employee in those 
circumstances where an action is permitted by this act. 
/.C. § 6-910 (emphasis added). This language is not ambiguous; Plaintiff may 
institute an action only if the claim is denied. A civil action is commenced by the 
filing of the Complaint with the court. I.R.C.P. 3(a). Thus, Plaintiff admits that he 
instituted this action before the tort claim notice was denied, in violation of the 
ITCA. See Memorandum in Opposition, p. 15; Block Aff., , 12. 
Plaintiff, instead, would have the Court construe /.C. § 6-910 such that it 
has no effect. In other words, Plaintiff may institute an action immediately after 
submitting a notice of tort claim, as long as it is not served until after the claim is 
denied, or the 90-day period expires. It is not the Court's role to interpret code 
such that a portion of a statute is essentially read out. "In determining the 
legislative intent, we should examine the reasonableness of the proposed 
interpretations and the policy behind the statutes so that all of the applicable 
sections can be construed together." State v. Seamons, 126 Idaho 809, 812 
(Idaho Ct. App. 1995). "A statute should be construed so that effect is given to all 
its provisions, so that no part will be rendered superfluous or insignificant." Brown 
v. Caldwell Sch. Dist. No. 132, 127 Idaho 112, 117 (1995). Plaintiff's 
interpretation would require the Court to ignore the portion of /.C. § 6-91 0 reading 
"if the claim is denied", rendering it meaningless and superfluous. A liberal reading 
of the ITCA does not mean rendering portions out of the statute superfluous. 
Plaintiff puts forth no evidence that the Defendants denied Plaintiff's August 
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26, 2009 notice of tort claim; therefore the only way the tort claim could have 
been denied was by the expiration of the 90-day period. Though the Court 
construes the Idaho Tort Claim Act liberally, the Court may not construe a statute 
so that it has no effect. Therefore, Plaintiff has violated the ITCA, and his 
Complaint should be dismissed without prejudice. Compliance with the ITCA is 
mandatory, and failure to comply is fatal. McQuillen, 113 Idaho at 722; 
Independent Sch. Dist. v. Callister, 97 Idaho 59, 61 (1975) (overruled on other 
grounds, Larson v. Emmett Joint Sch. Dist., 99 Idaho 120 (1978)}. The language 
of I. C. § 6-910 makes it clear that the Court is not even allowed to consider an 
action until the claim is denied. Because Plaintiff failed to wait until the tort claim 
was denied to file his Complaint, the Court has no jurisdiction over the Complaint. 
See I. C. § 6-914 (the rules under the lTC A govern over the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure). Compare Sommatino v. United States, 255 F.3d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 
2001) (compliance with administrative rules prior to filing a Title VII complaint, 
including rules regarding filing an administrative claim, is jurisdictional, and 
abandonment of administrative process precludes judicial review). 
Therefore, there is no excuse for Plaintiff to have filed the Complaint before 
the notice of tort claim was denied, regardless of whether Plaintiff waited until 
after 90 days to serve the Complaint. If one of the purposes of the ITCA is to save 
expenses of litigation, Memorandum in Opposition, p. 15, it makes little sense for 
Plaintiff to say that there is no harm filing a Complaint and waiting to serve it. It 
only takes seconds to search the Idaho Repository to determine if a Complaint has 
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been filed; once discovered, the governmental entity will incur costs related to 
monitoring whether the Complaint is properly served. Thus, Plaintiff should be 
required to abide by the plain language of the ITCA, and his Complaint against 
Defendants City and Cutshaw should be dismissed without prejudice. 
Ill. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants request that summary judgment be 
granted, or in the alternative, Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed without prejudice. 
DATED this __ day of July, 2010. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
By ~ C~~~J<~ 
Brian K. Julian, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for City of Lewiston and 
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer 
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I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this __ day of July, 2010, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by 
the method indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Ronald J. Landeck 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
693 Styner Avenue 
P. 0. Box 9344 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Telephone: (208) 883-1505 
Facsimile: (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Clinton 0. Casey 
CANTRILL, SKINNER SULLIVAN & 
KING, LLP. 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Telephone; (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant Jack J. 
Streibick 
[ ] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ > 1 Facsimile 
[ U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ - ] Facsimile 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
) 






JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK ) 
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of ) 
the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, ) 
deceased, CITY OF LEWISTON, a ) 
municipal corporation of the State of Idaho, ) 
and its employee LOWELL J. CUTSHAW, ) 
City of Lewiston Engineer, and DOES 1-20,) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
CASE NO. CV 09-02219 
MEMORANDUM OPINION 
AND ORDER ON MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
This matter came before the Court on Defendants City of Lewiston and Lowell J. 
Cutshaw's Motion for Summary Judgment. The Plaintiff was represented by Ronald 
Landeck, attorney at law. Defendant~ City of Lewiston and City of Lewiston Engineer, 
Lowell Cutshaw, were represented by Stephen Adams, of the firm Anderson, Julian & 
Hull. Clinton Casey, of the firm Can trill, Skinner, Sullivan & King appeared 
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telephonically on behalf of Defendant Streibick. 1 The Court heard oral argument on this 
matter on July 27, 2010. The Court, having heard the argument of counsel and being fully 
advised in the matter, hereby renders its decision. 
BACKGROUND 
In 2005, Plaintiff John Block purchased property in Lewiston, Idaho, from 
Defendant Jack Streibick and the Estate of Maureen Streibick (hereinafter "Streibick") 
for purposes of real estate development. Affidavit of John Block, at 2. The City of 
Lewiston (hereinafter "City")2 approved Block's application to resubdivide the property 
into three residential lots. The lots were designated as 153 Marine View Drive, 155 
Marine View Drive, and 159 Marine View Drive (hereinafter "153", "155", and "159"). 
!d. 
Prior to Block's purchase of the property, the City had issued two separate 
permits to Streibick, allowing Streibick to place and grade fill in the area of these lots. 
Id. at 4 (a copy of the permits is attached). The placement of fill on a building lot is a 
common construction practice in Lewiston, Idaho. Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl, at 3. 
Placement of fill is subject to permitting and inspection by the City for compliance with 
code requirements. !d. 
In 2006, Block received building permits from the City for purposes of 
constructing homes on all three lots. Complaint, at~ 16. During the construction of the 
homes, Block hired engineering firms to test compaction of the finished grade for the 
footings on these lots. Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl, at 3. The compaction testing reports 
1 While counsel was present on behalf of Defendant Streibick, the issues before the Court were limited to 
the Defendant City of Lewiston and employee Cutshaw's motion for summary judgment pursuant to the 
Idaho Tort Claims Act. 
2 For purposes of the motion before the Court, reference to the "City" encompasses both the Defendant City 
of Lewiston, and City employee Lowell Cutshaw. 
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established that the foundation locations were compacted in accordance with applicable 
building standards. ld. The compaction testing reports also confirmed that fill had been 
placed in the area ofthe testing. Jd. Following the construction of the homes, the City 
conducted inspections and found the homes to be constructed in accordance with 
applicable building codes and standards; thus, certificates of occupancy were issued by 
the City for each of the three properties. Affidavit of John Block, at 2; Complaint, at, 16. 
In April, 2007, Block sold 159 and the home thereon to a purchaser. Complaint, 
at, 16. In October, 2007, a realtor observed settling in the northwest comer of the home 
at 153 while showing this home to a perspective buyer. The realtor informed Block of 
this observation. Affidavit of John Block, at 2. In November, 2007, settling was also 
observed under an exterior door of the home at 155. ld. Also in November, the owner of 
159 reported to Block a crack in the basement floor of the home. Jd. As a result of these 
observations, Block consulted with Keltic Engineering regarding possible solutions to the 
settlement occurring on the three properties. ld.; Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl, at 3-4. 
Keltic Engineering sought the services of a geotechnical engineering firm, Strata, Inc., to 
assist on the project. Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl, at 3-4. 
In early December, 2007, Block repurchased 159 from the owners. Complaint, at 
, 20. He also consulted with engineers from Keltic and Strata regarding options for 
immediate repair to the homes. The installation of a deep foundation system consisting 
of helical piers was suggested. Andrew Abrams, the engineer from Strata, did explain to 
Block that without detailed subsurface knowledge and an engineering evaluation, he 
could not provide an engineering opinion ofthe causes of the settlement occurring on the 
three lots. Block ultimately decided to proceed with the installation of the helical pier 
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systems at the homes, and this installation was completed in December, 2007. Affidavit 
of John Block, at 3; Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl, at 4. 
In conjunction with the installation of helical piers, Block hired Keltic 
Engineering to monitor the structural stability of the residences. The monitoring was 
based upon surveys done prior to the installation of the helical pier systems, and by 
surveying the properties monthly following the installation of the helical piers. The 
surveying continued for a year, through December 2008. !d. Following successful 
monitoring, Block elected to make repairs to all three residences during the spring 
months of 2008. There were no further problems observed or reported at the residences 
until February, 2009. !d. 
In February, 2009, the tenant of 159 contacted Block about settling near the 
foundation of that residence. Reports of settlement in the driveway and basement of 153 
followed soon thereafter. Block inspected the properties in March, 2009, and observed 
settlement at all three residences, as well as cracks in the ground surfaces of each lot. 
Affidavit of John Block, at 4. In May, 2009, a gas leak occurred at 153; subsequently the 
City inspected all three properties and posted notice that the residential structures on 153 
and 159 were unsafe to occupy. !d. The City required Block to submit an abatement 
plan. Ultimately, the abatement plan required the demolition to the structures on 153 and 
159; however, the home at 155 remains, following improvements required by the City to 
ensure safe occupancy of the residence. !d. 
In late May, 2009, Block was contacted by Sandra Lee, a reporter from the local 
newspaper, the Lewiston Tribune. Lee provided Block with a copy of an article from the 
newspaper dated May 20, 1999. !d. The article reported that slope movement, in the 
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form of a landslide, occurred in 1999 in the vicinity of the three lots owned by Block on 
Marine View Drive. Prompted by the information contained in the 1999 newspaper 
article, Block proceeded to research City records regarding the development history of 
the property. !d. In June, 2009, Block discovered from City records that the City knew 
in 1999 that substantial slope movement occurred within the area of Block's lots and that 
the City filed information about the slope movements in records related to a different 
subdivision, known as Palisades #4. Jd., at 4-5. 
Eric Hasenoehrl, engineer with Keltic, was not made aware of the 1999 landslide 
until informed by Block following Block's contact with Sandra Lee. Upon receiving this 
information, Hasenoehrl surveyed the fault line of the 2009 movement, compared that 
line with the fault line in the 1999 photograph and concluded the lines are almost 
identical. Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl, at 4-5. 
Block filed a Notice of Claim for Damages with the City ofLewiston, including 
City Engineer Lowell Cutshaw, on August 26, 2009. Block filed the Complaint initiating 
this lawsuit on October 22, 2009, but did not effectuate service of process on the 
Defendants until ninety days had elapsed from the date Block filed the Notice of Claim 
for Damages. Affidavit of John Block, at 5. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
Summary judgment should be granted where there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter oflaw. I.R.C.P. 
56( c). In determining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the court must construe 
the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits in a light most favorable to the 
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nonmoving party. Conway v. Sonntag, 141 Idaho 144, 146, 106 P.3d 470,472 (2005), 
citing Infanger v. City ofSalmon, 137 Idaho 45,44 P.3d 1100 (2002). 
When a motion for summary judgment is "supported by a particularized affidavit, 
the opposing party may not rest upon bare allegations or denials in his pleadings," but 
must set forth "specific facts" showing a genuine issue. I.R.C.P. 56( e); Verbillis v. 
Dependable Appliance Co., 107 Idaho 335, 337, 689 P.2d 227,229 (Ct. App. 1984). A 
"mere scintilla" of evidence or only a "slight doubt" as to the facts is insufficient to 
withstand summary judgment. Corbridge v. Clark Equipment Co., 112 Idaho 85, 87, 730 
P.2d 1005, 1007 (1986), citing Snake River Equip. Co. v. Christensen, 107 Idaho 541, 
691 P.2d 787 (Ct. App. 1984); see also Jenkins v. Boise Cascade Corp., 141 Idaho 233, 
238, 108 P.3d 380, 385 (2005). 
Finally, the initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of 
material fact is on the moving party, and once this burden is met, it is incumbent upon the 
non-moving party to establish an issue of fact regarding that element. Yoakum v. 
Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 129 Idaho 171,923 P.2d 416 (1996). 
ANALYSIS 
The City contends the pending lawsuit must be dismissed against both the City 
and its employee, Lowell Cutshaw, pursuant to the Idaho Tort Claims Act (hereinafter 
"ITCA"). The ITCA "abrogates the doctrine of sovereign immunity and renders a 
governmental entity liable for damages arising out of its negligent acts or omissions." 
Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 458, 886 P.2d 330, 334 (1994). "The 
purpose of the ITCA is to provide 'much needed relief to those suffering injury from the 
negligence of government employees.' The ITCA is to be construed liberally, consistent 
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with its purpose, and with a view to 'attaining substantial justice."' Rees v. State, Dept. 
of Health and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 19, 137 P.3d 397,406 (2006) (internal citations 
omitted). 
1. Did the Plaintiff fail to file a timely notice of tort claim? 
The ITCA sets forth a mandatory time frame for the filing of a claim against a 
political subdivision or employee thereof. 
All claims against a political subdivison [subdivision] arising under the 
provisions of this act and all claims against an employee of a political 
subdivision for any act or omission of the employee within the course or 
scope of his employment shall be presented to and filed with the clerk or 
secretary of the political subdivision within one hundred eighty (180) days 
from the date the claim arose or reasonably should have been discovered, 
whichever is later. 
I.C. § 6-906. Directly at issue in the case at hand is whether Block filed the notice of tort 
claim within one hundred eighty days from the date his claim arose or reasonably should 
have been discovered. The City argues that Block was aware of the settlement issues as 
early as October and November, 2007, and thus, should have made inquiry during that 
time in order to discover the extent of his claim; because he failed to do so, his claim 
against the City is time barred. Block, on the other hand, argues that he was not aware he 
had a claim against the City until May of 2009, after the newspaper article about the 
slope movement activity from 1999 prompted him to research City of Lewiston records 
about the development of the property. 
Several Idaho cases have addressed the application of the 180 day time frame set 
forth in I. C. § 6-906. In Mallory v. City of Montpelier, 126 Idaho 446, 885 P.2d 1162 
(Ct. App. 1994) the Idaho Court of Appeals focused on the interpretation of the 
"reasonably should have been discovered language" in conjunction with the 180 day time 
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limit. In lvfallory, the plaintiff was injured during a softball game when she slid into 
second base at the city softball field. The injury occurred on July 26, 1990; five days 
later, the plaintiff went back to the field to inspect it and she discovered the bases were 
bolted down. 
Mallory's case against the city was ultimately dismissed because Mallory failed to 
file notice with the city within the time limit required by the ITCA. The notice was filed 
within 180 days of the date Mallory inspected the field; but not within 180 days from 
when Mallory suffered her injury. Mallory argued that her claim could not reasonably 
have been discovered until after she inspected the softball field. !d. The Mallory Court 
focused upon the "reasonably should have been discovered" language ofl.C. § 6-906. 
Whether the Mallorys' argument is correct depends upon how the 
language "reasonably should have been discovered" is to be interpreted. 
Our Idaho Supreme Court has stated, with regard to I. C. § 6-906, that, 
"knowledge of facts which would put a reasonably prudent person on 
inquiry is the equivalent to knowledge of the wrongful act and will start 
the running of the [180]-day period." McQuillen v. City of Ammon, 113 
Idaho 719, 722, 747 P.2d 741, 744 (1987); Newlan v. State, 96 Idaho 711, 
717, 535 p .2d 1348, 1354 (1975). 
!d. at 448, 885 P .2d at 1164. The Mallory Court discussed the facts known to Mallory at 
the time she was injured, as well as whether there were any facts hidden from Mallory 
which subsequently became known. 
The undisputed facts of this case are that Mallory was injured when she 
slid into second base during the game. There is no question regarding a 
latent injury, the extent or existence of which is unknown at the time of 
the "wrongful act." Similarly, no other facts were hidden from Mallory 
that subsequently became knovvn and, therefore, put her on inquiry notice 
of the City's role in her injury. Mallory's argument in this case is, 
essentially, that because she did not know the exact cause of her injury 
(allegedly the bolts) on July 26, her claim was not "discovered" until she 
investigated the bases themselves. This argument misreads the language of 
McQuillen. The statute does not begin running when a person fully 
understands the mechanism ofthe injury and the government's role, but 
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!d. 
rather when he or she is aware of such facts that would cause a reasonably 
prudent person to inquire further into the circumstances surrounding the 
incident. 
The Mallorys' case shows quite clearly the difference between actual 
knowledge and knowledge of facts that would put a reasonably prudent 
person on inquiry notice. Although Mallory did not know of the metal 
bolts, or perhaps even that the City owned the softball field, at the time of 
her injury, the facts she was aware ofled her to investigate the incident 
further. Her cursory inspection of the field revealed a possible cause of the 
injury and the City's ownership of the field could have been determined 
with minimal effort. Armed with a few simple facts, Mallory acted as a 
reasonably prudent person might when she sought to find out the exact 
nature of the accident. This is sufficient to constitute "inquiry notice." 
Moreover, Mallory does not contend that there subsequently became 
known to her any facts between July 26 and July 31 that led her to inspect 
the field. Thus, knowledge of facts that prompted a further inquiry, where 
such inquiry led to the discovery of facts necessary to formulate a claim 
against a government entity, were sufficient to begin the running ofl.C. § 
6-906 on July 26, even though the actual mechanics of the injury were 
unknown. 
A similar determination was made in Mitchell v. Bingham Memorial Hospital, 
130 Idaho 420, 942 P.2d 544 (1997). In this case, a patient brought suit against the 
county hospital after she received an overdose while admitted as a patient at the hospital. 
The patient knew of her injuries on the date of the overdose; however, the patient was not 
informed the overdose was due to a nurse's error until she was informed by her doctor 
two months later. Id. at 421, 942 P.2d at 545. The Court held that the 180 day time 
frame began at the time the injury occurred, not two months later when the doctor 
informed the patient that the injury was due to the nurse's error. 
The Mitchells were aware of the overdose and respiratory arrest on the day 
the overdose occurred. The facts available to the Mitchells were sufficient 
to cause a reasonably prudent person to inquire further into the 
circumstances surrounding the incident. Mallory, 126 Idaho at 448, 885 
P.2d at 1164. Furthermore, even if the cause of the overdose had been due 
to a malfunctioning infusion machine, and although there may be ultimate 
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shared responsibility with a manufacturer in such a case, the hospital is 
entitled to timely notice of a potential claim. Thus, we hold that the 180-
day period began to run on July 20, 1992, even though the Mitchells did 
not know the extent of the injury and Mrs. Mitchell's damages or the 
extent to which the hospital was responsible. 
!d. at 423-24, 942 P.2d at 547-48. 
The Idaho Supreme Court revisited its analysis from Mitchell v. Bingham 
Memorial recently in Steele v. Kootenai Medical Center, 142 Idaho 919, 136 P.3d 905 
(2006). The Steele Court was careful to note that the application of the "or reasonably 
should have been discovered, whichever is later" language from I. C. § 6-906 is dependent 
upon the facts of each case. 
The Bingham Memorial Court did not delete from Idaho Code § 6-906 
the phrase "or reasonably should have been discovered, whichever was 
later." Rather, it interpreted the phrase to mean, "The statute does not 
begin running when a person fully understands the mechanism of the 
injury and the government's role, but rather when he or she is aware of 
such facts to inquire further into the circumstances surrounding the 
incident." Mitchell v. Bingham Memorial Hospital, 130 Idaho 420, 423, 
942 P.2d 544, 547 (1997) (quoting from Mallory v. City of Montpelier, 
126 Idaho 446,448, 885 P.2d 1162, 1164 (Ct.App.1994)). The Court then 
held that on the day of the overdose, "[t]he facts available to the [patient] 
were sufficient to cause a reasonably prudent person to inquire further into 
the circumstances surrounding the incident." 130 Idaho at 423, 942 P.2d at 
54 7. The patient knew on that day she had received an overdose of 
medication from an infusion machine operated by a hospital nurse. A 
reasonable investigation begun at that time would have and did reveal the 
nurse's alleged negligence well before the expiration of the 180-day 
period for giving a notice of tort claim. Whether or not a claimant has 
sufficient knowledge to begin the running of the 180-day period depends 
upon the facts of the case. 
!d. at 921-22, 136 P.3d at 907-08. 
Mallory v. City of Montpelier, Mitchell v. Bingham Memorial Hospital and Steele 
v. Kootenai Medical Center all turn on the information known to the plaintiff at the time 
the injury occurred. Each case was dismissed because the injured party had knowledge 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 10 
ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
of facts which would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry regarding the 
governmental entities' role in the cause ofthe injury. See also McQuillen v. City of 
Ammon, 113 Idaho 719, 722, 747 P.2d 741, 744 (1987)("[K]nowledge of facts which 
would put a reasonably prudent person on inquiry is the equivalent to knowledge of the 
wrongful act and will start the running ofthe [180]-day period."). 
Whether an injured party had knowledge of facts which would put a reasonably 
prudent person on inquiry has been determined to be a question of material fact in some 
cases. See Trosper v. Raymond, 99 Idaho 54, 577 P.2d 33 (1978) (Whether claim against 
county was filed within 120 days of date when it reasonably should have been discovered 
was a question of a material fact which precluded summary judgment.); Carman v. 
Carman, 114 Idaho 551, 758 P.2d 710 (Ct. App. 1988); Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466, 
716 P.2d 1238 (1986). 
In Doe v. Durtschi parents and students filed suit against the school district for the 
negligent hiring and retention of a teacher where the school district knew the teacher, 
Durtschi, had sexually molested children. The plaintiffs asserted they learned of the 
negligence of the school district in early August, 1980, when it was discovered through a 
presentence investigation that the school district retained the teacher even after knowing 
ofhis illicit tendencies. Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho at 474, 716 P.2d at 1246. The 
Durtschi Court held: "If these facts are established at trial, the plaintiffs hardly could 
have discovered the negligent retention of the school district until early August, 1980. If 
this is the case, notice for the adult plaintiffs' claims was entirely adequate." !d. at 474-
75, 716 P.2d at 1246-47. 
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The Durtschi Court emphasized that the analysis regarding the application of the 
time limit does not focus solely on the date a person is injured, but also on the date the 
claimant becomes aware of the government's role. 
Obviously, a claim is not necessarily discovered the instant the injury or 
damages occur. The claimant only knows of his or her claim against the 
governmental entity and the 120-day limit only begins to run after the 
claimant becomes fully apprised of not only the injury or damages, but 
also ofthe governmental entity's role. 
Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho at 474, 716 P.2d at 1246. 
In Carman, the plaintiff was in the midst of a divorce action. The plaintiffs soon 
to be ex-husband was prematurely informed of the magistrate's decision on property 
division. Before the magistrate's decision was issued, the plaintiff entered into a divorce 
settlement. Once the plaintiff learned about the actions of the county employee, she 
brought suit against the county alleging that the county official's premature disclosure of 
the property division caused her to enter into a divorce settlement which was less 
favorable than the magistrate's decision. The Idaho Court of Appeals determined that a 
question of material fact existed regarding when the plaintiff should have discovered her 
claim against the county. 
A claimant "discovers" his claim against the governmental entity only 
when he becomes fully apprised ofthe injury or damage and of the 
governmental entity's role. Doe v. Durtschi, 110 Idaho 466,716 P.2d 1238 
(1986). The question ofwhen the claimant reasonably should have 
discovered the governmental entity's role is a question of material fact 
which, if genuinely disputed, is inappropriate for determination on a 
motion for summary judgment. !d.; Trosper v. Raymond, 99 Idaho 54, 577 
P.2d 33 (1978). Compare Full Circle, Inc. v. Schelling, 108 Idaho 634, 
701 P.2d 254 (Ct.App.1985) (question ofreasonable diligence to discover 
fraud under applicable statute of limitation is a question of fact for the 
jury). 
Here, a question of material fact exists concerning whether Cherie 
reasonably should have discovered her claim against the county prior to 
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1984. Consequently, the limitation period should not yet be applied. This 
issue should be determined by the jury. 
Carman v. Carman, 114 Idaho 551, 553,758 P.2d 710,712 (Ct. App. 1988). 
In the case at hand, the City contends that Block should have been on notice to 
inquire about the cause of the earth settlement when the settling first became evident to 
him in October and November of2007. The City argues that had Block fully inquired 
into the cause of settlement at that time, he would have easily been able to discern that 
the settlement may have been due to slope movement rather than earth settlement. Block, 
however, argues that he was not on notice of the City's knowledge of the earth movement 
in the area until he was contacted by the newspaper reporter in May, 2009. Affidavit of 
John Block, at 4. Block argues the City had knowledge ofthe earth movement, but 
during the building permit and inspection process failed to inform Block, or engineers 
hired by Block, about their previous knowledge of earth movement in the area. Eric 
Hasenoehrl, a civil engineer who worked with Block throughout the process of 
attempting to remedy the settlement issues on the lots, stated that neither he nor Block 
were informed of the previous landslides by the City. 
Throughout the course of my dealings and interactions with the City of 
Lewiston, neither I nor anyone at Keltic was ever made aware by the City 
that slope movement had previously occurred in the area of 153, 155, or 
159, nor during the substantial time I spent on the site in 2005, did I 
observe any evidence of slope movement in the area of 153, 155, and 159. 
It was not until John Block met with me in June 2009 and showed me a 
copy of documents and a photograph he told me he had obtained from the 
City of Lewiston's records and of a 1999 Lewiston Tribune article that he 
had received from Sandra Lee ... did I realize that slope movement had 
previously occurred in the area of 15 3, 15 5 and 15 9 and that the City of 
Lewiston had been made aware of that slope movement in 1999 and 
maintained that information in its records. 
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Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl, at 4-5. Further, Hasenoehrl opined that there was no overt 
evidence of slope movement in December, 2007, and that it would not be reasonable to 
conclude that he or Block should have known or attempted to discover that the settlement 
initially observed in 2007 was a result of slope movement and not earth settlement. Id. at 
5-6. 
The case at hand is similar to those cases where a fact hidden from the plaintiff 
subsequently became known. See Trosper v. Raymond, 99 Idaho 54, 577 P.2d 33 (1978), 
Carman v. Carman, 114 Idaho 551, 758 P.2d 710 (Ct. App. 1988), and Doe v. Durtschi, 
110 Idaho 466, 716 P .2d 123 8 ( 1986). In the case at hand, based upon the record before 
the Court, Block was not apprised of the City's knowledge of slope movement in the area 
until he was informed by the newspaper reporter. Thus, it is a material question of fact 
whether Block should have discovered his claim against the City prior to May, 2009. 
Because a question of material fact exists, summary judgment is not appropriate on this 
issue. 
2. Should the Complaint be dismissed based upon the Plaintiff's failure to wait until 
the tort claim was denied by the City? 
The City contends the complaint filed against it should be dismissed because the 
Plaintiff filed suit against the City prior to being informed his claim was denied, in 
contravention of the requirements ofl.C. §§ 6-908-910. The provisions relied upon by 
the City state: 
6-908. Restriction on the allowance of claims.- No claim or action 
shall be allowed against a governmental entity or its employee unless the 
claim has been presented and filed within the time limits prescribed by this 
act. 
6-909. Time for allowance or denial of claims.- Effect of failure to 
act.- Within ninety (90) days after the filing of the claim against the 
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governmental entity or its employee, the governmental entity shall act 
thereon and notify the claimant in writing of its approval or denial. A 
claim shall be deemed to have been denied if at the end of the ninety (90) 
day period the governmental entity has failed to approve or deny the 
claim. 
6-910. Suit on denied claims permitted.- If the claim is denied, a 
claimant may institute an action in the district court against the 
governmental entity or its employee in those circumstances where an 
action is permitted by this act. 
The City interprets these statutes to mean that only after a claim is denied (or deemed 
denied) is the party making the claim then allowed to file suit. Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment, at 7. 
There is no case law in Idaho directly on point regarding the issue of whether the 
ITCA requires a claim to be dismissed if it is filed before the governmental entity either 
issues a denial of the claim in writing, or the 90 day time frame set forth in I. C. § 6-909 
runs, effectively denying the claim. If the Court were to construe the statute in the 
narrow fashion suggested by the City, the case against the City would be dismissed 
without prejudice, simply to be refiled upon the receipt of this order. 
Block argues that the express language ofl.C. § 6-910 does not require dismissal 
of the suit; further, the purposes of the notice requirement have been served in this case, 
where the City had sufficient time to either resolve the claim, or investigate and prepare 
its defenses against the claim because the time for responding to the complaint did not 
begin to run until service was made upon the City. Plaintiff's Memorandum in 
Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment, at 16. 
The purposes of the notice claim requirement have been set forth in cases which 
have addressed a separate issue; whether the form of notice given to the governmental 
entity was sufficient under the requirements set forth in I.C. § 6-907. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 15 
ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The purposes ofthe notice of claim requirement under the ITCA are to: 
(1) save needless expense and litigation by providing opportunity for 
amicable resolution of differences among parties, (2) allow authorities to 
conduct a full investigation into the cause of the injury in order to 
determine the extent of the state's liability, if any, and (3) allow the state 
to prepare defenses. 
Driggers v. Grafe, 148 Idaho 295, 297, 221 P.3d 521, 523 (Ct. App. 2009), citing Pounds 
v. Denison, 120 Idaho 425,426-27, 816 P.2d 982, 983-84 (1991). The form ofthe notice 
provided by Block is not at issue in this case; however the purpose of the notice 
requirement is important in conjunction with the issue before the Court. The ITCA, in its 
entirety, should be considered when determining whether dismissal of this case is 
required, as argued by the City. In general, the purpose of the ITCA is to provide an 
avenue of relief for those who are harmed by the negligence of government employees. 
"The ITCA is to be construed liberally, consistent with its purpose, and with a view to 
'attaining substantial justice."' Rees v. State, Dept. of Health and Welfare, 143 Idaho 10, 
19, 137 P.3d 397, 406 (2006) (internal citations omitted). 
Considering the ITCA as a whole, this Court is not persuaded that the matter 
before it should be dismissed based upon a narrow reading ofl.C. § 6-910. While it may 
have been a better practice for the plaintiff to have filed suit against the non-
governmental entity defendants, then later amended the Complaint to include the City 
defendants after the City was given 90 days to consider the claim, failure to do so does 
not require a harsh remedy of dismissal. Thus, the Plaintiffs motion for summary 
judgment on this issue is denied. 
CONCLUSION 
Block is a real estate developer who purchased property from Streibick, and later 
developed the property by dividing it into three lots and building a home on each. Block 
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acquired building permits from the City, and each property was inspected and issued a 
Certificate of Occupancy. In late 2007, damage from earth settlement occurred on each 
of the properties. Block attempted to remedy the settlement by installing a helical pier 
foundation system on each. In 2009, earth settlement caused damage to the properties 
and ultimately rendered two of the homes uninhabitable. In 2009, Block received a copy 
of a newspaper article written in 1999 that reported landslide movement in the area. 
Following the receipt of the article, Block researched City records and determined that 
the City was aware of slope movement near his lots as early as 1999, but the City did not 
inform Block of this movement when it issued building and occupancy permits for the 
lots. 
The City is seeking summary judgment of the claims against it based upon the 
180 day notice provision set forth in the ITCA. The City argues Block was put on notice 
to inquire into the cause of the earth settlement in 2007, when the settlement first 
occurred. Had Block thoroughly researched the issue, he would have learned of the slope 
movement, and the City's knowledge of that slope movement at that time. Because 
Block failed to file his notice of tort claim with the city within the 180 day time frame 
after discovering the earth movement in 2007, the case must be dismissed. 
Block, however, argues that he did not become aware of the City's knowledge 
about the slope movement until receipt of the newspaper article in 2009. In the case at 
hand, a question of material fact exists concerning whether Block reasonably should have 
discovered his claim against the City prior to 2009. As a result, the City's motion for 
summary judgment is denied. 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 17 
ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The City also argues summary judgment should be granted because Block filed 
the current lawsuit before the City had denied the tort claim filed against it. The ITCA is 
to be construed liberally, with a view toward attaining substantial justice. Thus, dismissal 
ofthe lawsuit is not warranted on this basis. Therefore, the City's motion for summary 
judgment is denied. 
ORDER 
The Defendant City of Lewiston and Lowell J. Cutshaw's Motion for Summary 
Judgment is hereby DENIED. 
Dated this JL(ftday of September 2010. 
CARL B. KERRICK- District Judge 
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER 18 
ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
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I hereby certifY that a true copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER ON 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was: 
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__ hand delivered via court basket this __ day of September, 2010, or 
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September, 2010, to: 
Ronald J. Landeck 
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P.O. Box 359 
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Stephen L. Adams 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL 
P.O. Box 7426 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 






JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK ) 
STREIBICK, as Personal Representative ) 
of the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, ) 
deceased, CITY OF LEWISTON, a ) 
municipal corporation of the State ofidaho, ) 
and its employee, LOWELL J. CUTSHAW, ) 
City ofLewiston, Engineer, and DOES 1-20,) 
) 
Defendants. ) 
CASE NO. CV-09-02219 
ORDER SETTING CASE FOR 
TRIAL AND PRE-TRIAL 
CONFERENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the above-named case be set for JURY TRIAL 
before the Honorable CARL B. KERRICK, District Judge, at the Nez Perce County 
Courthouse, at Lewiston, Idaho, at the hour of 9:00 a.m. on the 26th day of September, 
2011, for EIGHT (8) days. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED parties shall comply with the following: 
disclosure of Plaintiff's expert witnesses, including compliance with IRCP 
26(b)(4)(A)(i), shall be on or before March 4, 2011; 
ORDER SETTING CASE FOR TRIAL 1 
AND PRE-TRIAL CONFERENCE 
disclosure of Defendant's expert witnesses, including compliance with 
IRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(i), shall be on or before May 6, 2011; 
all discovery shall be completed by August 26, 2011; 
that a pre-trial conference shall be held on September 16, 2011, at the hour 
of 1 :30 p.m. Lead counsel trying the case must be present at the pre-trial conference. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED at the pre-trial conference each party shall: 
1) Prepare in writing and submit to the Court in advance of the pre-trial 
hearing, a concise statement of the claims and/or defenses asserted by 
that party: 
2) Prepare a list of exhibits and bring all exhibits to the pre-trial 
conference to be marked; 
3) Each counsel shall make a request of opposing counsel for 
stipulations to as many facts and issues as possible, and be prepared to 
submit this stipulation to the Court at the pre-trial hearing; 
4) Be prepared to stipulate the admission of any exhibits or to make 
specific objections to its admissibility; 
5) Furnish opposing counsel with the names and addresses of all 
witnesses, the nature their testimony, experts' reports, and like 
instruments, and complete all other matter which may expedite both 
the pre-trial and trial of this case: 
6) Discuss the possibilities of settlement; 
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7) Submit to the court at the pre-trial hearing all contentions of law relied 
upon: 
8) Submit to the court and counsel a copy of all jury instructions counsel 
intends to request. The jury instructions shall consist of two copies, 
one copy containing citations of authority and one copy suitable for 
submission to the jury. The Court uses the following instructions from 
IDJI and it is not necessary for counsel to submit them: 1.00, 1.01, 
1.03, 1.03.1, 1.09, 1.11, 1.13, 1.15.1, 1.15.2, 1.17, 1.20.1, 1.20.2, 
1.24.1, 1.24.2, and 9.00. 
DATED this '7ft- day ofDecember, 2010. 
CARL B. KERRICK-District Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER SETTING CASE FOR TRIAL 
AND PRE-TRIAL CO~FERENCE was mailed, postage prepaid, by the undersigned at 
Lewiston, Idaho, this /f> day ofDecember, 2010, on: 
Ronald J. Landeck 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Clinton 0. Casey 
Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, ID 83 701 
Brian K. Julian 
Stephen L. Adams 
Anderson, Julian & Hull 
C.W. Moore Plaza 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
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Clinton 0. Casey, ISB #4333 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant, Jack J. Streibick, 
individually and as personal representative of 
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick 
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JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK ) 
STREIBICK, as Personal Representative of ) 
the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, ) 
deceased, CITY OF LEWISTON, a ) 
municipal corporation of the State of Idaho, ) 
and its employees, LOWELL J. ) 
CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, and ) 




Case No. CV09 02219 
ORDER EXTENDING 
DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE 
OF EXPERT WITNESSES 
BASED upon stipulation of the parties and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Disclosure of Expert Witnesses deadline is 
extended to June 3, 2011. 
ORDER EXTENDING DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT WITNESSES - 1 
'J1.- 4._ r } 
DATED This ;25, day of_,_~....Lfr;{)=--1'_,_' ___ , 2011. 
~ 
Carl B. Kerrick 
District Judge 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the day of 11(?(;, ( , 2011, I served a true and 
correct copy of the above and foregoing instrument, by fuethod indicated below, upon: 
Clinton 0. Casey 
Cantrill, Skinner, Sullivan & King, LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
PO Box 359 
Boise, ID 83701 
Attorneys for Defendant Streibick 
Ronald Landeck 
Attorney at Law 
693 Styner A venue 
PO Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Brian K. Julian 
Stephen L. Adams 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
Attorney for Defendants City of Lewiston 
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CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & KING LLP 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P. 0. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83 701 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant, Jack J. Streibick, 
individually and as personal representative of 
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 






JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK ) 
STREIBICK, as Personal Representative of ) 
the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, ) 
deceased, CITY OF LEWISTON, a ) 
municipal corporation of the State of Idaho, ) 
and its employees, LOWELL J. ) 
CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, and ) 




Case No. CV09 02219 
ORDER EXTENDING 
DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE 
OF DAMAGE EXPERT REPORTS 
BASED upon stipulation of the parties and good cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Defendants' Disclosure ofDamage Expert Reports deadline 
is extended to June 24, 2011. 
ORDER EXTENDING DEFENDANTS' DISCLOSURE OF DAMAGE EXPERT REPORTS - 1 
DATED This ---l-_,___day of tJ~ '2011. 
C21 /Jj/~ 
Carl B. Kerrick 
District Judge 
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Ronald Landeck 
Attorney at Law 
693 Styner A venue 
PO Box 9344 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Attorney for Plaintiffs 
Brian K. Julian 
Stephen L. Adams 
Anderson, Julian & Hull, LLP 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
P.O. Box 7426 
Boise, ID 83707-7426 
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Brian K. Julian, ISB No. 2360 
Stephen L. Adams, ISB No. 7534 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-5510 
E-Mail: bjulian@ajhlaw.com 
sadams@ajhlaw.com 
Attorneys for Defendants City of Lewiston and 
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer 
oc-u~Y 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK 
STREIBICK as Personal Representative ofthe 
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased, CITY 
OF LEWISTON, a municipal corporation of the 
State ofldaho, and its employee LOWELL J. 
CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, and 
DOES 1-20, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 09-02219 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COME NOW, the above-entitled Defendants, City of Lewiston and Lowell J. Cutshaw, 
by and through their attorneys of record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, and hereby submit this 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff John Block is suing the City of Lewiston for negligence related to the 
construction of homes within the Canyon Greens and Canyon Greens II subdivisions. The three 
homes in Canyon Greens, located at 153, 155, and 159 Marine View Drive, were allegedly 
damaged as a result of slope movement which occurred on or near those properties. The 
remaining houses have not experienced any structural damage, but Plaintiff is seeking monetary 
damages related to those properties due to decrease in value. Plaintiff is seeking also lost 
business income damages as a result of the claims outlined in his Complaint. The two causes of 
action in the Complaint which are directed against the City are both based in negligence. See 
Complaint,~~ 54- 57. Paragraph 55 of the Complaint lists 11 actions or omissions by the City 
and City Engineer Lowell Cutshaw which allegedly resulted in a breach of a duty owed to 
Plaintiff, and Paragraph 57 alleges that these negligent acts were grossly negligent. 
Defendants City and Cutshaw (collectively referred to as "Defendants") contend that they 
are entitled to summary judgment on a number of grounds. First, a number of the allegedly 
wrongful acts by the City occurred before Plaintiff owned the property, and the City and its 
employees have no duty to all future property owners of a property to act in any specific way. 
Second, the Defendants had no tort duty to protect against purely economic loss, which 
encompasses all of Plaintiffs damages. Third, Plaintiff cannot show that the Defendants had any 
duty to mandatorily require that he obtain a slope stability or other geotechnical analysis prior to 
construction on the properties at issue. Fourth, Plaintiff cannot show that any action or inaction 
of the Defendants caused slope movement and any additional economic loss resulting therefrom. 
Fifth, the Defendants are immune from all of Plaintiffs claims pursuant to I. C. §§ 6-904(1), 6-
904(7), 6-904 B(3 ), and 6-904 B( 4 ). Each of these issues will be discussed in more detail below. 
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II. 
NEGLIGENCE ARGUMENTS 
A. DEFENDANTS HAD NO DUTY TOWARD PLAINTIFF WITH REGARD TO 
THE PROPERTIES AT ISSUE PRIOR TO HIM PURCHASING THE 
PROPERTY. 
Plaintiffs allegations of negligence by the Defendants include the following: 
(iii) failing to require that such earth movement in the area of 153, 155, and 159 be 
eliminated or properly abated by Streibick and/or Others prior to Block's 
purchase of the Property; 
(iv) failing to prevent Streibick from developing and selling 153, 155, and 159 to 
Block without notice and/or warning to Block that such earth movement had 
occurred in 1999 or without having eliminated or properly abated such earth 
movement; 
(v) failing to require Streibick to complete the required storm water improvements in 
1994 for Palisades No. 4 subdivision and approving and allowing Streibick's 
construction of a storm water detention pond within the area of 153 where the 
City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others knew earth movement had occurred in 
1999, thereby contributing to the instability of soil in that area; 
(ix) failing to require and/or compel Streibick to eliminate or properly abate the 
dangerous condition caused by and/or existing as a result of such earth movement 
in the area of 153, 155 and 159; 
(x) failing to supervise Streibick's development activities within the area of 153, 155, 
and 159 between 1999 and 2006 thereby allowing concealment of such earth 
movement and the creation of a dangerous condition and risk of harm; and 
(xi) failing to inspect and/or make an inadequate inspection of Streibick's 
development activities within the area of 153, 155, and 159 between 1999 and 
2006 thereby allowing concealment of such earth movement and the creation of a 
dangerous condition and risk of harm. 
Complaint, ~55. Plaintiff purchased the property in or around December, 2005. Complaint, ~ 
13. Defendants contend that each of these allegations above concern acts or omissions prior to 
Plaintiff purchasing the property. Ignoring the issues of whether the City actually had a duty to 
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anyone at the times mentioned as Plaintiff alleges, Defendants contend that they had no duty to 
Plaintiff with regard to the acts or omissions alleged. 
The existence of a duty is a question of law. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247 
(1999). "No liability arises from the law of torts unless the defendant owes a duty to the 
plaintiff." Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 389 (2001). Numerous Idaho cases have made 
it clear that a party cannot recover from a governmental entity for failure to perform a duty owed 
to the public at large. "[I]f the duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty 
to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a 
public, not an individual, injury, and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public 
prosecution." Jacobson v. McMillan, 64 Idaho 351, 359 (1943). See also Worden v. Witt, 4 
Idaho 404, 406- 07 (1895). 
Generally, a person has no common law duty to prevent a third person from 
injuring another unless there is some kind of special relationship. Applying this 
principle to governmental torts in what is called the "public duty rule" requires 
that a governmental unit owe the plaintiff a duty different from that owed to the 
general public in order for the governmental unit to be found liable. 
Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788, 793 (Minn. 2005) (cited in Rees v. State, 143 
Idaho 10, 16 (2006). In Udy v. Custer County, the plaintiff argued that a sheriff who saw rocks 
lying on a road (which later caused a motor vehicle accident) had a duty to clear the rocks or 
give notice to someone to move them. Udy, 136 Idaho at 389. The Idaho Supreme Court stated 
Udy's claims are in reality claims for negligent police protection for which there 
can be no recovery absent a special relationship with the victim. Here, the record 
does not establish, nor does Udy argue that he or his passengers were in a special 
relationship with Sheriff Roskelley. Thus, the fact that Udy's accident may have 
been prevented through reasonable law enforcement actions is insufficient to 
establish a duty to the Appellants or otherwise form the basis for Sheriff 
Roskelley's liability in tort. 
Udy, 136 Idaho at 391. In other words, absent a special relationship, there was no duty owed to 
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the plaintiff just because there may have been a duty to the public at large. 
The same is true in this case. Before Plaintiff owned the property at issue, there was no 
duty owed by the City to him specifically with regard to the property. Similarly, there was no 
special relationship between the Defendants and Plaintiff related to this property, as the property 
was owned by Streibick. Until Plaintiff owned the property, the Defendants had no more duty to 
him than it did to any other member of the public as regarding this property. Therefore, Plaintiff 
should not be allowed to recover damages related to the actions/omissions discussed above, and 
summary judgment should be granted to the Defendants on these claims. Further, should this 
case proceed to trial, Plaintiff should not be allowed to use evidence of these claims as evidence 
that the City was negligent after Plaintiff purchased the property, and should be prevented from 
submitting evidence that these claims are a basis for his damages. 
B. BECAUSE ALL OF PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES IN THIS CASE ARE ECONOMIC 
LOSSES, DEFENDANTS HAD NO DUTY TO PREVENT THE OCCURRENCE 
OF SUCH DAMAGES. 
All of Plaintiff's damages in this case constitute economic damages, including repair and 
lost value on the homes at 153, 155, and 159 Marine View Drive, lost business damages, and lost 
value on six of the eight homes that were designated part of Canyon Greens II (none of which 
had any physical damage related to slope movement). See Statement of Facts, ~ 22. With limited 
exception, economic losses are not recoverable in negligence actions. Duffin v. Idaho Crop 
Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007 (1995). See also Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman 
Elec., Inc., 244 P .3d 166, 170 (Idaho 201 0) ("The economic loss rule applies to negligence cases 
in general; its application is not restricted to products liability cases."). 
With regard to the definition of economic loss, the Supreme Court has stated that 
"Economic loss includes costs of repair and replacement of defective property which is the 
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subject of the transaction, as well as commercial loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of 
profits or use." Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 351 
(197 5). This definition has been followed by a majority of cases addressing economic loss. 1 
Based on this definition, in order for there to be economic loss, there has to be defective property 
which is the subject of the transaction at issue in the lawsuit. See Brian & Christie, Inc. v. 
Leishman Elec., Inc., 244 P.3d 166, 171 (Idaho 2010). This can apply to cases "involving the 
purchase of defective personal property and real property." Id. at 170. 
There are a number of cases addressing economic loss which parallel the facts of this 
case. In Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37 (1987), the plaintiff purchased duplexes, and 
found after purchase that the foundation on the properties was cracking. Id. at 40. The Court 
stated that "The structural defects have caused damage to the duplexes themselves and to the 
parking lot, and have caused losses in rental income, but Tusch Enterprises has suffered no 
personal injuries and has suffered no damage to property other than that which was the subject of 
the duplex sales transaction." Id. The Court then barred recovery of these damages, stating "the 
only damages it alleges are lost rental income and property damage to the duplexes and the 
parking lot. These losses are economic." Id. 
A similar result was reached in Duffin. In Duffin, the plaintiffs purchased seed potatoes 
which allegedly were infected with bacterial ring rot, despite having been inspected by the 
Department of Agriculture. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1005. The Department of Agriculture argued 
that recovery was barred because the Department had no duty to protect against economic loss of 
See Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007 (1995); Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 
Idaho 37, 41 (1987); Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 300 (2005); Ramerth v. Hart, 133 
Idaho 194, 196 (1999); Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Sys., 147 Idaho 785, 790 (2009). Cf Brian & Christie, Inc. 
v. Leishman Elec., Inc., 244 P.3d 166, 170 (Idaho 2010) (holding that the definition provided of economic 
loss in the Salmon Rivers case does not apply to claims for economic loss related to services, as opposed to 
defective property). 
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the plaintiffs. I d. at 1006. The Court found that the losses related to the use of the infected seed 
potatoes was economic, and not recoverable. Id. at 1007. The Court then went on to address the 
various exceptions to the economic loss rule, and found that none were applicable. I d. at 1007 -
08. 
In this case, there is clearly a defective property at issue. In the Complaint, Plaintiff 
clearly acknowledges that the property he purchased had suffered slope movement prior to his 
purchase, and that the property was subject to future slope movement. Complaint,~ 25. Plaintiff 
even refers to the condition of the property as a "Defective Condition". Complaint, ~~ 29 - 41. 
This is the same as purchasing diseased seed potatoes2, duplexes which had been built on fill and 
which had cracks in the foundation3, houses built on soil subject to settlement4, or defective 
roofing materials. 5 Because the property allegedly had a "defective condition" when Plaintiff 
purchased it, this meets the "defective property" requirement of the Salmon Rivers definition of 
economic loss. 
The remainder of the Salmon Rivers definition also is met. The defective property at 
issue (the lots purchased by Plaintiff from Streibick) are clearly the subject of the transaction 
between Block and Streibick, and are the subject transaction in this case. Complaint, ~ 11. In 
Blahd, the Court engages in a lengthy discussion of what the "subject of the transaction" is, 
stating 
4 
In Tusch Enterprises, a seller hired a contractor to level a hill to prepare the area 
for construction. The seller participated in the site preparation, hired a builder to 
construct a duplex on the site and sold the duplex to a buyer. The buyer then 
discovered the duplex was damaged because the foundation was defective. The 
See Duffin, 126ldaho at 1005. 
See Tusch Enters., 113 Idaho at 40. 
See Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 299 (2005). 
See State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 336 (1984). 
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buyer sued the seller and the builder alleging negligence in preparing the 
foundation. This Court held the economic loss rule barred the negligence claims 
because the damage to the duplex caused by the defective foundation was purely 
economic. This Court later explained in another case that it "considered the 
duplex itself, rather than its construction, to be the subject of the transaction." 
In Ramerth, an airplane owner sued a repairman alleging the repairman's 
negligent servicing and inspection of the airplane caused damage to the engine 
and aircraft. The airplane owner argued the economic loss rule did not bar his 
negligence claim because the subject of the transaction was the repairman's 
services, not the engine or airplane that was serviced. This Court rejected that 
argument and held the damage to the engine and the aircraft were purely 
economic and therefore, subject to the economic loss rule. These cases indicate 
the word "transaction," for purposes of the economic loss rule, does not mean a 
business deal--it means the subject of the lawsuit. 
Like the duplex in Tusch Enterprises, the Blahds' house is damaged because the 
foundation is settling. The damage to the Blahds' house is similar to the duplex 
damage in Tusch Enterprises, where this Court held the losses were economic. 
The Blahds seek to distinguish their case by noting the buyer in Tusch Enterprises 
did not sue the contractor who leveled the lot and did not allege the property had 
been leveled negligently. The fact that the buyer in Tusch Enterprises only sued 
the builder and the seller is immaterial. It is the subject of the transaction that 
determines whether a loss is property damage or economic loss, not the status of 
the party being sued. The Blahds purchased the house and lot as an integrated 
whole. Like the leveled lot and duplex in Tusch Enterprises, the subject of the 
transaction in this case is both the lot and the house. That being the case, the 
damages to the Blahds' house are purely economic and the Blahds' negligence 
claims against the Smith Entities and Jones are barred by the economic loss rule. 
Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 300-301 (2005). There is no need for the 
Defendants to be part of the sale of property in order for it to be the transaction relevant to the 
lawsuit; for example, in Duffin, the Department of Agriculture was not involved in the purchase 
of the seed potatoes (other than inspecting them), yet was still allowed to argue the economic 
loss defense. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1005 and 1008. As in Blahd, Tusch, Duffin, and Ramerth, 
the subject of the transaction was the purchase of the defective property, i.e. Plaintiffs purchase 
of the land at issue. 
Finally, all of the damages alleged by Plaintiff are economic in the sense that they are 
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costs of repair and replacement of the defective property, or are commercial loss or consequent 
loss of profits or use. Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, 97 Idaho at 351. With regard to the 
houses located at 153, 155, and 159 Marine View Drive, the damage was caused by the slope 
movement (which was the defect that existed in the property at the time of purchase), and the 
losses on these houses are the loss of increased property value (which are profits) and repair of 
the properties. This is economic loss. With regard to the damages allegedly related to the 
properties at 161 Marine View Drive, and 101- 107 Canyon Greens Court, none ofthese houses 
have suffered any physical damage. All loss is loss of value, which constitutes commercial loss 
or loss of profits/use, which is economic loss. Statement of Facts,~ 22. Finally, with regard to 
Plaintiffs business damages, this also clearly is commercial loss (equivalent to lost crop yield in 
Duffin), and is economic loss. Also see Just's v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 468 
(1978) ("The damages claimed by the plaintiff, lost profits, are purely economic losses"). 
All of Plaintiffs damages are economic losses, and the Defendants had no duty to protect 
against such losses. The defect was in the soil at the time Plaintiff purchased the property, and 
there is no evidence that Defendants caused the defect to exist. The defect in the soil later caused 
Plaintiffs damages, resulting in economic loss. See Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Elec., 
Inc., 244 P.3d 166, 171 (Idaho 2010) (explaining how economic loss worked in the context of 
purchasing a defective airplane in Ramerth v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194 (1999)). The exceptions to 
the economic loss rule do not apply. There is no special relationship between the Defendants and 
Plaintiff. The term "special relationship" "refers to those situations where the relationship 
between the parties is such that it would be equitable to impose such a duty. In other words, there 
is an extremely limited group of cases where the law of negligence extends its protections to a 
party's economic interest." Blaltd, 141 Idaho at 301 (quoting Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008). There 
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1s no evidence that the Defendants were performing professional or "quasi-professional" 
personal services to Plaintiff. See Blahd, 141 at 301; MeA/vain v. General Ins. Co., 97 Idaho 
777, 780 (1976). The fact that City employees reviewed plat maps and other documents for 
compliance with City code is no more a personal service than was the inspection of seed potatoes 
by the Department of Agriculture in Duffin. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008. Similarly, the City does 
not hold itself out as having expertise regarding a specialized function any more than did the 
Department of Agriculture. Blahd, 141 Idaho at 3 01. The "unique circumstances exception" also 
does not apply. As the Court stated in Blahd, "The purchase of a residential house is an everyday 
occurrence and does not create the type of unique circumstances required to justify a different 
allocation of risk, particularly where it appears there may be other defendants available to 
respond in contract damages." Id. at 302. The same is true for the purchase of real property 
without improvements on it. Therefore, there is no exception to the economic loss rule, and 
Defendants request that the Court determine that Defendants had no duty toward Plaintiff with 
regard to economic loss. As all of Plaintiff's damages are economic damages, Defendants 
request that summary judgment be granted on all of Plaintiff's claims against the Defendants. 
C. DEFENDANTS HAD NO DUTY TO REQUIRE THAT PLAINTIFF OBTAIN A 
GEOTECHNICAL OR SLOPE STABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPERTY IN 
QUESTION. 
A main issue in Plaintiff's claim of negligence is that the City failed to require that 
Plaintiff obtain a geotechnical or slope stability analysis prior to approving the plat for Canyon 
Greens, or during the construction process. This argument fails because there was no duty owed 
by the City to require Plaintiff to take such steps before the plat was accepted or building permits 
were issued. The current Lewiston City Code, with regard to subdivisions, does not contain any 
language mandating that a slope stability or geotechnical analysis be completed during the 
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subdivision process. The only language which relates to such requirements is as follows: 
Sec. 32-9. Preapplication Conference. 
(2) Actions by the city. The city will discuss the proposal with the subdivider and 
advise him of procedural steps, design and improvement standards, and general 
plat requirements. Then, depending upon the scope of the proposed development, 
they will proceed with the following actions: 
e. Review and discuss with the developer the potential need for special studies, 
which may include but are not limited to traffic, soil, slope stability. wetlands, 
foundations or other studies that may be required as a result of site conditions, and 
the implications of the findings of those studies. if required. The requirement o( 
said special studies shall be determined bv the city engineer. 
Sec. 32-20. Information required for preliminary plat submittal. 
(c) Existing conditions data. 
(2) Soils stability analysis when required by the city engineer. 
Sec. 32-31. General. 
(e) Where the tract to be subdivided is located in whole or in part in terrain having 
an average slope exceeding ten (1 0) percent, design and development shall 
conform to the findings of a suitability study as required by the city engineer. 
Lewiston City Code, §§ 32-9, 32-20, and 32-31. As can be seen from these code sections, it is 
purely within the discretion of the Lewiston City Engineer to require a slope stability or 
geotechnical analysis. 
Based on this language, the Defendants had no affirmative statutory or regulatory duty to 
require Plaintiff to complete a slope stability or geotechnical analysis. Such decision is left to the 
discretion of the City engineer and the developer (in this case Plaintiff). This conclusion is 
further emphasized by the fact that in 1997, when the City revised the subdivision code, it took 
out a significant amount of language requiring mandatory slope stability analysis. Statement of 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 11 
Facts,~ 5. This modification oflanguage shows a clear intent on the part of the City Council to 
adopt a policy of giving City employees discretion to require such analyses. 
With regard to the building permits, City Building Official John Smith has testified that 
he can require certain soil stability analysis be done before issuing a building permit. Statement 
of Facts,~ 14. However, that is limited to compaction testing under the footings. In this case, the 
compaction testing was required, and was completed. Statement of Facts,~~ 14- 15. Therefore, 
to the extent there was a duty to require certain soil analysis prior to construction, there is no 
question of fact but that the Defendants complied with such duty by requiring compaction testing 
be completed. 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants request that the Court find that there was no duty to 
require Plaintiff to obtain a slope stability or geotechnical analysis prior to approving the plat for 
Canyon Greens or issuing the building permits, and grant summary judgment with regard to 
these issues. 
D. PLAINTIFF CANNOT SHOW THAT ANY ACTION OR INACTION BY THE 
CITY CAUSED PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES. 
In order to be able to prevail on a claim for negligence, Plaintiff must prove all four 
elements of a negligence claim, "(1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to 
conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection 
between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and ( 4) actual loss or damage." Nation 
v. State, 144 Idaho 177, 189 (2007). "The issue of causation is usually a question of fact for the 
jury." Walker v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 130 Idaho 824, 831 (1997). However, it can become a 
question of law when there is insufficient evidence to support an inference of causation. I d. 
In this case, there is a deficiency in Plaintiff's ability to prove that the Defendants' 
actions caused his damages. It is clear that the damage to the houses at 153, 155, and 159 Marine 
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View Drive was caused by the slope movement. Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl (dated July 13, 
2010), 1 13. There is no claim that any action or inaction by the Defendants caused direct 
damage to the properties (for example, there is no claim that any City employee ran into one of 
the houses with a tractor). All claims of negligence against the City are for failure to warn, 
inspect, give notice, prevent someone else from action, or similar actions. Complaint, 1 55. 
There is no evidence that any action or inaction by the City directly caused the slope movement. 
As is described in Streibick's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs expert have not 
provided any testimony as to what is the cause of the slope movement. Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment (dated June 7, 2010), pp. 6-8. Because Plaintiff has failed 
to do an in depth geotechnical analysis of the property, it will be impossible to ascertain what is 
the cause of the slope movement (and thus the cause ofthe damage to 153, 155, and 159 Marine 
View Drive). Because it is impossible to know what caused the slope movement, no evidence 
can be provided to the Court stating whether or not any action or inaction by the City would have 
prevented future slope movement. It is inadmissible for Plaintiff to argue that he doesn't know 
what was and is causing the slopes to fail, but in the same breath say that had the City required a 
slope stability analysis, no damage to the houses would have occurred. Plaintiffs cause of 
action for negligence against the City must fail because Plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, prove 
that the Defendant's actions or inactions caused his damages. 
III. 
IMMUNITY ARGUMENTS 
When summary judgment is requested on the grounds of immunity under the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act, the Supreme Court has specified a three step analysis. 
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment against a governmental entity 
and its employees under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), this Court must 
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engage in a three step analysis. First, we must determine whether tort recovery 
is allowed under the laws of Idaho. This is essentially a determination of whether 
there is such a tort under Idaho Law. Second, this Court determines if an 
exception to liability under the ITCA shields the alleged misconduct from 
liability. Finally, if no exception applies, [we examine] whether the merits ofthe 
claim as presented for consideration on the motion for summary judgment entitle 
the moving party to dismissal. 
Rees v. State, 143 Idaho 10, 14 - 15 (2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
Defendants concede that negligence is a recognized tort in the state of Idaho, see, e.g, Nation v. 
State, 144 Idaho 177, 189 (2007); Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484, 487 (1995), and therefore do 
not address this first step of the analysis. With regard to the second step, Defendants contend that 
immunity applies to all claims pursuant to LR.C.P. §§ 6-904(1) and (7), 6-904B(3) and (4). 
A. DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FOR ANY CLAIM OF DAMAGE RESULTING 
FROM THE ACCEPTANCE AND DESIGN OF SUBDIVISION PLAT MAPS 
RELATING TO SUNSET PALISADES NO. 4, SUNSET PALISADES NO. 8, 
CANYON GREENS, OR CANYON GREENS II. 
Defendants are immune for claims arising out of 
a plan or design for construction or improvement to the highways, roads, streets, 
bridges, or other public property where such plan or design is prepared in 
substantial conformance with engineering or design standards in effect at the time 
of preparation of the plan or design or approved in advance of the construction by 
the legislative body of the governmental entity or by some other body or 
administrative agency, exercising discretion by authority to give such approval 
L C. § 6-904(7). There is no claim that the City was acting with malice or criminal intent, so 
these exceptions do not apply. Complaint, ~ 57. This language is interpreted to be broken into 
two separate parts: 
The addition by the legislature of the word "or" to I.C. § 6-904(7) clearly 
indicates that immunity is available under the provision if the governmental entity 
shows substantial conformance or advance approval. Therefore, under I.C. § 6-
904(7) as amended, the City was required to establish (1) the existence of a plan 
or design that was (2) either prepared in substantial conformance with existing 
engineering or design standards or approved in advance of construction by the 
legislative or administrative authority. 
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Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 459 (1994). Defendants claim that immunity applies 
under both ofthe "substantial conformance" and "advance approval" elements of this statute. 
With regard to the "substantial conformance" portion of the immunity, a brief 
background of the property is helpful. This property has been subdivided up to four times. 
Originally, it was titled Block 3 of Sunset Palisades No.4. Statement of Facts, 11 1, 6. In 2005, 
it was resubdivided by Streibick as Sunset Palisades No. 8. Statement of Facts, 1 6. When 
Plaintiff purchased the property, he subdivided the largest single lot in Sunset Palisades No. 8 
into three lots (later designated 153, 155, and 159 Marine View Dr.), and called the subdivision 
Canyon Greens. Statement of Facts, 1 11. Plaintiff then subdivided the remaining three lots of 
Sunset Palisades No. 8 into eight lots, calling the subdivision Canyon Greens II. Statement of 
Facts, 121. At each of these subdivisions, a stamped, engineered subdivision plat was submitted 
to the City, including roads, sewage lines and easements, storm drain lines and easements, and 
other public property. See Statement of Facts, 11 1, 7, 12, 21. All of Plaintiffs claims against 
Defendants arise out of the acceptance of these plat maps, allowing subdivision of the property. 
The only way Plaintiff can avoid this immunity is by arguing that the plat maps were not 
prepared in substantial conformance with design or engineering standards. However, Plaintiff 
cannot do this, as the entity who prepared the plat maps for Sunset Palisades No. 8, Canyon 
Greens, and Canyon Greens II is Plaintiffs engineering expert, Eric Hasenoerhl. Statement of 
Facts, 11 6 - 7, 11 - 12. If Plaintiff alleges that Sunset Palisades No. 8 and Canyon Greens 
subdivision plat maps are not prepared in substantial conformance with design and engineering 
standards, he essentially admits that he (and his engineer) failed to comply with the standard of 
care owed. 
Second, with regard to the "advance approval" element of this immunity, there is no 
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question but that every plat map and building permit was approved in advance by the person at 
the City who had authority to approve such documents. In fact, each plat map must be signed and 
approved by the City engineer, the City clerk, the County Treasurer, the City surveyor, and the 
County sanitarian. Statement of Facts,,, 7, 12. There is no allegation that these persons do not 
have authority to give such approval. Ultimately, each plat must be and was approved by the City 
Council, as well. See Statement of Facts,~ 7, 12, 21. See also Lewiston City Code§§ 32-18 and 
32-19 (requiring City Council approval of preliminary and final plats). The fact that each of 
these plat maps was approved, and the property later subdivided, shows that the City Council did 
review and approve the plan in advance. Therefore, immunity is applicable under this section. 
Defendants contend that this immunity applies to all claims arising out of the plan or 
design for construction of public property, including the streets and City rights of way included 
on these maps. Defendants contend that this would include all damage to the properties related to 
slope movement, as it affects all of the City easements included on the various subdivision plats. 
Further, this immunity specifically includes all claims relating to or arising from placement of 
storm water improvements, detention ponds, fill or retaining walls crossing City rights-or-way, 
streets, or other improvements. 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants contend that summary judgment is appropriate on all 
of Plaintiff's claims pursuant to I. C. § 6-904(7). 
B. DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FOR ANY CLAIM OF DAMAGE RESULTING 
FROM FAILURE TO REQUIRE A SLOPE STABILITY ANALYSIS, AS SUCH 
DECISION RESULTED FROM A DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION OF CITY 
EMPLOYEES. 
Defendants are immune for claims arising out of 
any act or omission of an employee of the governmental entity exerc1smg 
ordinary care, in reliance upon or the execution or performance of a statutory or 
regulatory function, whether or not the statute or regulation be valid, or based 
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upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee 
thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused 
LC. § 6-904(1). As stated above, there is no claim for malice or criminal intent, and thus these 
exceptions do not apply. 
In order for an act to be immune under the discretionary function theory, the act must be 
discretionary, and must be a planning or policy formation decision. See Dorea Enters. v. City of 
Blackfoot, 144 Idaho 422, 425 (2007). There are a number of discretionary decisions which 
affected this case, and allow the immunity to apply. First, in 1997, the City of Lewiston enacted 
Lewiston City Ordinance 4177, which significantly revised the Lewiston subdivision code. 
Statement of Facts, ,-r 5. This revision took out all language mandatorily requiring that slope 
stability or other geotechnical analysis be completed. All that remains in the Lewiston 
subdivision code discussing slope stability studies is contained in §§ 32-9 and 32-20, discussed 
above. These sections clearly give discretion to the City engineer to determine whether a slope 
stability analysis is necessary. Based on these changes to the Lewiston City Code, a policy shift 
occurred whereby mandatory slope stability analysis was no longer required. Plaintiffs experts 
repeatedly state that the City does not often require slope stability analysis. There is no evidence 
that the City Council did not exercise ordinary care when passing Ordinance 4177, and therefore, 
it was policy based discretionary act by the City Council. 
Second, the decision of the City engineer to not require a slope stability analysis itself 
was a discretionary decision. As discussed above, the City engineer had the discretion to 
determine whether or not to require a slope stability or other geotechnical analysis during the 
subdivision process. 
Third, the City has a policy of not doing the background research for a developer when 
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an application is made to open a subdivision file. Similarly, the City does not move documents 
from old files into new files when a new subdivision file is created. See Statement of Facts,~ 13. 
In fact, the City, in its role as a records repository, does not take steps to ensure that every City 
employee is aware of every document in every file that is relevant to a subdivision process. 
Information stored in City files is available for use by the developer or the engineer working on a 
project to inspect the information.6 Plaintiff himself took the opportunity to inspect the files in 
June, 2009, see Complaint,~ 23, but for some unexplained reason, neither he nor his engineers, 
surveyors, or other agents ever took the time to look at available City records. Statement of 
Facts, ~ 9. It is clearly within the City's discretion to determine how much time, effort, and 
personnel it wishes to utilize in doing background research on a property. In this and in all cases, 
the City has made the decision that instead of acting as a source of all knowledge regarding the 
conditions of a property, it retains information about properties in files open to the public and 
available for review. See Redenbaugh Deposition, pp. 36:2 - 36:23. See also I.C. § 9-337, et 
seq. This policy determination meant that in this case, Plaintiff had the opportunity and 
obligation to search through City files prior to working on the property, and the City had no duty 
or obligation to do that search for him. Because the files were available for public review, the 
City did not have to expend the manpower resources, budgetary resources, or training resources 
of searching through publicly available City files. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the City IS Immune for all claims pursuant to the 
discretionary function immunity. 
C. DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FOR ANY CLAIM OF DAMAGE ARISING OUT 
OF ISSUING BUILDING PERMITS, APPROVING SUBDIVISION PLATS, OR 
MAKING OR FAILING TO MAKE INSPECTIONS. 
This information is subject to the open records laws of the State ofldaho, and the only preliminary step that 
is required prior to examining such information is to fill out a public records request. LC. § 9-337, et seq. 
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Defendants are immune for any claim which 
3. Arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or failure 
or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke a permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order or similar authorization. 
4. Arises out of the failure to make an inspection, or the making of an 
inadequate inspection of any property, real or personal, other than the property of 
the governmental entity performing the inspection. 
I. C. § 6-904B. This immunity language is broad enough to cover any claims of negligence which 
are based on issuance of building or other permits, approving subdivision plats, and inspecting or 
not inspecting the property at issue. This would cover each of the claims of negligence included 
in the Complaint against the Defendants. See Complaint,~ 55. This immunity does not apply if 
the Defendants acted with reckless, willful, and wanton conduct, or with gross negligence. I. C. § 
6-904B. These terms are statutorily defined. J.C. § 6-904C. 
As a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot show that the Defendants acted with gross negligence 
or reckless, willful and wanton conduct. In order to establish gross negligence, Plaintiff will have 
to show that Defendants did or failed to do 
an act which a reasonable person in a similar situation and of similar 
responsibility would, with a minimum of contemplation, be inescapably drawn to 
recognize his or her duty to do or not do such act and that failing that duty shows 
deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences to others. 
I.C. § 6-904C(l). As discussed above, Plaintiff cannot show that Defendants had any duty to 
search through public records on Plaintiffs behalf, or mandatorily require that Plaintiff obtain a 
soil stability or geotechnical analysis on the defective property at issue. There is no issue of fact 
that a city or its employees is not "inescapably dravvn to recognize a duty" to do something that 
Plaintiff could and should have done for himself, such as doing due diligence on a property. 
In order to establish reckless, willful and wanton conduct, Plaintiff will have to show that 
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the Defendants "knowingly [did] or fail[ ed] to do an act creating unreasonable risk of harm to 
another, and which involves a high degree of probability that such harm will result." LC. § 6-
904C(2). As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence connecting the City's 
actions with the slope movement and the economic loss Plaintiff has suffered. In order for there 
to be a "high degree of probability" that the slope movement would cause damage to Plaintiffs 
property, it would be necessary to know at a minimum what was causing the slope movement. 
Unless it is known what was causing the slope movement, it is impossible to determine that any 
action or inaction by the Defendants involves a high degree of probability that any harm would 
result. Further, it is impossible to show that the issuance of building permits, approving plats, 
inspecting or failing to inspect the property resulted in slope movement which damaged the 
houses. As discussed above, that defect was in the ground when Plaintiff bought the property. 
Until an in depth geotechnical survey is done, it cannot be known whether compacting 
foundations, building houses, digging pools, and installing retaining walls would have stabilized 
the property or not. Because no one knows what is causing the slope movement, know one can 
say whether in 2006 and 2007, when the City actions/inactions occurred regarding subdivision 
and construction, there was a high degree of probability that any damage would result. 
Therefore, Plaintiff cannot show, as a matter of law, that there was any reckless, willful and 
wanton conduct. 
IV. 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Pursuant to I.C. § 6-911, Plaintiffs claims against the city are "forever barred, unless an 
action is begun within two (2) years after the date the claim arose or reasonably should have 
been discovered, whichever is later." Plaintiff has failed to meet the required statute of 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 20 
limitations. 
According to the Complaint, Defendants' negligent acts all related to acts done before 
Plaintiff owned the property, or are related to the approval of subdivision plats and issuance of 
building permits. Complaint, ,-r 55. All of this was completed prior to May, 2007. Complaint, ,-r,-r 
14 - 16. With regard to the allegedly negligent acts performed by the Defendants prior to 
Plaintiff's purchase of the property, liability is barred by the statute of limitations. With regard to 
allegedly negligent acts committed by the Defendants after Plaintiff purchased the property, the 
Complaint was not filed until October 22, 2009. Under the circumstances of this case, where 
Plaintiff purchased a property with a defect in it, his damages arose immediately. Therefore, 
under Plaintiffs theory of the case, where the City should not have issued permits or approved 
plats, such claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 
There is no question but that Plaintiff was or reasonably should have been aware of the 
City's involvement prior to October, 2007. He admits that prior to construction, he knew that fill 
had been placed on the properties. Statement of Facts, ,-r 15. Plaintiff knew, at a minimum, that 
the property had previously been subdivided, and that the City retained records that had been 
provided to it related to such subdivisions. Plaintiff knew that the City had been involved in his 
own construction and subdivision process. None of the documents that Plaintiff is alleging that 
the City failed to tell him about were concealed from him. They were available for him to 
review, free of cost, pursuant to the Idaho Public Record laws, J.C. § 9-337, et seq., and he 
simply didn't go look. Particularly where the City has no policy of history of doing background 
research on properties for developers, it is reasonable for a developer or his engineer to do his 
own research. 
Based on the foregoing, all of Plaintiffs claims against the City are barred by the statute 
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of limitations outlined in I C. § 6-911. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants City of Lewiston and Lowell Cutshaw request that 
summary judgment be entered, and all claims against them be dismissed. 
DATED this L( day of June, 2011. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
Brian K. Julian, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for City of Lewiston and 
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this~ day of June, 2011, I served a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT by delivering the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by the method 
indicated below, addressed as follows: 
Ronald J. Landeck 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
693 Styner A venue 
P. 0. Box 9344 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Telephone: (208) 883-1505 
Facsimile: (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Clinton 0. Casey 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & 
KING, LLP. 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83 706 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant Jack J Streibick 
[ >:'] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
[ Y] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
Brian K. Julian 
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Brian K. Julian, ISB No. 2360 
Stephen L. Adams, ISB No. 7534 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83707-7426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-551 0 
E-Mail: bjulian@ajhlaw .com 
sadams@ajhlaw .com 
Attorneys for Defendants City of Lewiston and 
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man, 
ODI(' ~\I I\ llJ j OJ 
DE :_. T t' 
Case No. CV 09-02219 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK 
STREIBICK as Personal Representative of 
the Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, 
deceased, CITY OF LEWISTON, a 
municipal corporation of the State of 
Idaho, and its employee LOWELL J. 
CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, 
and DOES 1 - 20, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COME NOW, the above-entitled Defendants, City of Lewiston and Lowell J. 
Cutshaw, by and through their attorneys of record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, and 
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L 
hereby submit this Motion for Summary Judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, submit this Motion for Summary Judgment. This Motion 
for Summary Judgment is made on the grounds more fully stated in Defendants' 
Memorandum in Support, which include that Defendants are immune for liability 
from Mr. Block's claims pursuant to the Idaho Tort Claims Act, and Plaintiff cannot 
establish negligence as Plaintiff cannot either a duty or causation. 
This Motion is supported by the pleadings on file, and by the following 
documents submitted contemporaneously herewith: 
1. Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
2. Statement of Facts in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. 
3. Supplemental Affidavit of Stephen Adams in Support of Motion for 
Summary Judgment. 
4. Affidavit of Kari Ravencroft in support of Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
DATED this L L\, day of June, 2011. 
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ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
Brian K. Julian, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for City of Lewiston and 
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 2 day of June, 2011, I served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT by delivering 
the same to each of the following attorneys of record, by the method indicated 
below, addressed as follows: 
Ronald J. Landeck 
RONALD J. LANDECK, P.C. 
693 Styner Avenue 
P. 0. Box 9344 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Telephone: {208) 883-1505 
Facsimile: (208) 883-4593 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
Clinton 0. Casey 
CANTRILL, SKINNER, SULLIVAN & 
KING, LLP. 
1423 Tyrell Lane 
P.O. Box 359 
Boise, Idaho 83706 
Telephone: (208) 344-8035 
Facsimile: (208) 345-7212 
Attorneys for Defendant Jack J. 
Streibick 
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[Y] U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
[ ] Hand-Delivered 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
[ ] Facsimile 
Brian K. Julian 
Brian K. Julian, ISB No. 2360 
Stephen L. Adams, ISB No. 7534 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
C. W. Moore Plaza 
250 South Fifth Street, Suite 700 
Post Office Box 7426 
Boise, Idaho 83 707-7 426 
Telephone: (208) 344-5800 
Facsimile: (208) 344-5510 
E-Mail: bjulian@ajhlaw.com 
sadams@ajhlaw .com 
Attorneys for Defendants City of Lewiston and 
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer 
~~Wl~ 
DC-JIT 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF 
THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND 
FOR THE COUNTY OF NEZ PERCE 
JOHN G. BLOCK, a single man, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JACK J. STREIBICK, a single man, JACK 
STREIBICK as Personal Representative ofthe 
Estate of Maureen F. Streibick, deceased, CITY 
OF LEWISTON, a municipal corporation of the 
State ofldaho, and its employee LOWELL J. 
CUTSHAW, City of Lewiston Engineer, and 
DOES 1-20, 
Defendants. 
Case No. CV 09-02219 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
COME NOW, the above-entitled Defendants, City of Lewiston and Lowell J. Cutshaw, 
by and through their attorneys of record, Anderson, Julian & Hull, and hereby submit this 
Memorandum in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. 
I. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff John Block is suing the City of Lewiston for negligence related to the 
construction of homes within the Canyon Greens and Canyon Greens II subdivisions. The three 
homes in Canyon Greens, located at 153, 155, and 159 Marine View Drive, were allegedly 
damaged as a result of slope movement which occurred on or near those properties. The 
remaining houses have not experienced any structural damage, but Plaintiff is seeking monetary 
damages related to those properties due to decrease in value. Plaintiff is seeking also lost 
business income damages as a result of the claims outlined in his Complaint. The two causes of 
action in the Complaint which are directed against the City are both based in negligence. See 
Complaint, ~~ 54 57. Paragraph 55 of the Complaint lists 11 actions or omissions by the City 
and City Engineer Lowell Cutshaw which allegedly resulted in a breach of a duty owed to 
Plaintiff, and Paragraph 57 alleges that these negligent acts were grossly negligent. 
Defendants City and Cutshaw (collectively referred to as "Defendants") contend that they 
are entitled to summary judgment on a number of grounds. First, a number of the allegedly 
wrongful acts by the City occurred before Plaintiff owned the property, and the City and its 
employees have no duty to all future property owners of a property to act in any specific way. 
Second, the Defendants had no tort duty to protect against purely economic loss, which 
encompasses all of Plaintiff's damages. Third, Plaintiff cannot show that the Defendants had any 
duty to mandatorily require that he obtain a slope stability or other geotechnical analysis prior to 
construction on the properties at issue. Fourth, Plaintiff cannot show that any action or inaction 
of the Defendants caused slope movement and any additional economic loss resulting therefrom. 
Fifth, the Defendants are immune from all of Plaintiff's claims pursuant to I.C. §§ 6-904(1), 6-
904(7), 6-904B(3), and 6-904B(4). Each of these issues will be discussed in more detail below. 
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II. 
NEGLIGENCE ARGUMENTS 
A. DEFENDANTS HAD NO DUTY TOWARD PLAINTIFF WITH REGARD TO 
THE PROPERTIES AT ISSUE PRIOR TO HIM PURCHASING THE 
PROPERTY. 
Plaintiff's allegations of negligence by the Defendants include the following: 
(iii) failing to require that such earth movement in the area of 153, 155, and 159 be 
eliminated or properly abated by Streibick and/or Others prior to Block's 
purchase of the Property; 
(iv) failing to prevent Streibick from developing and selling 153, 155, and 159 to 
Block without notice and/or warning to Block that such earth movement had 
occurred in 1999 or without having eliminated or properly abated such earth 
movement; 
(v) failing to require Streibick to complete the required storm water improvements in 
1994 for Palisades No. 4 subdivision and approving and allowing Streibick's 
construction of a storm water detention pond within the area of 153 where the 
City of Lewiston, Cutshaw and/or Others knew earth movement had occurred in 
1999, thereby contributing to the instability of soil in that area; 
(ix) failing to require and/or compel Streibick to eliminate or properly abate the 
dangerous condition caused by and/or existing as a result of such earth movement 
in the area of 153, 155 and 159; 
(x) failing to supervise Streibick's development activities within the area of 153, 155, 
and 159 between 1999 and 2006 thereby allowing concealment of such earth 
movement and the creation of a dangerous condition and risk of harm; and 
(xi) failing to inspect and/or make an inadequate inspection of Streibick's 
development activities within the area of 153, 155, and 159 between 1999 and 
2006 thereby allowing concealment of such earth movement and the creation of a 
dangerous condition and risk of harm. 
Complaint,~ 55. Plaintiff purchased the property in or around December, 2005. Complaint, ~ 
13. Defendants contend that each of these allegations above concern acts or omissions prior to 
Plaintiff purchasing the property. Ignoring the issues of whether the City actually had a duty to 
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anyone at the times mentioned as Plaintiff alleges, Defendants contend that they had no duty to 
Plaintiff with regard to the acts or omissions alleged. 
The existence of a duty is a question of law. Turpen v. Granieri, 133 Idaho 244, 247 
(1999). "No liability arises from the law of torts unless the defendant owes a duty to the 
plaintiff." Udy v. Custer County, 136 Idaho 386, 389 (2001). Numerous Idaho cases have made 
it clear that a party cannot recover from a governmental entity for failure to perform a duty owed 
to the public at large. "[I]fthe duty which the official authority imposes upon an officer is a duty 
to the public, a failure to perform it, or an inadequate or erroneous performance, must be a 
public, not an individual, injury, and must be redressed, if at all, in some form of public 
prosecution." Jacobson v. McMillan, 64 Idaho 351, 359 (1943). See also Worden v. Witt, 4 
Idaho 404, 406 - 07 (1895). 
Generally, a person has no common law duty to prevent a third person from 
injuring another unless there is some kind of special relationship. Applying this 
principle to governmental torts in what is called the "public duty rule" requires 
that a governmental unit owe the plaintiff a duty different from that owed to the 
general public in order for the governmental unit to be found liable. 
Radke v. County of Freeborn, 694 N.W.2d 788, 793 (Minn. 2005) (cited in Rees v. State, 143 
Idaho 10, 16 (2006). In Udy v. Custer County, the plaintiff argued that a sheriff who saw rocks 
lying on a road (which later caused a motor vehicle accident) had a duty to clear the rocks or 
give notice to someone to move them. Udy, 136 Idaho at 389. The Idaho Supreme Court stated 
Udy's claims are in reality claims for negligent police protection for which there 
can be no recovery absent a special relationship with the victim. Here, the record 
does not establish, nor does Udy argue that he or his passengers were in a special 
relationship with Sheriff Roskelley. Thus, the fact that Udy's accident may have 
been prevented through reasonable law enforcement actions is insufficient to 
establish a duty to the Appellants or otherwise form the basis for Sheriff 
Roskelley's liability in tort. 
Udy, 136 Idaho at 391. In other words, absent a special relationship, there was no duty owed to 
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the plaintiff just because there may have been a duty to the public at large. 
The same is true in this case. Before Plaintiff owned the property at issue, there was no 
duty owed by the City to him specifically with regard to the property. Similarly, there was no 
special relationship between the Defendants and Plaintiff related to this property, as the property 
was owned by Streibick. Until Plaintiff owned the property, the Defendants had no more duty to 
him than it did to any other member of the public as regarding this property. Therefore, Plaintiff 
should not be allowed to recover damages related to the actions/omissions discussed above, and 
summary judgment should be granted to the Defendants on these claims. Further, should this 
case proceed to trial, Plaintiff should not be allowed to use evidence of these claims as evidence 
that the City was negligent after Plaintiff purchased the property, and should be prevented from 
submitting evidence that these claims are a basis for his damages. 
B. BECAUSE ALL OF PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES IN THIS CASE ARE ECONOMIC 
LOSSES, DEFENDANTS HAD NO DUTY TO PREVENT THE OCCURRENCE 
OF SUCH DAMAGES. 
All of Plaintiff's damages in this case constitute economic damages, including repair and 
lost value on the homes at 153, 155, and 159 Marine View Drive, lost business damages, and lost 
value on six of the eight homes that were designated part of Canyon Greens II (none of which 
had any physical damage related to slope movement). See Statement of Facts,~ 22. With limited 
exception, economic losses are not recoverable in negligence actions. Duffin v. Idaho Crop 
Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007 (1995). See also Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman 
Elec., Inc., 244 P.3d 166, 170 (Idaho 2010) ("The economic loss rule applies to negligence cases 
in general; its application is not restricted to products liability cases."). 
With regard to the definition of economic loss, the Supreme Court has stated that 
"Economic loss includes costs of repair and replacement of defective property which is the 
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subject of the transaction, as well as commercial loss for inadequate value and consequent loss of 
profits or use." Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 97 Idaho 348, 351 
(1975). This definition has been followed by a majority of cases addressing economic loss. 1 
Based on this definition, in order for there to be economic loss, there has to be defective property 
which is the subject of the transaction at issue in the lawsuit. See Brian & Christie, Inc. v. 
Leishman Elec., Inc., 244 P.3d 166, 171 (Idaho 2010). This can apply to cases "involving the 
purchase of defective personal property and real property." I d. at 170. 
There are a number of cases addressing economic loss which parallel the facts of this 
case. In Tusclt Enters. v. Coffin, 113 Idaho 37 (1987), the plaintiff purchased duplexes, and 
found after purchase that the foundation on the properties was cracking. Id. at 40. The Court 
stated that "The structural defects have caused damage to the duplexes themselves and to the 
parking lot, and have caused losses in rental income, but Tusch Enterprises has suffered no 
personal injuries and has suffered no damage to property other than that which was the subject of 
the duplex sales transaction." Id. The Court then barred recovery of these damages, stating "the 
only damages it alleges are lost rental income and property damage to the duplexes and the 
parking lot. These losses are economic." Id. 
A similar result was reached in Duffin. In Duffin, the plaintiffs purchased seed potatoes 
which allegedly were infected with bacterial ring rot, despite having been inspected by the 
Department of Agriculture. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1005. The Department of Agriculture argued 
that recovery was barred because the Department had no duty to protect against economic loss of 
See Duffin v. Idaho Crop Improvement Ass'n, 126 Idaho 1002, 1007 (1995); Tusch Enters. v. Coffin, 113 
Idaho 37, 41 (1987); Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 300 (2005); Ramerth v. Hart, 133 
Idaho 194, 196 (1999); Aardema v. U.S. Dairy Sys., 147 Idaho 785, 790 (2009). Cf Brian & Christie, Inc. 
v. Leishman Elec., Inc., 244 P.3d 166, 170 (Idaho 2010) (holding that the definition provided of economic 
loss in the Salmon Rivers case does not apply to claims for economic loss related to services, as opposed to 
defective property). 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT- 6 
the plaintiffs. /d. at 1006. The Court found that the losses related to the use ofthe infected seed 
potatoes was economic, and not recoverable. ld. at 1007. The Court then went on to address the 
various exceptions to the economic loss rule, and found that none were applicable. /d. at 1007 
08. 
In this case, there is clearly a defective property at issue. In the Complaint, Plaintiff 
clearly acknowledges that the property he purchased had suffered slope movement prior to his 
purchase, and that the property was subject to future slope movement. Complaint,~ 25. Plaintiff 
even refers to the condition of the property as a "Defective Condition". Complaint, ~~ 29 - 41. 
This is the same as purchasing diseased seed potatoes2, duplexes which had been built on fill and 
which had cracks in the foundation3, houses built on soil subject to settlement4 , or defective 
roofing materials.5 Because the property allegedly had a "defective condition" when Plaintiff 
purchased it, this meets the "defective property" requirement of the Salmon Rivers definition of 
economic loss. 
The remainder of the Salmon Rivers definition also is met. The defective property at 
issue (the lots purchased by Plaintiff from Streibick) are clearly the subject of the transaction 
between Block and Streibick, and are the subject transaction in this case. Complaint, ~ 11. In 
Blahd, the Court engages in a lengthy discussion of what the "subject of the transaction" is, 
stating 
4 
In Tusch Enterprises, a seller hired a contractor to level a hill to prepare the area 
for construction. The seller participated in the site preparation, hired a builder to 
construct a duplex on the site and sold the duplex to a buyer. The buyer then 
discovered the duplex was damaged because the foundation was defective. The 
See Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1005. 
See Tusch Enters., 113 Idaho at 40. 
See Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 299 (2005). 
See State v. Mitchell Constr. Co., 108 Idaho 335, 336 (1984). 
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buyer sued the seller and the builder alleging negligence in preparing the 
foundation. This Court held the economic loss rule barred the negligence claims 
because the damage to the duplex caused by the defective foundation was purely 
economic. This Court later explained in another case that it "considered the 
duplex itself, rather than its construction, to be the subject of the transaction." 
In Ramerth, an airplane owner sued a repairman alleging the repairman's 
negligent servicing and inspection of the airplane caused damage to the engine 
and aircraft. The airplane owner argued the economic loss rule did not bar his 
negligence claim because the subject of the transaction was the repairman's 
services, not the engine or airplane that was serviced. This Court rejected that 
argument and held the damage to the engine and the aircraft were purely 
economic and therefore, subject to the economic loss rule. These cases indicate 
the word "transaction," for purposes of the economic loss rule, does not mean a 
business deal--it means the subject of the lawsuit. 
Like the duplex in Tusch Enterprises, the Blahds' house is damaged because the 
foundation is settling. The damage to the Blahds' house is similar to the duplex 
damage in Tusch Enterprises, where this Court held the losses were economic. 
The Blahds seek to distinguish their case by noting the buyer in Tusch Enterprises 
did not sue the contractor who leveled the lot and did not allege the property had 
been leveled negligently. The fact that the buyer in Tusch Enterprises only sued 
the builder and the seller is immaterial. It is the subject of the transaction that 
determines whether a loss is property damage or economic loss, not the status of 
the party being sued. The Blahds purchased the house and lot as an integrated 
whole. Like the leveled lot and duplex in Tusch Enterprises, the subject of the 
transaction in this case is both the lot and the house. That being the case, the 
damages to the Blahds' house are purely economic and the Blahds' negligence 
claims against the Smith Entities and Jones are barred by the economic loss rule. 
Blahd v. Richard B. Smith, Inc., 141 Idaho 296, 300-301 (2005). There is no need for the 
Defendants to be part of the sale of property in order for it to be the transaction relevant to the 
lawsuit; for example, in Duffin, the Department of Agriculture was not involved in the purchase 
of the seed potatoes (other than inspecting them), yet was still allowed to argue the economic 
loss defense. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1005 and 1008. As in Blahd, Tusch, Duffin, and Ramerth, 
the subject ofthe transaction was the purchase of the defective property, i.e. Plaintiffs purchase 
of the land at issue. 
Finally, all of the damages alleged by Plaintiff are economic in the sense that they are 
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costs of repair and replacement of the defective property, or are commercial loss or consequent 
loss of profits or use. Salmon Rivers Sportsman Camps, 97 Idaho at 351. With regard to the 
houses located at 153, 155, and 159 Marine View Drive, the damage was caused by the slope 
movement (which was the defect that existed in the property at the time of purchase), and the 
losses on these houses are the loss of increased property value (which are profits) and repair of 
the properties. This is economic loss. With regard to the damages allegedly related to the 
properties at 161 Marine View Drive, and 101- 107 Canyon Greens Court, none ofthese houses 
have suffered any physical damage. All loss is loss of value, which constitutes commercial loss 
or loss of profits/use, which is economic loss. Statement of Facts, ~ 22. Finally, with regard to 
Plaintiffs business damages, this also clearly is commercial loss (equivalent to lost crop yield in 
Duffin), and is economic loss. Also see Just's v. Arrington Constr. Co., 99 Idaho 462, 468 
(1978) ("The damages claimed by the plaintiff, lost profits, are purely economic losses"). 
All of Plaintiffs damages are economic losses, and the Defendants had no duty to protect 
against such losses. The defect was in the soil at the time Plaintiff purchased the property, and 
there is no evidence that Defendants caused the defect to exist. The defect in the soil later caused 
Plaintiffs damages, resulting in economic loss. See Brian & Christie, Inc. v. Leishman Elec., 
Inc., 244 P.3d 166, 171 (Idaho 2010) (explaining how economic loss worked in the context of 
purchasing a defective airplane in Ramertlt v. Hart, 133 Idaho 194 (1999)). The exceptions to 
the economic loss rule do not apply. There is no special relationship between the Defendants and 
Plaintiff. The term "special relationship" "refers to those situations where the relationship 
between the parties is such that it would be equitable to impose such a duty. In other words, there 
is an extremely limited group of cases where the law of negligence extends its protections to a 
party's economic interest." Blaltd, 141 Idaho at 301 (quoting Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008). There 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 9 
is no evidence that the Defendants were performing professional or "quasi-professional" 
personal services to Plaintiff. See Blahd, 141 at 301; MeA/vain v. General Ins. Co., 97 Idaho 
777, 780 (1976). The fact that City employees reviewed plat maps and other documents for 
compliance with City code is no more a personal service than was the inspection of seed potatoes 
by the Department of Agriculture in Duffin. Duffin, 126 Idaho at 1008. Similarly, the City does 
not hold itself out as having expertise regarding a specialized function any more than did the 
Department of Agriculture. Blahd, 141 Idaho at 301. The "unique circumstances exception" also 
does not apply. As the Court stated in Blahd, "The purchase of a residential house is an everyday 
occurrence and does not create the type of unique circumstances required to justify a different 
allocation of risk, particularly where it appears there may be other defendants available to 
respond in contract damages." ld. at 302. The same is true for the purchase of real property 
without improvements on it. Therefore, there is no exception to the economic loss rule, and 
Defendants request that the Court determine that Defendants had no duty toward Plaintiff with 
regard to economic loss. As all of Plaintiffs damages are economic damages, Defendants 
request that summary judgment be granted on all of Plaintiffs claims against the Defendants. 
C. DEFENDANTS HAD NO DUTY TO REQUIRE THAT PLAINTIFF OBTAIN A 
GEOTECHNICAL OR SLOPE STABILITY ANALYSIS OF THE PROPERTY IN 
QUESTION. 
A main issue in Plaintiffs claim of negligence is that the City failed to require that 
Plaintiff obtain a geotechnical or slope stability analysis prior to approving the plat for Canyon 
Greens, or during the construction process. This argument fails because there was no duty owed 
by the City to require Plaintiff to take such steps before the plat was accepted or building permits 
were issued. The current Lewiston City Code, with regard to subdivisions, does not contain any 
language mandating that a slope stability or geotechnical analysis be completed during the 
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subdivision process. The only language which relates to such requirements is as follows: 
Sec. 32-9. Preapplication Conference. 
(2) Actions by the city. The city will discuss the proposal with the subdivider and 
advise him of procedural steps, design and improvement standards, and general 
plat requirements. Then, depending upon the scope of the proposed development, 
they will proceed with the following actions: 
e. Review and discuss with the developer the potential need for special studies, 
which may include but are not limited to traffic, soil, slope stability. wetlands, 
foundations or other studies that may be required as a result of site conditions, and 
the implications of the findings of those studies, if required. The requirement of 
said special studies shall be determined by the city engineer. 
Sec. 32-20. Information required for preliminary plat submittal. 
(c) Existing conditions data. 
(2) Soils stability analysis when required by the city engineer. 
Sec. 32-31. General. 
(e) Where the tract to be subdivided is located in whole or in part in terrain having 
an average slope exceeding ten (1 0) percent, design and development shall 
conform to the findings of a suitability study as required by the city engineer. 
Lewiston City Code, §§ 32-9, 32-20, and 32-31. As can be seen from these code sections, it is 
purely within the discretion of the Lewiston City Engineer to require a slope stability or 
geotechnical analysis. 
Based on this language, the Defendants had no affirmative statutory or regulatory duty to 
require Plaintiff to complete a slope stability or geotechnical analysis. Such decision is left to the 
discretion of the City engineer and the developer (in this case Plaintiff). This conclusion is 
further emphasized by the fact that in 1997, when the City revised the subdivision code, it took 
out a significant amount of language requiring mandatory slope stability analysis. Statement of 
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Facts,~ 5. This modification of language shows a clear intent on the part of the City Council to 
adopt a policy of giving City employees discretion to require such analyses. 
With regard to the building permits, City Building Official John Smith has testified that 
he can require certain soil stability analysis be done before issuing a building permit. Statement 
of Facts,, 14. However, that is limited to compaction testing under the footings. In this case, the 
compaction testing was required, and was completed. Statement of Facts,,, 14- 15. Therefore, 
to the extent there was a duty to require certain soil analysis prior to construction, there is no 
question of fact but that the Defendants complied with such duty by requiring compaction testing 
be completed. 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants request that the Court find that there was no duty to 
require Plaintiff to obtain a slope stability or geotechnical analysis prior to approving the plat for 
Canyon Greens or issuing the building permits, and grant summary judgment with regard to 
these issues. 
D. PLAINTIFF CANNOT SHOW THAT ANY ACTION OR INACTION BY THE 
CITY CAUSED PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES. 
In order to be able to prevail on a claim for negligence, Plaintiff must prove all four 
elements of a negligence claim, "(1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the defendant to 
conform to a certain standard of conduct; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) a causal connection 
between the defendant's conduct and the resulting injury; and ( 4) actual loss or damage." Nation 
v. State, 144 Idaho 177, 189 (2007). "The issue of causation is usually a question of fact for the 
jury." Walker v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 130 Idaho 824, 831 (1997). However, it can become a 
question of law when there is insufficient evidence to support an inference of causation. /d. 
In this case, there is a deficiency in Plaintiff's ability to prove that the Defendants' 
actions caused his damages. It is clear that the damage to the houses at 153, 155, and 159 Marine 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT - 12 
View Drive was caused by the slope movement. Affidavit of Eric Hasenoehrl (dated July 13, 
201 0), , 13. There is no claim that any action or inaction by the Defendants caused direct 
damage to the properties (for example, there is no claim that any City employee ran into one of 
the houses with a tractor). All claims of negligence against the City are for failure to warn, 
inspect, give notice, prevent someone else from action, or similar actions. Complaint, , 55. 
There is no evidence that any action or inaction by the City directly caused the slope movement. 
As is described in Streibick's Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs expert have not 
provided any testimony as to what is the cause of the slope movement. Memorandum in Support 
of Motion for Summary Judgment (dated June 7, 2010), pp. 6- 8. Because Plaintiff has failed 
to do an in depth geotechnical analysis of the property, it will be impossible to ascertain what is 
the cause of the slope movement (and thus the cause ofthe damage to 153, 155, and 159 Marine 
View Drive). Because it is impossible to know what caused the slope movement, no evidence 
can be provided to the Court stating whether or not any action or inaction by the City would have 
prevented future slope movement. It is inadmissible for Plaintiff to argue that he doesn't know 
what was and is causing the slopes to fail, but in the same breath say that had the City required a 
slope stability analysis, no damage to the houses would have occurred. Plaintiff's cause of 
action for negligence against the City must fail because Plaintiff cannot, as a matter of law, prove 
that the Defendant's actions or inactions caused his damages. 
III. 
IMMUNITY ARGUMENTS 
When summary judgment is requested on the grounds of immunity under the Idaho Tort 
Claims Act, the Supreme Court has specified a three step analysis. 
When reviewing a motion for summary judgment against a governmental entity 
and its employees under the Idaho Tort Claims Act (ITCA), this Court must 
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engage in a three step analysis. First, we must determine whether tort recovery 
is allowed under the laws of Idaho. This is essentially a determination of whether 
there is such a tort under Idaho Law. Second, this Court determines if an 
exception to liability under the ITCA shields the alleged misconduct from 
liability. Finally, if no exception applies, [we examine] whether the merits of the 
claim as presented for consideration on the motion for summary judgment entitle 
the moving party to dismissal. 
Rees v. State, 143 Idaho 10, 14- 15 (2006) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). 
Defendants concede that negligence is a recognized tort in the state of Idaho, see, e.g, Nation v. 
State, 144 Idaho 177, 189 (2007); Brooks v. Logan, 127 Idaho 484,487 (1995), and therefore do 
not address this first step of the analysis. With regard to the second step, Defendants contend that 
immunity applies to all claims pursuant to LR.C.P. §§ 6-904(1) and (7), 6-904B(3) and ( 4). 
A. DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FOR ANY CLAIM OF DAMAGE RESULTING 
FROM THE ACCEPTANCE AND DESIGN OF SUBDIVISION PLAT MAPS 
RELATING TO SUNSET PALISADES NO. 4, SUNSET PALISADES NO. 8, 
CANYON GREENS, OR CANYON GREENS II. 
Defendants are immune for claims arising out of 
a plan or design for construction or improvement to the highways, roads, streets, 
bridges, or other public property where such plan or design is prepared in 
substantial conformance with engineering or design standards in effect at the time 
of preparation of the plan or design or approved in advance of the construction by 
the legislative body of the governmental entity or by some other body or 
administrative agency, exercising discretion by authority to give such approval 
LC. § 6-904(7). There is no claim that the City was acting with malice or criminal intent, so 
these exceptions do not apply. Complaint, 'I! 57. This language is interpreted to be broken into 
two separate parts: 
The addition by the legislature of the word "or" to I.C. § 6-904(7) clearly 
indicates that immunity is available under the provision if the governmental entity 
shows substantial conformance or advance approval. Therefore, under I.C. § 6-
904(7) as amended, the City was required to establish (1) the existence of a plan 
or design that was (2) either prepared in substantial confonnance with existing 
engineering or design standards or approved in advance of construction by the 
legislative or administrative authority. 
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Lawton v. City of Pocatello, 126 Idaho 454, 459 (1994). Defendants claim that immunity applies 
under both of the "substantial conformance" and "advance approval" elements of this statute. 
With regard to the "substantial conformance" portion of the immunity, a brief 
background of the property is helpful. This property has been subdivided up to four times. 
Originally, it was titled Block 3 of Sunset Palisades No.4. Statement of Facts,~~ 1, 6. In 2005, 
it was resubdivided by Streibick as Sunset Palisades No. 8. Statement of Facts, ~ 6. When 
Plaintiff purchased the property, he subdivided the largest single lot in Sunset Palisades No. 8 
into three lots (later designated 153, 155, and 159 Marine View Dr.), and called the subdivision 
Canyon Greens. Statement of Facts, ~ 11. Plaintiff then subdivided the remaining three lots of 
Sunset Palisades No. 8 into eight lots, calling the subdivision Canyon Greens II. Statement of 
Facts, ~ 21. At each of these subdivisions, a stamped, engineered subdivision plat was submitted 
to the City, including roads, sewage lines and easements, storm drain lines and easements, and 
other public property. See Statement of Facts, ~~ 1, 7, 12, 21. All of Plaintiffs claims against 
Defendants arise out of the acceptance of these plat maps, allowing subdivision of the property. 
The only way Plaintiff can avoid this immunity is by arguing that the plat maps were not 
prepared in substantial conformance with design or engineering standards. However, Plaintiff 
cannot do this, as the entity who prepared the plat maps for Sunset Palisades No. 8, Canyon 
Greens, and Canyon Greens II is Plaintiffs engineering expert, Eric Hasenoerhl. Statement of 
Facts, ~~ 6 - 7, 11 - 12. If Plaintiff alleges that Sunset Palisades No. 8 and Canyon Greens 
subdivision plat maps are not prepared in substantial conformance with design and engineering 
standards, he essentially admits that he (and his engineer) failed to comply with the standard of 
care owed. 
Second, with regard to the "advance approval" element of this immunity, there is no 
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question but that every plat map and building permit was approved in advance by the person at 
the City who had authority to approve such documents. In fact, each plat map must be signed and 
approved by the City engineer, the City clerk, the County Treasurer, the City surveyor, and the 
County sanitarian. Statement of Facts,~,-[ 7, 12. There is no allegation that these persons do not 
have authority to give such approval. Ultimately, each plat must be and was approved by the City 
Council, as well. See Statement of Facts,,-[ 7, 12, 21. See also Lewiston City Code§§ 32-18 and 
32-19 (requiring City Council approval of preliminary and final plats). The fact that each of 
these plat maps was approved, and the property later subdivided, shows that the City Council did 
review and approve the plan in advance. Therefore, immunity is applicable under this section. 
Defendants contend that this immunity applies to all claims arising out of the plan or 
design for construction of public property, including the streets and City rights of way included 
on these maps. Defendants contend that this would include all damage to the properties related to 
slope movement, as it affects all of the City easements included on the various subdivision plats. 
Further, this immunity specifically includes all claims relating to or arising from placement of 
storm water improvements, detention ponds, fill or retaining walls crossing City rights-or-way, 
streets, or other improvements. 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants contend that summary judgment is appropriate on all 
of Plaintiffs claims pursuant to I.C. § 6-904(7). 
B. DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FOR ANY CLAIM OF DAMAGE RESULTING 
FROM FAILURE TO REQUIRE A SLOPE STABILITY ANALYSIS, AS SUCH 
DECISION RESULTED FROM A DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION OF CITY 
EMPLOYEES. 
Defendants are immune for claims arising out of 
any act or omission of an employee of the governmental entity exerc1smg 
ordinary care, in reliance upon or the execution or performance of a statutory or 
regulatory function, whether or not the statute or regulation be valid, or based 
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upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a 
discretionary function or duty on the part of a governmental entity or employee 
thereof, whether or not the discretion be abused 
LC. § 6-904(1). As stated above, there is no claim for malice or criminal intent, and thus these 
exceptions do not apply. 
In order for an act to be immune under the discretionary function theory, the act must be 
discretionary, and must be a planning or policy formation decision. See Dorea Enters. v. City of 
Blackfoot, 144 Idaho 422, 425 (2007). There are a number of discretionary decisions which 
affected this case, and allow the immunity to apply. First, in 1997, the City of Lewiston enacted 
Lewiston City Ordinance 4177, which significantly revised the Lewiston subdivision code. 
Statement of Facts, ,-[ 5. This revision took out all language mandatorily requiring that slope 
stability or other geotechnical analysis be completed. All that remains in the Lewiston 
subdivision code discussing slope stability studies is contained in §§ 32-9 and 32-20, discussed 
above. These sections clearly give discretion to the City engineer to determine whether a slope 
stability analysis is necessary. Based on these changes to the Lewiston City Code, a policy shift 
occurred whereby mandatory slope stability analysis was no longer required. Plaintiffs experts 
repeatedly state that the City does not often require slope stability analysis. There is no evidence 
that the City Council did not exercise ordinary care when passing Ordinance 4177, and therefore, 
it was policy based discretionary act by the City Council. 
Second, the decision of the City engineer to not require a slope stability analysis itself 
was a discretionary decision. As discussed above, the City engineer had the discretion to 
determine whether or not to require a slope stability or other geotechnical analysis during the 
subdivision process. 
Third, the City has a policy of not doing the background research for a developer when 
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an application is made to open a subdivision file. Similarly, the City does not move documents 
from old files into new files when a new subdivision file is created. See Statement of Facts,, 13. 
In fact, the City, in its role as a records repository, does not take steps to ensure that every City 
employee is aware of every document in every file that is relevant to a subdivision process. 
Information stored in City files is available for use by the developer or the engineer working on a 
project to inspect the information.6 Plaintiff himself took the opportunity to inspect the files in 
June, 2009, see Complaint,, 23, but for some unexplained reason, neither he nor his engineers, 
surveyors, or other agents ever took the time to look at available City records. Statement of 
Facts, , 9. It is clearly within the City's discretion to determine how much time, effort, and 
personnel it wishes to utilize in doing background research on a property. In this and in all cases, 
the City has made the decision that instead of acting as a source of all knowledge regarding the 
conditions of a property, it retains information about properties in files open to the public and 
available for review. See Redenbaugh Deposition, pp. 36:2- 36:23. See also I.C. § 9-337, et 
seq. This policy determination meant that in this case, Plaintiff had the opportunity and 
obligation to search through City files prior to working on the property, and the City had no duty 
or obligation to do that search for him. Because the files were available for public review, the 
City did not have to expend the manpower resources, budgetary resources, or training resources 
of searching through publicly available City files. 
Based on the foregoing analysis, the City is 1mmune for all claims pursuant to the 
discretionary function immunity. 
c. 
6 
DEFENDANTS ARE IMMUNE FOR ANY CLAIM OF DAMAGE ARISING OUT 
OF ISSUING BUILDING PERMITS, APPROVING SUBDIVISION PLATS, OR 
MAKING OR FAILING TO MAKE INSPECTIONS. 
This information is subject to the open records laws of the State ofldaho, and the only preliminary step that 
is required prior to examining such information is to fill out a public records request. I. C. § 9-337, et seq. 
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Defendants are immune for any claim which 
3. Arises out of the issuance, denial, suspension or revocation of, or failure 
or refusal to issue, deny, suspend, or revoke a permit, license, certificate, 
approval, order or similar authorization. 
4. Arises out of the failure to make an inspection, or the making of an 
inadequate inspection of any property, real or personal, other than the property of 
the governmental entity performing the inspection. 
I. C. § 6-904B. This immunity language is broad enough to cover any claims of negligence which 
are based on issuance of building or other permits, approving subdivision plats, and inspecting or 
not inspecting the property at issue. This would cover each of the claims of negligence included 
in the Complaint against the Defendants. See Complaint,~ 55. This immunity does not apply if 
the Defendants acted with reckless, willful, and wanton conduct, or with gross negligence. I. C. § 
6-904B. These terms are statutorily defined. I. C. § 6-904C. 
As a matter of law, Plaintiff cannot show that the Defendants acted with gross negligence 
or reckless, willful and wanton conduct. In order to establish gross negligence, Plaintiff will have 
to show that Defendants did or failed to do 
an act which a reasonable person in a similar situation and of similar 
responsibility would, with a minimum of contemplation, be inescapably drawn to 
recognize his or her duty to do or not do such act and that failing that duty shows 
deliberate indifference to the harmful consequences to others. 
I.C. § 6-904C(l). As discussed above, Plaintiff cannot show that Defendants had any duty to 
search through public records on Plaintiffs behalf, or mandatorily require that Plaintiff obtain a 
soil stability or geotechnical analysis on the defective property at issue. There is no issue of fact 
that a city or its employees is not "inescapably drawn to recognize a duty" to do something that 
Plaintiff could and should have done for himself, such as doing due diligence on a property. 
In order to establish reckless, willful and wanton conduct, Plaintiff will have to show that 
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the Defendants "knowingly [did] or fail[ ed] to do an act creating unreasonable risk of harm to 
another, and which involves a high degree of probability that such harm will result." I.C. § 6-
904C(2). As discussed above, Plaintiff has failed to provide any evidence connecting the City's 
actions with the slope movement and the economic loss Plaintiff has suffered. In order for there 
to be a "high degree of probability" that the slope movement would cause damage to Plaintiffs 
property, it would be necessary to know at a minimum what was causing the slope movement. 
Unless it is known what was causing the slope movement, it is impossible to determine that any 
action or inaction by the Defendants involves a high degree of probability that any harm would 
result. Further, it is impossible to show that the issuance of building permits, approving plats, 
inspecting or failing to inspect the property resulted in slope movement which damaged the 
houses. As discussed above, that defect was in the ground when Plaintiff bought the property. 
Until an in depth geotechnical survey is done, it cannot be known whether compacting 
foundations, building houses, digging pools, and installing retaining walls would have stabilized 
the property or not. Because no one knows what is causing the slope movement, know one can 
say whether in 2006 and 2007, when the City actions/inactions occurred regarding subdivision 
and construction, there was a high degree of probability that any damage would result. 
Therefore, Plaintiff cannot show, as a matter of law, that there was any reckless, willful and 
wanton conduct. 
IV. 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
Pursuant to I.C. § 6-911, Plaintiffs claims against the city are "forever barred, unless an 
action is begun within two (2) years after the date the claim arose or reasonably should have 
been discovered, whichever is later." Plaintiff has failed to meet the required statute of 
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limitations. 
According to the Complaint, Defendants' negligent acts all related to acts done before 
Plaintiff owned the property, or are related to the approval of subdivision plats and issuance of 
building permits. Complaint, ,-r 55. All of this was completed prior to May, 2007. Complaint, ,-r,-r 
14 16. With regard to the allegedly negligent acts performed by the Defendants prior to 
Plaintiffs purchase of the property, liability is barred by the statute of limitations. With regard to 
allegedly negligent acts committed by the Defendants after Plaintiff purchased the property, the 
Complaint was not filed until October 22, 2009. Under the circumstances of this case, where 
Plaintiff purchased a property with a defect in it, his damages arose immediately. Therefore, 
under Plaintiffs theory of the case, where the City should not have issued permits or approved 
plats, such claims are barred by the statute of limitations. 
There is no question but that Plaintiff was or reasonably should have been aware of the 
City's involvement prior to October, 2007. He admits that prior to construction, he knew that fill 
had been placed on the properties. Statement of Facts, ,-r 15. Plaintiff knew, at a minimum, that 
the property had previously been subdivided, and that the City retained records that had been 
provided to it related to such subdivisions. Plaintiff knew that the City had been involved in his 
own construction and subdivision process. None of the documents that Plaintiff is alleging that 
the City failed to tell him about were concealed from him. They were available for him to 
review, free of cost, pursuant to the Idaho Public Record laws, /.C. § 9-337, et seq., and he 
simply didn't go look. Particularly where the City has no policy of history of doing background 
research on properties for developers, it is reasonable for a developer or his engineer to do his 
own research. 
Based on the foregoing, all of Plaintiffs claims against the City are barred by the statute 
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of limitations outlined in I. C. § 6-911. 
v. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Defendants City of Lewiston and Lowell Cutshaw request that 
summary judgment be entered, and all claims against them be dismissed. 
DATED this Z L( day of June, 2011. 
ANDERSON, JULIAN & HULL LLP 
Brian K. Julian, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for City of Lewiston and 
Lowell J. Cutshaw, City Engineer 
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